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EDITING HUMANITY: ON THE PRECISE 
MANIPULATION OF DNA IN HUMAN 
EMBRYOS* 
PAUL ENRÍQUEZ** 
Genetically modified humans are among us. Emerging 
technologies for genome editing have launched humanity into the 
uncharted territory of modifying the human germline—namely, 
the reproductive cells and embryos that carry our genetic ancestry. 
Reports of the first live births of humans with edited genomes in 
China recently confirmed that the power to manipulate our genes 
at an embryonic stage is no longer theoretical. In the wake of 
enormous scientific progress, questions regarding how the law will 
treat this technological breakthrough abound.  
This Article examines the legality of human genome editing, 
specifically germline genome editing (“GGE”), from 
administrative and constitutional law perspectives. It argues that 
the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA” or “Agency”) 
forbearance in claiming jurisdiction over GGE is creating a 
perilous void for an emerging field of law. At the same time, the 
contemporary de facto legislative ban on GGE clinical 
applications, which categorically prohibits the Agency from 
evaluating the safety and efficacy of any investigational new drug 
or biological product application derived from the technology, is 
unnecessary and creates more societal costs than benefits. On a 
broad scale, the ban embodies poor public policy because it 
prevents the FDA from exercising jurisdiction over matters that 
constitute extensions of the Agency’s traditional regulatory scope. 
An analysis of the law reveals salient regulatory gaps that could be 
viewed as rendering some types of GGE beyond the FDA’s 
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regulatory reach. Notwithstanding those gaps, this Article argues 
that the FDA can work within the existing statutory framework to 
cure regulatory deficits and promulgate rules to regulate the 
technology and, thus, urges the FDA to exercise that jurisdiction. 
This Article ultimately demonstrates how law and policy converge 
into a proposed new regulatory paradigm for human GGE that 
flows from the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in United States v. 
Regenerative Sciences, LLC, which held that specific stem cell 
mixtures can be regulated as drugs or biological products within 
the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the 
Public Health Service Act. 
This Article further contends that efforts to ban GGE technologies 
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny in the long run because 
they impinge on a cognizable fundamental right that protects select 
uses of GGE. This fundamental right flows from jurisprudence in 
the areas of procreative, parental, and—to some extent—privacy 
rights, but it is not absolute. The Article presents an interpretive 
model for this body of jurisprudence in the GGE context, which 
promotes extrapolation of applicable legal principles that can 
guide and promote coherent public policy. Launching from this 
jurisprudential departing point, this Article introduces a novel 
legal- and science-based normative framework to delineate 
primary limits for a right to perform GGE based upon four 
distinct categories: (1) therapeutic uses to remedy disease; (2) 
prophylactic purposes, which may or may not be therapeutic; (3) 
cosmetic or enhancement purposes; and (4) uses involving 
modification of traits that raise concerns of discrimination already 
prohibited by the law. This conceptual and structural approach 
outlines a legal blueprint for GGE clinical interventions, but more 
importantly it circumvents problems that dominate the existing 
literature, which arise from the conventional tendency to group 
GGE applications into therapeutic uses on one hand, and 
enhancements on the other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the Second International Summit on Human 
Genome Editing2 in November 2018, news broke about the first 
reported live births of human twins whose genomes had been edited.3 
The development follows a stream of recent scientific advances that 
collectively constitute a revolution concerning “the rational and 
deliberate manipulation of the genetic composition” of living 
 
 1. The print version of this Article contains only black-and-white figures. Color figures 
can be found in the online version of this Article, which can be accessed at the North 
Carolina Law Review’s website, https://www.northcarolinalawreview.org. 
 2. Genome editing is an umbrella term that refers to “scientific technological advances 
that enable rational genetic engineering—at a local (gene) or global (genome) level—to 
facilitate precise insertion, removal, or substitution of fragments of Deoxyribonucleic acid 
[(“DNA”)] molecules, comprising one or more nucleotides .	 .	 . into the cell(s) of an 
organism’s genome.” Paul Enríquez, Genome Editing and the Jurisprudence of Scientific 
Empiricism, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 617 (2017) (footnotes omitted). The term 
“genome editing” has often been used interchangeably with gene editing, genetic 
engineering, gene targeting, and other related terms. Id. at 617 n.53.  
 3. Jon Cohen, After Last Week’s Shock, Scientists Scramble to Prevent More Gene-
Edited Babies, SCIENCE (Dec. 4, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/
news/2018/12/after-last-weeks-shock-scientists-scramble-prevent-more-gene-edited-babies 
[https://perma.cc/2KQC-PU7C]. 
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organisms.4 The engine at the core of this molecular revolution is a 
breakthrough, now commonly known as CRISPR—an acronym that 
refers to the system of Clustered, Regularly Interspaced, Short, 
Palindromic Repeats and CRISPR-associated (Cas) proteins.5 
At the Human Genome Editing Summit, He Jiankui, a researcher 
from the Southern University of Science and Technology in Shenzhen, 
China, confirmed reports that he had performed genome editing on 
viable human embryos using CRISPR–Cas9.6 The experiments, which 
led to the birth of the world’s first gene-edited babies, sought to edit a 
fragment of the CCR5 locus that encodes a protein receptor involved 
in HIV resistance in humans.7 He Jiankui performed the clinical trial 
in virtually complete secrecy, and his subsequent disclosure sent shock 
waves throughout the world.8 
To be clear, He Jiankui’s experiments to edit human embryos for 
clinical use were largely predictable. Another Chinese study published 
three years earlier amid similar controversy reported the first instance 
of human embryo editing to correct a genetic mutation.9 The 
distinction between that study and the one conducted by He Jiankui 
primarily concerns the quality of the embryos used. The former had 
experimented with embryos incapable of leading to a pregnancy,10 
whereas the latter edited healthy embryos that ultimately led to 
implantation in a woman’s uterus and the live birth of twins.11  
The logical leap between the two Chinese experiments was not 
large. After all, the same type of experiments had already been 
 
 4. Paul Enríquez, CRISPR GMOs, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 432, 435 (2017); see also 
Enríquez, supra note 2, at 632 (providing a short list of living organisms that have been 
modified using CRISPR-based genome-editing technology).  
 5. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 607. CRISPR is an adaptive immunity system that occurs 
naturally in bacteria and archaea. It has been repurposed for targeted genome editing by 
scientists. See id. at 629–31. For a brief overview of CRISPR–Cas systems, including the 
popular CRISPR–Cas9 genome-editing platform used to edit the genomes of the first 
genetically edited humans, see id. at 628–33.  
 6. Statement, Francis S. Collins, Dir., Nat’l Insts. of Health, Statement on Claim of 
First Gene-Edited Babies by Chinese Researcher (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nih.gov/about-
nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-claim-first-gene-edited-babies-chinese-
researcher [https://perma.cc/RW3Q-BWDV].  
 7. Id.; Cohen, supra note 3; see also infra Figure 5. 
 8. See Statement, Francis S. Collins, supra note 6; Cohen, supra note 3. 
 9. Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear 
Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363, 363–64 (2015). For an overview of the results of the study 
as well as its implications, see Enríquez, supra note 2, at 664–67.  
 10. See Liang et al., supra note 9, at 364. 
 11. Cohen, supra note 3. 
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reported in monkeys and numerous other animal species.12 Indeed, the 
birth of a genetically edited human had been a forgone conclusion13 
since 2012, following the debut of CRISPR–Cas9 (Figure 1) as a 
molecular tool repurposed for programmable genome editing.14 
Predictability and inevitability, however, did not soften the blow 
generated by the realization that it took humans only six years from the 
advent of an emerging technology to achieve what had been impossible 
for thousands of years before.15 
In the aftermath of the births of the first gene-edited babies, calls 
for permanent or temporary bans on the use of technologies intended 
for genome editing have surfaced.16 Critics of the experiments claim 
that editing the human germline—sperm, eggs, zygotes, and 
embryos17—is immoral, unethical, and will lead humans down a 
dangerous path.18 At the same time, gene editing of somatic cells—
differentiated cells, not including the germline19—is underway to 
 
 12. See, e.g., Yuyu Niu et al., Generation of Gene-Modified Cynomolgus Monkey via 
Cas9/RNA-Mediated Gene Targeting in One-Cell Embryos, 156 CELL 836, 836–37 (2014).  
 13. See Enríquez, supra note 2, at 664 (“Genome editing in human germ cells was 
largely predictable in light of the successes of germline editing in a plethora of animal and 
plant species [in recent] years. .	.	. In principle, manipulation of the human germline is not 
much different than germline manipulation in other species.”); see also Edward Lanphier et 
al., Don’t Edit the Human Germline, 519 NATURE 410, 410 (2015) (advocating for a 
complete ban on human GGE in response to news about the study Liang and colleagues 
performed on nonviable human embryos in China); Liang et al., supra note 9, at 363–64 
(reporting results from the first experiments to edit nonviable human embryos); Lichun 
Tang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human Zygotes Using Cas9 Protein, 
292 MOLECULAR GENETICS & GENOMICS 525, 525 (2017) (presenting results from 
experiments to edit viable human embryos). 
 14. See Martin Jinek et al., A Programmable Dual-RNA–Guided DNA Endonuclease 
in Adaptive Bacterial Immunity, 337 SCIENCE 816, 820 (2012) (concluding that CRISPR–
Cas9 “could offer considerable potential for gene-targeting and genome-editing 
applications”). 
 15. See Enríquez, supra note 2, at 607 (“A quantum leap in genome editing capabilities 
has led us to the Rubicon of precise, endogenous, genetic manipulation—one originally 
envisioned decades ago, yet methodologically beyond reach for prior generations of 
scientists.” (footnote omitted)). 
 16. See, e.g., UNESCO Panel of Experts Calls for Ban on “Editing” of Human DNA to 
Avoid Unethical Tampering with Hereditary Traits, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/news/
unesco-panel-experts-calls-ban-editing-human-dna-avoid-unethical-tampering-hereditary-
traits [https://perma.cc/Y6JJ-54W8]. 
 17. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 664. 
 18. See, e.g., Marc A. Thiessen, Gene Editing Is Here. It’s an Enormous Threat., WASH. 
POST (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gene-editing-is-here-its-an-
enormous-threat/2018/11/29/78190c96-f401-11e8-bc79-68604ed88993_story.html?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.d949dc81d002 [https://perma.cc/S85U-KB24]. 
 19. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 633. 
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address various unmet needs in human therapeutics.20 But criticisms of 
the potential use of human germline genome editing (“GGE”) clinical 
applications vastly overlook the advantages of germline modification, 
especially when compared to interventions for somatic genome 
editing.21 
 
 20. See Damian Garde, FDA Signs Off on Editas CRISPR Study on Patients with a Rare 
Genetic Disorder, STAT (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/11/30/editas-
crispr-trial/ [https://perma.cc/6B92-6AZU]. 
 21. See Enríquez, supra note 2, at 668 (pointing out that human GGE offers “greater 
prospects for human health and welfare than somatic” interventions because GGE can be 
used to correct genetic aberrations and prevent their transmission to an individual’s 
progeny); see also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: 
SCIENCE, ETHICS, & GOVERNANCE 111, 113–16 (Rona Briere & Helaine Resnick eds., 
2017) [hereinafter NASEM REPORT] (stating that human GGE can potentially alleviate 
emotional, financial, and other types of burdens that families experience as a result of the 
transmission of serious genetic diseases). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019) 
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Figure 1. Structural Representation of the CRISPR–Cas9 Enzyme in 
Complex with Target Double-Stranded DNA and a Single-Guide 
RNA (sgRNA)22 
 
The x-ray, three-dimensional structure (left) of the CRISPR–
Cas9 endonuclease (gray) bound to an sgRNA (orange) and 
double-stranded DNA (blue) captures the macromolecular 
complex as it primes for DNA cleavage. The green spheres 
represent the two active-site residues indispensable for Cas9 
catalytic activity (Aspartate 10, on the right; Histidine 840, on the 
 
 22. The figure was adapted from Paul Enríquez, Epigenome Editing, in EPIGENETICS 
AND CHROMATIN (forthcoming 2019), https://www.intechopen.com/online-first/epigenome-
editing [https://perma.cc/XG6R-QMGJ]. The structural model was built using the atomic 
coordinates deposited in the Protein Data Bank, accession code 5F9R. 5F9R, PROTEIN 
DATA BANK, https://www.rcsb.org/structure/5F9R [https://perma.cc/Y9FW-W4SG]. For an 
overview of the mechanisms by which CRISPR–Cas9 detects and cleaves its target DNA, 
see Fuguo Jiang & Jennifer A. Doudna, CRISPR–Cas9 Structures and Mechanisms, 46 ANN. 
REV. BIOPHYSICS 505, 516–21 (2017). 
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left). The cartoon representation of the complex is shown on the 
right.  
A panel of the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine (“NASEM”) recently published a report outlining 
certain recommendations for genome editing in the human germline.23 
The report recommended that human germline editing clinical trials 
should proceed only if they seek to prevent serious diseases or 
conditions for which no reasonable alternatives exist and the trials are 
subject to rigorous oversight and transparency regarding their safety 
and efficacy.24 
Although NASEM recommendations outline a potential path 
forward for translating human GGE technologies to the clinical setting, 
they are not without potential flaws.25 And a large void currently exists 
regarding how the law will treat this emerging technology, particularly 
given that the technology exists in the context of an increasingly 
globalized and interconnected world where cultures do not always 
share the same values.26 
 
 23. See generally NASEM REPORT, supra note 21 (considering critical questions 
regarding genome editing in the human germline, providing conclusions on the need for 
public education and engagement on that issue, and recommending principles for governing 
human genome editing). 
 24. Id. at 7–8. 
 25. For instance, the panel recommended that there should be “ongoing, rigorous 
oversight during clinical trials of the effects of the procedure on the health and safety of the 
research participants” as well as “comprehensive plans for long-term, multigenerational 
follow-up that still respect personal autonomy.” Id. at 8. However, long-term and 
multigenerational monitoring can be achieved only with the consent of participants, who 
may wish to revoke consent at any point following the birth of gene-edited offspring. In a 
recent study involving the birth of a human baby via mitochondrial replacement therapy, 
which is colloquially known as an intervention involving “three-parent embryos,” see 
Françoise Baylis, The Ethics of Creating Children with Three Genetic Parents, 26 REPROD. 
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 531, 532 (2013), the parents decided not to submit their child for 
mitochondrial DNA load retesting after the initial testing performed at birth “unless there 
[would be] a clinical benefit,” John Zhang et al., Live Birth Derived from Oocyte Spindle 
Transfer to Prevent Mitochondrial Disease, 34 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 361, 367 
(2017) (reporting the first live birth of a human baby via mitochondrial replacement 
therapy—a type of germline intervention—to prevent transmission of mutations in 
mitochondrial DNA). The researchers’ goals of monitoring the baby every three months in 
the first year, every six months in the second year, and every year after the third year of age 
depend largely on the parents’ willingness to permit such monitoring. See id. And the goal 
of assessing the baby’s “fertility function” after age eighteen will depend on the consent of 
the adult individual at that point. See id. 
 26. See Paul Enríquez, Deconstructing Transnationalism: Conceptualizing 
Metanationalism as a Putative Model of Evolving Jurisprudence, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1265, 1289–91, 1336 (2010). For instance, laws related to the genetic modification of the 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019) 
1156 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
Much has been written about human cloning and somatic cell gene 
therapy from diverse perspectives in the last three decades.27 More 
 
human germline are permissive in Mexico, Japan, and China and slightly more restrictive in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., R. Isasi, E. Kleiderman & B.M. 
Knoppers, Editing Policy to Fit the Genome?, 351 SCIENCE 337, 337–38 (2016); Cohen, supra 
note 3; David Cyranoski, Japan Set to Allow Gene Editing in Human Embryos, NATURE 
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06847-7 [https://perma.cc/
UA9Y-BYJ2]. Meanwhile, other countries like Canada and Germany have instituted broad 
bans on human germline manipulations. Isasi et al., supra, at 337. 
 27. See generally LEROY WALTERS & JULIE GAGE PALMER, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN 
GENE THERAPY (1997) (exploring some ethical questions raised by gene-therapy 
interventions); Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 
21 J. LEGAL MED. 35 (2000) (discussing how human cloning and other reproductive 
technologies raise some cultural, religious, ethical, and legal issues); Judith Areen, 
Regulating Human Gene Therapy, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 153 (1985) (considering possible ways 
to regulate human gene therapy); Timothy Caulfield, Human Cloning Laws, Human 
Dignity and the Poverty of the Policy Making Dialogue, 4 BMC MED. ETHICS, no. 3, July 29, 
2003, at 1 (criticizing the use of “human dignity” as an ethical justification for human cloning 
laws); Vernon J. Ehlers, The Case Against Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 523 (1999) 
(advocating a legislative ban on human cloning primarily based on social and moral 
grounds); Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42 
ARIZ. L. REV. 647 (2000) (discussing some constitutional implications associated with 
technologies for human cloning); Russell Korobkin, Stem Cell Research and the Cloning 
Wars, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 161 (2007) (arguing that a ban on human cloning would 
have a negative impact on the advancement of stem cell research that could lead to 
substantial medical breakthroughs); Tony McGleenan, Human Gene Therapy and Slippery 
Slope Arguments, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 350 (1995) (rejecting slippery slope arguments about 
human gene therapy and arguing that “moral line-drawing” aspects of the technology 
should be the focus instead); Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic 
Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (1999) (exploring potential regulatory 
mechanisms to govern gene therapy and other reproductive technologies); David 
Orentlicher, Cloning and the Preservation of Family Integrity, 59 LA. L. REV. 1019 (1999) 
(arguing that human cloning as a reproductive method could be beneficial and should not 
be banned, as it would permit infertile couples and single persons to reproduce without 
involving “undesired” individuals); Eric A. Posner & Richard A. Posner, The Demand for 
Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 579 (1999) (evaluating the potential demand for 
human cloning from an economic perspective while focusing on the private benefits and 
social costs of the technology); David Resnik, Debunking the Slippery Slope Argument 
Against Human Germ-Line Gene Therapy, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 23 (1994) (arguing that 
genetic enhancement via the use of gene therapy would be neither immoral nor unjust if it 
were governed by appropriate regulations and accompanied by adequate education); John 
A. Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333 
(1982) [hereinafter Robertson, The Right to Procreate] (explaining that prenatal gene 
therapy would be desirable and, in some cases, required under the law); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987 (2002) (arguing that no right 
to clone for reproductive purposes exists under the Constitution); LeRoy Walters, Human 
Gene Therapy: Ethics and Public Policy, 2 HUM. GENE THERAPY 115 (1991) (stating that 
because a consensus had formed regarding the social and moral legitimacy of somatic cell 
gene therapy for curing disease, it was time to begin formal discussions about germline gene 
therapy); Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is There a 
Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1998) (dismissing some ethical concerns 
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recently, a body of ethics-based scholarship has focused on germline 
genetic modification from moral, egalitarian, and other societal 
perspectives, primarily in the context of whether it is appropriate for 
humans to modify the genome of future generations.28 However, the 
legal scholarship on the implications of modern methods to perform 
genome editing in the human germline—namely, (1) the extent to 
which existing laws address GGE regulatory issues; (2) whether any 
constitutional rights as to GGE may exist; and (3) what specific legal- 
and science-based structural schemes, if any, should be implemented at 
this point in time to promote or hinder GGE technological 
development—is remarkably thin. 
In panoramic scope, this Article examines the legality of human 
genome editing and, more specifically, GGE with the overarching goal 
of closing salient gaps in this emerging field of legal scholarship. To 
that end, this Article makes three distinct contributions that, 
collectively, outline a legal- and science-based blueprint that 
deconstructs the nuances inherent in various uses of genome editing 
for targeted manipulation of the genetic composition of the human 
germline. Above all, the Article outlines an approach that ameliorates 
intractable problems that often arise from the conventional tendency 
 
about human cloning as immaterial because married couples purportedly have a 
constitutional right to use the technology for reproductive purposes). 
 28. See generally Carolyn Brokowski & Mazhar Adli, CRISPR Ethics: Moral 
Considerations for Applications of a Powerful Tool, 431 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 88 (2019) 
(reviewing CRISPR-based technologies from ethical and moral perspectives); I. Glenn 
Cohen, What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Human Enhancement? What (If Anything) Is 
Right with It?, 49 TULSA L. REV. 645 (2012) (exploring issues related to human 
enhancement); Marcy Darnovsky, A Slippery Slope to Human Germline Modification, 499 
NATURE 127 (2013) (arguing in favor of a moratorium on mitochondrial-replacement 
procedures because they are a type of germline modification that raises social and ethical 
concerns); John C. Fletcher & W. French Anderson, Germ-Line Gene Therapy: A New Stage 
of Debate, 20 J.L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 26 (1992) (providing an overview of some ethical 
and social debates related to germline gene-therapy research); Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, 
and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1135 (arguing that the FDA’s approval process is not suited for proper 
evaluation of ethical and moral aspects related to biotechnologies for human enhancement); 
Eric Lander et al., Adopt a Moratorium on Heritable Genome Editing, 567 NATURE 165 
(2019) (advocating for a global moratorium on human germline clinical uses due to societal, 
ethical, moral, and technical considerations); Edward Lanphier et al., supra note 13, at 411 
(advocating for a moratorium on human GGE because it “could start us down a path 
towards non-therapeutic genetic enhancement” that raises ethical concerns); S. Matthew 
Liao, Designing Humans: A Human Rights Approach, 33 BIOETHICS 98 (2019) (proposing 
an ethics-based, human rights approach to assess the ethics of genetic engineering for 
reproductive purposes); Janet Rossant, Gene Editing in Human Development: Ethical 
Concerns and Practical Applications, DEVELOPMENT (SPECIAL ISSUE), Aug. 2018, at 1 
(stating that GGE tools have raised ethical concerns). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019) 
1158 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
to group GGE applications into therapeutic uses on one hand and 
enhancements on the other. That outdated model is inefficient and 
susceptible to analytical derailments stemming from awkward attempts 
to fit therapeutic, eugenical, and so-called “designer baby”29 
enhancements into a single doctrinal model. Positing a “therapeutic” 
and “enhancement” dichotomy also perpetuates a basic 
misunderstanding of reproductive technologies and breeds an 
environment for “deceptive simplicity.”30 
The first contribution centers on the intersection of GGE and 
administrative law, particularly in the context of executive authority 
under existing law to regulate GGE technological advances. 
Specifically, the Article focuses on the FDA’s jurisdictional powers as 
the agency in charge of “protecting the public health by ensuring the 
safety, efficacy, and security of human .	.	. drugs, biological products, 
and medical devices,”31 and its current role in shepherding scientific 
discoveries into the clinical realm. However, GGE research involving 
human embryos is also currently susceptible to regulation pursuant to 
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment,32 the oversight of the National 
 
 29. The term “designer baby” has taken root in popular culture, but it is far from helpful 
in the context of discussing assisted reproductive technologies and their societal 
implications. This inapplicability is due primarily to the fact that the term is frequently and 
sensationally associated with phenotypic preferences that are technologically impracticable. 
See Enríquez, supra note 2, at 676, 678 nn.504 & 506. A common scientific misperception 
concerns the notion that technological advances bestow upon humankind the ability to 
engineer humans in a petri dish who exhibit superior beauty, athletic prowess, tall stature, 
enhanced musical ability and intelligence, etc.—none of which are practicable with the use 
of current technology. See id. 
 30. The term “deceptive simplicity” refers to “preposterous, impractical, or 
sensationalist claims .	.	. concerning issues raised by technological advances.” Id. at 672. 
 31. What We Do, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/default.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8H8A-6SK9]. 
 32. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment prohibits the Department of Health and Human 
Services (“DHHS”) from using appropriated funds on “research in which a human embryo 
or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death 
greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero.” Balanced Budget Downpayment 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, §	 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996). The Amendment was passed by 
Congress in 1996 and signed into law by President Clinton. It has exerted a significant 
inhibitory effect on the generation of new stem cell lines despite continuous funding for 
research on already-existing cell lines. See Russell A. Spivak, I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. 
Adashi, Germ-Line Gene Editing and Congressional Reaction in Context: Learning from 
Almost 50 Years of Congressional Reactions to Biomedical Breakthroughs, 30 J.L. & 
HEALTH 20, 30 (2017). 
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Institutes of Health (the “NIH”),33 and other regulations related to 
assisted reproductive technologies.34 
At its core, the Article’s first contribution proposes a new 
regulatory path for GGE that flows from the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in 
United States v. Regenerative Sciences, LLC,35 which held that specific 
stem cell mixtures can be regulated as drugs or biological products 
within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”) and the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”).36 The 
approach reinforces FDA jurisdiction over GGE products and 
therapies. 
The second contribution focuses on GGE and constitutional law. 
It surveys the due process and equal protection landscape through a—
mostly—descriptive lens to identify a cognizable fundamental right to 
select uses of GGE under the Constitution.37 Such a fundamental right 
 
 33. See, e.g., NASEM REPORT, supra note 21, at 130–31 (discussing NIH oversight over 
federally funded research via its Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (“RAC”) and 
the use of local Institutional Review Boards and Institutional Biosafety Committees). See 
generally NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING 
RECOMBINANT OR SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES (2016), 
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/NIH_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HX4L-JT9F] (outlining the safety considerations, experimental protocols, and 
responsibilities required for conducting clinical investigations under NIH guidelines). It 
should be noted that in August 2018, the NIH announced it “will no longer accept new 
human gene transfer protocols for the protocol registration process under the NIH 
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH 
Guidelines), or convene the RAC to review individual human gene transfer protocols.” 
Statement, Francis S. Collins, Dir., Nat’l Insts. of Health, Statement on Modernizing Human 
Gene Therapy Oversight (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-
director/statements/statement-modernizing-human-gene-therapy-oversight [https://perma.cc/
37TG-GGK8]; see also Amendments to Streamline Review of Gene Therapy Trials and 
Transform the RAC to NExTRAC – April 2019, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, 
https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/nih-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/JUS9-DDTT]. 
 34. The FDA may also regulate GGE under provisions applicable to assisted 
reproductive technologies (“ART”), which relate to the handling of gametes and embryos. 
See 42 U.S.C. §	263a-1(a)–(c) (2012). For a general overview of ART regulations in the 
United States, see generally David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies in the United States, 78 FERTILITY & STERILITY 932 (2002). 
 35. 741 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 36. Id. at 1317. 
 37. See discussion infra Part II. A putative fundamental right to perform select GGE 
interventions articulated in this Article should not be confused with the unrecognized rights 
of terminally ill patients to access unapproved drugs, see United States v. Rutherford, 442 
U.S. 544, 546 (1979) (finding no constitutional right to try “a drug not recognized as ‘safe 
and effective’”), or access “a potentially toxic drug with no proven therapeutic benefit,” 
Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 
713 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Abigail, for example, rejected a presumptive right of a terminally ill 
patient desperately in need of a curative treatment to use a drug that could potentially 
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flows from jurisprudence in the areas of procreative, parental 
autonomy, and—to some extent—privacy rights, but it is not absolute.38 
 
hasten death. Id. This Article does not advocate that parents should assert a “right to try” 
GGE because there are no alternatives to conceiving a healthy child. To the contrary, this 
Article extensively links the FDA’s role in establishing the safety and efficacy of drugs and 
biological products to the GGE context. See discussion infra Part I. This Article argues, 
however, that once safety and efficacy of select GGE interventions are established, which 
probably will occur at some point in the near future, the government likely cannot 
categorically ban access to the technology. 
Unlike the distribution of unapproved drugs, research in human embryos is legal—at 
least when performed without the use of public funds. Drug manufacturers may not legally 
test unapproved drugs without FDA oversight, but little currently prevents geneticists, 
fertility specialists, and other researchers from continuing to test, refine, and develop GGE 
technologies for use in early-stage embryos. See, e.g., Hong Ma et al., Correction of a 
Pathogenic Gene Mutation in Human Embryos, 548 NATURE 413, 413 (2017) (correcting 
pathogenic heritable mutations in human embryos via GGE). This marks a fundamental 
distinction between the right-to-try cases and GGE technologies. Scientists in the United 
States and abroad are conducting research in human and animal embryos to address current 
limitations of genome-editing technologies, which will lead to more precise genome-editing 
tools to make GGE safe and effective. At some point in the future, the only impediment to 
clinical use of GGE may be the current legislative ban on FDA review of Investigational 
New Drug Applications and Biologic Licensing Applications for GGE purposes. See infra 
Section I.D. But such a ban may not withstand the pressures of rapid and continuous 
scientific advances that lead to precise, safe, and effective GGE. 
 38. This Article builds upon the influential scholarship of the late John A. Robertson, 
who was a pioneer in the fields of law, bioethics, and reproductive rights. Throughout 
various works, Robertson proposed that “principles of reproductive freedom and family 
autonomy appear to support a presumptive liberty right to obtain and use genetic 
information in making reproductive decisions.” John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of 
Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 422 (1996) [hereinafter Robertson, Genetic 
Selection]; see also John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The 
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 955–56 (1986). See 
generally JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994) (examining legal, ethical, and social implications 
of reproductive technologies through the lens of an individual’s procreative liberty); John 
A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive 
Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490 (2008) (exploring reproductive freedom in genetic 
and offspring selection); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 
AM. J.L. & MED. 439 (2003) (discussing challenges presented by the use of genomic 
information in reproduction); Robertson, The Right to Procreate, supra note 27 (arguing 
that prenatal gene therapy would be desirable and, in some cases, required under the law). 
Robertson believed that the use of genetic technology to make certain prebirth 
decisions is “an essential aspect of an individual’s procreative liberty, and that the harms 
thought to flow from prebirth selection decisions are insufficient to justify interference with 
them.” Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra, at 468. “Individuals, not government or third 
parties, are the best judge of whether [a particular package of reproductive burdens and 
benefits] is in their own best interest.” Id. at 469. Robertson’s thinking on the fundamental 
status of reproductive choices has influenced subsequent scholarly works, including this 
Article. 
Although Robertson’s scholarship has helped to pave the road for a potential, 
cognizable constitutional right to select offspring genetic modifications in some contexts, 
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Here, the Article builds upon existing scholarship and presents an 
interpretive model for this body of jurisprudence in the GGE context,39 
which promotes extrapolation of applicable legal principles that can 
guide and promote coherent public policy. 
The final contribution merges the foregoing analysis to expand the 
literature and propose a novel legal- and science-based normative 
framework to delineate primordial limits for a right to perform GGE 
based upon four categories: (1) therapeutic uses to remedy disease; (2) 
prophylactic purposes, which may or may not be therapeutic; (3) 
cosmetic or enhancement purposes; and (4) uses involving 
modification of traits that raise concerns of discrimination already 
prohibited by the law. This conceptual and structural approach outlines 
a legal blueprint for a path to GGE clinical interventions. It also aims 
to encourage scholarly and public discussions about whether, and the 
extent to which, editing the genetic composition of the human germline 
should be permitted, and in some instances protected—a subject 
arguably among the most significant and consequential of this 
generation.  
This Article is divided into three main parts. Part I analyzes GGE 
through an administrative law lens. Section I.A provides a brief history 
of federal public-health and consumer-protection laws in the United 
 
the bulk of his literature was published well before the advent of genome-editing 
technologies, which have recently been used to modify the human germline. Accordingly, 
this Article helps to reintroduce and adapt some of his scholarship to the modern age of 
genome editing and expands the literature to the GGE context. More importantly, this 
Article goes beyond the existing literature to not only corroborate principles embedded in 
the Constitution that likely give rise to a fundamental right to perform GGE in select 
contexts but also to propose the creation of a normative framework that delineates clear 
and specific limits for such a constitutional right, which is currently lacking in the legal 
literature. Cf. Jason C. Glahn, I Teach You the Superman: Why Congress Cannot 
Constitutionally Prohibit Genetic Modification, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 433–34 (2003) 
(making similar constitutional arguments that Robertson articulated in his scholarship 
without specifying any potential limitations applicable to a right of genetic modification); 
Tandice Ossareh, Note, Would You Like Blue Eyes with That? A Fundamental Right to 
Genetic Modification of Embryos, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 729, 756, 758 (2017) (arguing that 
from a constitutional standpoint, a “truly reflective and full description” of a right to genetic 
modification “should assert a right to privacy against state interference to make decisions 
central to procreation and to parenting,” while noting that “drawing [an] exact line” to mark 
the limits of a right to genetic modification for therapeutic or enhancement uses was 
“beyond the scope” of the paper (footnotes omitted)); Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra, 
at 475 (arguing that positive alterations to the genetic composition of biological offspring 
may be protected by the Constitution, while acknowledging—at that point in time—that “as 
a practical matter [such alterations were] so speculative and so distant in the future that 
precise predictions about their ultimate status [were] difficult”). 
 39. See supra note 38. 
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States, leading to the establishment and expansion of the FDA’s 
jurisdiction over various aspects of public health.40 Section I.B then 
examines the emergence of FDA oversight of somatic cell gene 
therapy, which has established precedents applicable to GGE.41 By 
examining existing laws applicable to gene therapy, this section 
identifies potential regulatory gaps that could be viewed as rendering 
some types of GGE beyond the FDA’s regulatory reach, but contends 
that any such gaps are the product of the FDA’s forbearance in 
claiming jurisdiction of GGE.42 
Section I.C proposes a novel regulatory path for GGE that flows 
from the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Regenerative Sciences, which held that 
specific stem cell mixtures can be regulated as drugs or biological 
products within the meaning of the FDCA and the PHSA.43 The 
approach identifies potential classifications for GGE products and 
reinforces FDA jurisdiction over GGE products and therapies.  
Finally, Section I.D argues against the current de facto legislative 
ban on GGE clinical applications, in which human embryos undergo 
intentional genomic modification. This Article asserts that such a ban 
is unnecessary because it creates more societal costs than benefits and 
prevents the FDA from (1) carrying out its mission to protect the public 
health by ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs, biological products, 
and medical devices and (2) exercising full jurisdictional power over an 
area that is a mere extension of what has traditionally been subject to 
regulation by the Agency. 
Taken as a whole, Part I provides a legal foundation to support 
the view that the FDA is well equipped to address the challenges of 
regulating emerging technologies intended for GGE—particularly 
from safety and efficacy standpoints—that fall within the scope of its 
jurisdiction. 
Part II of this Article contends that permanent legislative or 
administrative bans on GGE cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny 
and will likely succumb to litigation because they impinge on a 
cognizable fundamental right that protects select uses of GGE. This 
fundamental right flows from jurisprudence in the areas of procreative, 
parental, and—to some extent—privacy rights, but it is not absolute.44 
 
 40. See infra discussion Section I.A. 
 41. See infra discussion Section I.B. 
 42. See infra discussion Section I.B.2. 
 43. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 44. See infra discussion Sections II.A–C. 
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This part examines GGE in the context of an enduring, and often 
contentious, debate regarding the methodological framework under 
which the Constitution should be interpreted. The Article 
acknowledges the interpretive dichotomy that surrounds the 
invocation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments45 to adjudicate cases and controversies under Article III 
of the Constitution. Whether the extant body of substantive due 
process jurisprudence is proper when viewed through the lenses of 
originalism and nonoriginalism, however, is beyond the scope of this 
Article. And no position on the issue is taken herein.46 Accordingly, 
Sections II.A–C undertake a—mostly—descriptive, rather than 
normative, analysis of the existing jurisprudence in this area of the law. 
Section II.D briefly examines Roe v. Wade47 and its progeny to 
argue that although issues related to abortion and GGE may appear 
intertwined at first glance, Roe’s brand of substantive due process is 
likely to be of little significance in the GGE realm.48 Section II.E then 
highlights a crucial role for framing a question centered on the right to 
perform GGE and provides examples of the types of questions that 
may come for review before the courts.49 Overall, Part II concludes that 
current precedents in substantive due process and equal protection 
jurisprudence collectively pave a path for the recognition of a right to 
perform GGE in select contexts. 
Part III shifts gears to articulate a normative framework consisting 
of four distinct categories of GGE: (1) therapeutic uses to remedy 
disease; (2) prophylactic purposes, which may or may not be 
therapeutic; (3) cosmetic or enhancement purposes; and (4) uses 
involving modification of traits that raise concerns of discrimination 
already prohibited the law.50 The four-category spectrum suggested 
here facilitates creation of initial boundaries for GGE and outlines a 
legal blueprint. Under this approach, Category 1 GGE purposes are 
permitted and constitute a fundamental right; their prohibition cannot 
withstand strict constitutional scrutiny. Conversely, Category 4 GGE 
 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person .	.	. be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .	 .	 .	 .”); id. amend. XIV, §	1 (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .	.	.	.”). 
 46. See infra text accompanying notes 273–77. 
 47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 48. See infra discussion Section II.D. 
 49. See infra discussion Section II.E. 
 50. See infra discussion Sections III.A–D. 
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uses are prohibited because they create a likelihood of discrimination 
against specific groups and are not constitutionally justifiable. 
Lastly, Part III of this Article explains that, from a scientific 
standpoint, many GGE applications that fall within the sphere of 
Categories 2 and 3 involve uncharacterized and complex associations 
between multiple genetic targets.51 Thus, it is unlikely that the 
technology to address such types of GGE interventions will be ready 
for clinical use in the near future. Time currently favors the creation of 
a rational and robust legal approach to GGE. Accordingly, because 
Categories 2 and 3 concern GGE uses that are not technologically 
feasible at this time—and perhaps may not be even in the near future—
premature laws and regulations concerning the sanction or prohibition 
of GGE prophylactic, cosmetic, and enhancement interventions should 
be avoided. 
I.  REGULATION OF GERMLINE GENOME EDITING 
A. Food and Drug Administration Jurisdiction 
The FDA is the federal agency within the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services “responsible for protecting the public 
health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human .	.	. drugs, 
biological products, and medical devices.”52 It is the “oldest 
comprehensive [federal] consumer protection agency” in the United 
States.53 The history of the Agency is replete with important lessons 
relevant to the discussion of GGE and other emerging technologies. 
The Agency’s past highlights the significance of balancing the federal 
government’s goal of ensuring consumer protection in the marketplace 
and the private sector’s opposition to regulatory reform in various 
contexts.54 It also brings into focus the pivotal role of public opinion in 
shifting the fulcrum when government or corporate malfeasance 
disturbs such balance.55  
 
 51. See infra discussion Sections III.B–C. 
 52. What We Do, supra note 31. 
 53. The History of FDA’s Fight for Consumer Protection and Public Health, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/default.htm [https://perma.cc/HDK9-RXJV] 
[hereinafter Fight for Consumer Protection]. 
 54. See discussion infra Sections I.A.1–3. 
 55. See discussion infra Sections I.A.1–3. See generally, e.g., Carol Ballentine, Taste of 
Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER, June 
1981, reprinted in SULFANILAMIDE DISASTER, https://www.fda.gov/media/110479/
download [https://perma.cc/DZR4-UCJT] (noting that the 1937 Elixir of Sulfanilamide drug 
scandal increased the jurisdictional powers of the FDA); Michelle Meadows, A Century of 
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Above all, the FDA’s history showcases, in principle, the 
separation of powers in our democratic system. Over the past century, 
Congress has enacted laws that granted new and broad regulatory 
powers to the administrative agency. The executive agency has then 
promulgated rules56 under its statutory mandates and sought to enforce 
perceived violations of the laws. And the judiciary has either endorsed 
or checked the Agency’s power by interpreting the regulations in the 
context of cases or controversies under Article III of the Constitution.57 
Setting the proper historical context also provides an opportunity 
to learn from past mistakes and take proactive steps toward adequate 
regulation of emerging technologies. Accordingly, the next section 
examines why Congress has consolidated federal oversight within the 
FDA to regulate the food and drug industries and how the FDA has 
become one of the quintessential consumer-protection watchdog 
agencies. This backdrop of the FDA’s status as the consumer-
protection federal agency tasked with ensuring safety and efficacy of 
drugs, biological products, and medical devices underscores the notion 
that the FDA is well suited to regulate GGE and GGE-related 
emerging technologies. 
1.  Administrative Antecedents 
The FDA’s inception can be traced back to 1839 when Congress 
appropriated funds to the Patent Office for agricultural purposes, 
including the “collection of agricultural statistics.”58 The congressional 
appropriations subsequently led to the creation of a chemical 
 
Ensuring Safe Foods and Cosmetics, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 6 (chronicling the 
effects induced by public outrage in the 1906 meat-packing scandal on the jurisdictional 
powers of the FDA). 
 56. It bears pointing out that some scholars have noted—with light discomfort—that 
administrative agencies, including the FDA, are increasingly relying on the issuance of 
nonbinding guidance documents and other less formal administrative tools to implement 
their statutory authority, while shifting away from the promulgation of binding rules. See, 
e.g., Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 
NEB. L. REV. 89, 90 (2014). 
 57. See discussion infra Sections I.A.2–3. It should be noted that, in general, the 
decisions of administrative agencies are subject to the Auer and Chevron judicial deference 
doctrines. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 459 (1997) (endorsing deference to an agency’s 
nonsubstantive interpretation of its own regulations); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984) (reflecting deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of its governing statute). 
 58. Peter Barton Hutt, Historical Themes and Developments at FDA over the Past Fifty 
Years, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING 
DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 17, 17 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 
2015). 
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laboratory within the Agricultural Division of the Patent Office in 
1848.59 Since that date, the federal government has continuously used 
chemical analysis to monitor the safety of products available to 
consumers.60 
Over the next decade, calls for an independent department to 
oversee agricultural matters led to legislation that established the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) in May of 1862.61 President 
Abraham Lincoln then appointed a chemist to head a new USDA 
Chemical Division,62 which comprised what was formerly known as the 
Chemical Laboratory of the Agricultural Division of the Patent 
Office.63 Under the leadership of Harvey W. Wiley, who was appointed 
chief chemist in 1883,64 the Division of Chemistry65 began to undertake 
seminal studies on food analysis, particularly pertaining to the 
detection of food adulteration.66 The research was published in a series 
of ten reports summarizing the best current methods of detecting and 
analyzing adulteration in foods.67 
Wiley’s reports aroused public attention and led to the 
introduction of a food inspection bill in 1887,68 as well as the first pure 
food bill in 1889.69 By the turn of the twentieth century, Wiley’s 
 
 59. Id.; When and Why Was FDA Formed?, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/
transparency/basics/ucm214403.htm [https://perma.cc/4H89-JBCA]. 
 60. Chemical analysis was initially used to monitor the safety of agricultural products, 
but the scope expanded in subsequent decades to encompass other types of consumer 
products. Fight for Consumer Protection, supra note 53. 
 61. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387. The Act charged the newly formed USDA 
with duties “to acquire and to diffuse .	 .	 . useful information on subjects connected with 
agriculture .	 .	 . and to procure, propagate, and distribute .	 .	 . new and valuable seeds and 
plants.” Id. §	1, 12 Stat. at 387. 
 62. FDA History Office, A Guide to Resources on the History of the Food and Drug 
Administration, in THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA) 149, 149 (Meredith A. 
Hickmann ed., 2003). 
 63. Hutt, supra note 58, at 17–18. 
 64. See Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, of Indiana, Class of 1871 of the Indiana Medical College, 
25 IND. MED. J. 446, 447 (1907) [hereinafter Dr. Harvey W. Wiley]. 
 65. The Chemical Division of the USDA became the USDA Division of Chemistry in 
1890. Hutt, supra note 58, at 18. 
 66. See Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, supra note 64, at 446–47. Before undertaking his role as 
chief of the Division of Chemistry, Wiley was the State Chemist of Indiana. Id. 
 67. The first report, for example, examined consumer dairy products. See USDA, DIV. 
OF CHEMISTRY, BULLETIN NO. 13, FOODS AND FOOD ADULTERANTS. PART FIRST: 
DAIRY PRODUCTS 3 (1887). Subsequent reports were published over the span of the next 
fifteen years. W.D. Bigelow, Obituary: Harvey Washington Wiley, 72 SCIENCE 311, 311 
(1930). 
 68. Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, supra note 64, at 447. 
 69. Bigelow, supra note 67, at 311. For additional accounts of the history of the FDA in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Lewis A. Grossman, Food, Drugs, and 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019) 
2019] EDITING HUMANITY 1167 
advocacy70 for food and drug safety had contributed to the introduction 
of nearly one hundred bills that sought to address pervasive abuses in 
the consumer product marketplace.71 Each of those bills succumbed to 
the influence of powerful industry and manufacturing groups that 
strongly opposed regulatory reform.72 
But in 1906, the release of the novel The Jungle,73 which chronicled 
the exploitation of immigrant workers and a litany of repugnant and 
unsanitary practices characteristic of the meat-packing industry of the 
early twentieth century,74 stoked massive public fear and uproar.75 
Within weeks of the novel’s publication, President Theodore 
Roosevelt appointed a Special Committee to investigate practices at 
the meat-packing houses of the Chicago stockyards.76 The findings of 
 
Droods: A Historical Consideration of Definitions and Categories in American Food and 
Drug Law, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1091, 1098–111 (2008); Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical 
Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 854–56 (2017). 
 70. See Mary K. Bruch & Elaine Larson, An Early Historical Perspective on the FDA’s 
Regulation of OTC Drugs, 10 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY 527, 527–28 
(1989). For his leadership and contributions to the promotion of food and drug safety during 
his nearly thirty-year career, Wiley became widely known as the “Father of the FDA.” See, 
e.g., WILLIAM H. EAGLSTEIN, THE FDA FOR DOCTORS 89 (2014). 
 71. When and Why Was FDA Formed?, supra note 59. 
 72. Bigelow, supra note 67, at 311; see also Dale A. Stirling, Profiles in Toxicology: 
Harvey W. Wiley, 67 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 157, 157 (2002) (noting that attempts at passing 
food-safety legislation had failed until the enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 
1906).  
 73. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). 
 74. Sinclair’s primary impetus for writing the novel was to promote a socialist 
movement in the United States. Accordingly, he expressed discontent that the novel’s focus 
on the plight and injustice experienced by immigrant workers at the hands of the meat-
packing industry, along with its political message, took a backseat to the public uproar 
engendered by his relatively brief depictions of unsanitary conditions at the Chicago 
stockyards. Indeed, after his novel had become a commercial success, Sinclair published an 
essay in Cosmopolitan Magazine, in which he candidly stated, 
I wished to frighten the country by a picture of what its industrial masters were doing 
to their victims; entirely by chance I had stumbled on another discovery—what they 
were doing to the meat supply of the civilized world. In other words, I aimed at the 
public’s heart, and by accident I hit it in the stomach. 
Upton Sinclair, What Life Means to Me, COSMOPOLITAN, May–Oct. 1906, at 591, 594 
(emphasis added). 
 75. Daniel E. Slotnik, Upton Sinclair, Whose Muckraking Changed the Meat Industry, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/obituaries/
archives/upton-sinclair-meat-industry [https://perma.cc/M3D5-4NYF]. 
 76. See Message from President Theodore Roosevelt to the Senate and House of 
Representatives on Conditions in Chicago Stock Yards (June 4, 1906), republished in Report 
on Chicago Stock Yards, HIST. ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Records-and-
Research/Listing/c_042/ [https://perma.cc/E4A9-AMYT]. 
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the investigation, which lasted more than two weeks, documented a 
long list of food handling and preparation methods deemed dangerous 
to human health.77 The Special Committee’s report lent support to 
Roosevelt’s urgent call to enact laws sanctioning the power of the 
federal government to inspect, supervise the preparation methods of, 
and establish sanitation norms for meat and meat food products 
entering into interstate commerce.78 
2.  The Dawn of a Federal System of Public Health and Consumer 
Protection 
Public clamor concerning the meat-packing exposé coupled with 
Wiley’s long-standing advocacy for the institutionalization of food and 
drug safety eventually paved the road for regulatory reform. On June 
30, 1906, the Pure Food and Drug Act (“PFDA”) was enacted into 
law.79 It sought to prevent “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of 
adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs, 
medicines, and liquors.”80 The landmark legislation—signed into law 
on the same day as the Federal Meat Inspection Act81—left an indelible 
mark during the formative years of what would eventually become the 
FDA. 
The PFDA had several notable provisions. First, the Act made it 
unlawful to manufacture82 and introduce into interstate commerce83 
any article of food or drug that was deemed “adulterated”84 or 
“misbranded”85 within the meaning of the law, and it prescribed fines 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§	301–399 (2012 & Supp. 2017)). 
 80. Id. §	1, 34 Stat. at 768. 
 81. Federal Meat Inspection Act, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1256 (1907) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. §§	601–695 (2012)); see also Meadows, supra note 55, at 8 (noting that the PFDA 
and Federal Meat Inspection Act became law on the same day). 
 82. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, §	1, 34 Stat. at 768. 
 83. See id. §	2, 34 Stat. at 768. 
 84. Id. §	7, 34 Stat. at 769–70. The PFDA defined adulterated articles, for the first time, 
as (1) drugs that differed from recognized standards of strength, quality, or purity; (2) 
confectionery with ingredients that were deleterious or detrimental to health; or (3) food 
that contained injurious mixtures or substitutes, had constituent parts abstracted, featured 
addition of poisonous or deleterious ingredients, concealed damage or inferior quality, or 
consisted of a decomposed animal or vegetable substance. Id. 
 85. Id. §	8, 34 Stat. at 770–71. Misbranded articles were also defined, for the first time, 
as (1) drugs that bore a false name, featured false contents, failed to include a label that 
lacked the quantity or proportion of specific numerated substances; or (2) food that was an 
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or imprisonment as penalty for such violations.86 Second, the legislation 
assigned authority to the USDA to make rules and regulations to 
implement provisions of the Act.87 Third, the law granted enforcement 
powers to the Bureau of Chemistry,88 including the power to examine 
specimens of foods and drugs manufactured or sold in interstate 
commerce.89 Fourth, the Act outlined due process provisions 
applicable in the event that testing by the Bureau of Chemistry 
revealed adulteration or misbranding of food and drugs within the 
meaning of the PFDA.90 Lastly, the law introduced the antecedent of 
the modern definition of “drug” as “any substance or mixture .	 .	 . 
intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease” 
and recognized the U.S. Pharmacœpeia and National Formulary as 
authoritative drug entities.91 
The PFDA was the first of more than two hundred laws that 
constitute the backbone of our federal public-health and consumer-
protection system.92 It represented an unprecedented expansion of 
federal oversight over food and drug law, and consolidated federal 
jurisdiction over food and drug products intended for interstate 
commerce into a single federal agency with broad regulatory powers. 
Thus, the PFDA essentially established the FDA’s modern regulatory 
functions, which laid the groundwork for building the basic elements 
of consumer protection that stand to this day.93 
Following the PFDA’s enactment, the Bureau of Chemistry 
undertook the task of enforcing the new law.94 Under Wiley’s 
leadership, the Bureau gained strength and stature as an administrative 
 
imitation of another article, contained misleading labels, failed to include a label that lacked 
the quantity or proportion of specific numerated substances, did not state its weight or 
measure, or contained a label with misleading ingredients. Id. 
 86. Id. §	1, 34 Stat. at 768. 
 87. The Department of the Treasury and the Department of Commerce and Labor also 
shared authority to make rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act. Id. 
§	3, 34 Stat. at 768–69. 
 88. The USDA Division of Chemistry became the USDA Bureau of Chemistry in 1901. 
Hutt, supra note 58, at 17. 
 89. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, §	4, 34 Stat. at 769. 
 90. Id. §§	4–5, 34 Stat. at 769. 
 91. Id. §	6, 34 Stat. at 769. Compare the definition of drug under the PFDA with that of 
the FDCA. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 92. Laws Enforced by FDA, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/
LawsEnforcedbyFDA/default.htm [https://perma.cc/F2DZ-DEGD]. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See HARVEY W. WILEY, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 288 (1930). 
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body.95 Its appropriations more than sextupled, the staff expanded, and 
a new building was set aside for operations.96 Soon thereafter, however, 
Wiley encountered strong opposition from business and manufacturing 
interests that sought to curtail the Bureau’s new regulatory powers.97 
Litigation ensued and led to a string of judicial decisions that 
stymied the Bureau’s enforcement mechanisms and constricted the 
regulatory scope of the PFDA,98 often in perplexing ways that ran 
contrary to the advancement of public welfare.99 This apparent 
influence of business interests over the execution of the PFDA was 
deeply troubling to advocates of increased regulation.100 It also 
 
 95. Harvey Washington Wiley, M.D., FDA, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/
FOrgsHistory/Leaders/ucm093765.htm [https://perma.cc/C8TS-FBG4]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., WILEY, supra note 94, at 261–73 (recounting select legal battles stemming 
from prosecution of PFDA violations). 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411 (1914) 
(holding that the government has the burden to establish that a poisonous or deleterious 
food additive may render a food article injurious to health before it can be condemned, and 
that the mere presence of such an additive is not sufficient to render the article of food 
illegal); United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497–98 (1911) (holding that the PFDA 
applied only to false or misleading statements about the ingredients or identity of a drug 
and did not prohibit false curative claims). 
Notably, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson did not end the controversy. Congress 
sought to overcome Johnson’s narrowing of the scope and power of the Bureau of 
Chemistry by enacting the Sherley Amendment. Sherley Amendment to the Pure Food and 
Drugs Act, ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416 (1912), repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
ch. 675, §	902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §	387b (2012)). 
The revision was intended to prohibit false and fraudulent curative or therapeutic claims of 
health benefits that had been upheld in Johnson. Subsequent judicial interpretation, 
however, made enforcing the Sherley Amendment problematic because of the high 
threshold required to establish fraudulent intent. See STEPHEN WILSON, FOOD & DRUG 
REGULATION 81–82 (1942); see also C. W. Crawford, Technical Problems in Food and Drug 
Law Enforcement, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 36, 41 (1933) (describing how defense 
counsel for a ketchup company delegitimized effective methods of determining spoilage by 
framing them as “encroachments [by] mendaciously meddling bureaucracy” threatening 
“[t]raditional American freedom[s]”). 
 99. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 98, at 36 (“It has been rightly said that the policy of 
the Federal Food and Drugs Act regarding added poisonous substances in food is an 
inverted one since the law places the obligation on the Government to show that the 
contaminated food may be harmful to health, rather than on the manufacturer to show that 
it will not.”). 
 100. For instance, Wiley expressed the following concern: 
There is a distinct tendency to put regulations and rules for the enforcement of the 
law into the hands of the industries engaged in the food and drug activities. I 
consider this one of the most pernicious threats to pure food and drugs. .	.	. When 
we permit business in general to regulate the quality and character of our food and 
drug supplies, we are treading upon very dangerous ground. .	.	. It is never advisable 
to surrender entirely food and drug control to business interests. There is much to 
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highlighted the simple fact that the chief law responsible for launching 
the FDA into the modern era of health and consumer protection was 
far from perfect.101 In the end, despite the enforcement hurdles 
associated with the PFDA, the landmark legislation succeeded in 
establishing foundations and a preliminary framework for the system 
of food and drug law that has prevailed for more than a century. 
3.  Expanding the Core of Modern Food and Drug Law 
A key turning point in the history of the FDA arrived in the late 
1920s and early 1930s.102 Pressure began to mount to address a long list 
of inherent shortcomings within the PFDA that rendered it toothless 
against flagrant abuses and misdeeds in the marketplace.103 The FDA 
recommended a complete overhaul of the 1906 law104 and advocated 
for stronger legislation.105 But the proposed bill stalled in Congress and 
 
be done yet before we can point to a food and drug control that is wholly interested 
in the welfare of the consumer. 
WILEY, supra note 94, at 273. 
 101. Indeed, Wiley, the PFDA’s author and chief enforcer, lamented the gradual 
decrease of enthusiasm in the years after the bill was signed into law. He contemporaneously 
expressed that “[the PFDA] is regarded as established and in perfect operation. This is a 
great mistake. There are practises which are permitted under the present administration of 
the law that are in direct opposition to fundamental principles.” Id. at 272–73. 
 102. By 1927, the Bureau of Chemistry underwent reorganization to separate its 
regulatory and research branches. Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/history/forgshistory/evolvingpowers/ucm2007256.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QP8M-4KTL] [hereinafter Milestones]. The regulatory division of the 
Bureau became the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration, which was subsequently 
abbreviated to Food and Drug Administration in 1930. Id. Although the FDA was baptized 
with its current name in 1930, it was still part of the USDA. Then in 1940, it was transferred 
to the Federal Security Agency, which was twice renamed: the Department of Health 
Education and Welfare in 1953 and Department of Health and Human Services in 1979. 
History of FDA’s Internal Organization, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/
FOrgsHistory/default.htm [https://perma.cc/2LNU-WUGZ]. The FDA currently resides 
within the DHHS. Id. 
 103. For a brief account of said shortcomings, including the lack of oversight over 
cosmetics, patent medicines, false advertising, food preservatives, etc., and vagueness vis-à-
vis food adulteration, see CHARLES O. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE 
NEW DEAL 3–8 (1970). 
 104. Milestones, supra note 102. 
 105. In the aftermath of the New Deal, the FDA engaged in a public relations campaign 
aimed at addressing the need for new, stronger federal laws to adequately enforce food and 
drug safety and protect consumers from dangerous products that were marketed legally. To 
reach a wide range of audiences in government, the press, and the general public, the 
Agency assembled a collection of graphic depictions and turned it into an exhibit that 
became known as the “Chamber of Horrors.” John P. Swann, How Chemists Pushed for 
Consumer Protection: The Food and Drugs Act of 1906, CHEMICAL HERITAGE, Summer 
2006, at 6, reprinted in HOW CHEMISTS PUSHED FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE FOOD 
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triggered a five-year legislative battle.106 Progress on enacting a new 
law stagnated until a public tragedy involving a so-called Elixir of 
Sulfanilamide drug became publicized in 1937.107 
The drug contained diethylene glycol, a toxic and untested organic 
solvent commonly used in a wide range of industrial products.108 As the 
drug hit the market, reports of mass poisonings, including the death of 
107 people—mostly children—highlighted the pressing need to enact a 
tighter food and drug law to protect consumers.109 Thus, it took a wave 
of public outrage—much like the meat-packing scandals during the 
passage of the PFDA in 1906110—to break congressional gridlock and 
pass the legislation through Congress. 
On June 25, 1938, Congress enacted the FDCA.111 The legislation 
aimed to “prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of 
adulterated and misbranded food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics.”112 It 
repealed the PFDA of 1906 and replaced it with a sweeping statute that 
constitutes the core of today’s food and drug law. The FDCA 
addressed many of the weaknesses of the PFDA, expanded the FDA’s 
jurisdictional powers over new areas, and closed loopholes derived 
from judicial interpretations of the antecedent regulatory scheme. 
For instance, under the FDCA, the FDA assumed authority to 
regulate therapeutic claims on drug labels,113 thereby repealing the 
Sherley Amendment requirement that one must prove intent to 
defraud or mislead in a misbranding case.114 The Act expanded the 
FDA’s jurisdiction to encompass regulation of cosmetics and medical 
devices.115 It broadened the scope and definition of terms including 
 
AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906, https://www.fda.gov/media/110307/download [https://perma.cc/
PT4D-H8SQ]. The exhibit consisted of a series of ghastly images depicting harmful effects 
caused by various unsafe products, which were lawfully marketed to consumers at the time. 
Id. 
 106. Milestones, supra note 102. 
 107. Id.; FDA History Office, supra note 62, at 151. 
 108. See Leo J. Schep et al., Diethylene Glycol Poisoning, 47 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 
525, 525 (2009). 
 109. Milestones, supra note 102. 
 110. See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
 111. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§	301–399 (2012 & Supp. 2017)). 
 112. Id. (quoting the long title of the Act). 
 113. Id. §	502(a), (i)(1), 52 Stat. at 1050–51. 
 114. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §	201(h)–(i), 52 Stat. at 1041. 
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food,116 drug,117 label,118 and misbranded article.119 The law further 
specified the FDA’s authority to conduct inspections of any “factory, 
warehouse, or establishment in which food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics 
are manufactured, processed, packed, or held.”120 The FDCA also 
charged the FDA with promulgating rules to set tolerance limits for 
unavoidable poisonous ingredients in foods.121 Drug labels were now 
required to indicate, in language likely to be read and understood by 
an ordinary individual, whether the drug contained any habit-forming 
substances or derivatives.122 
Importantly, the FDCA instituted a mandatory premarket 
approval scheme for new drugs. No drug manufacturer could introduce 
a new drug into interstate commerce without first filing an application 
that contained sufficient information to establish the drug’s safety 
before the FDA.123 Had this feature been in place prior to 1938, the 
Elixir of Sulfanilamide crisis might have been averted. 
Armed with an arsenal of new jurisdictional powers, the FDA 
began to enforce provisions of the FDCA. Predictably, the Agency 
faced litigation challenges. However, as courts began to examine and 
interpret the FDCA, the Agency’s authority was upheld in pivotal 
cases that ultimately strengthened the FDA’s jurisdiction over public-
health and consumer-protection matters.124 
 
 116. Id. §	201(f), 52 Stat. at 1040. The definition of “food” explicitly included chewing 
gum. Id. 
 117. Id. §	 201(g), 52 Stat. at 1041. The term “drug” under the FDCA of 1938 meant 
“articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease in man or other animals; and .	.	. articles (other than food) intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” Id. 
 118. Id. §	201(k), 52 Stat. at 1041. 
 119. Id. §	201(n), 52 Stat. at 1041. 
 120. Id. §	 704, 52 Stat. at 1057. The FDCA also authorized inspectors “to enter any 
vehicle being used to transport or hold such food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.” Id.  
 121. Id. §	406(a), 52 Stat. at 1049. 
 122. Id. §	502(c)–(d), 52 Stat. at 1050. 
 123. Id. §	505(a), 52 Stat. at 1052. 
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 697–98 (1948) (holding that the 
FDCA did not exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when a 
retailer was charged with performing acts that resulted in a drug being misbranded while 
held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce); Alberty Food Prods. v. United States, 
194 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1952) (affirming a lower court’s ruling that the drugs in question 
were misbranded under the FDCA because the label lacked adequate directions for use). 
But see United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1952) (holding that refusal to grant 
permission to inspect a factory pursuant to the FDCA cannot constitute a crime because the 
Act is too vague to be enforced under criminal law). 
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Further expansion of that authority came with the enactment of 
the PHSA,125 another legislative milestone that consolidated and 
updated laws related to the administration of the Public Health 
Service. The PHSA addressed a broad spectrum of health concerns, 
including the establishment of the federal government’s quarantine 
powers to prevent the spread of communicable diseases,126 the 
government’s duty to promote and coordinate research and 
investigations into the causes and treatment of disease,127 and the 
regulation of biological products applicable to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of diseases.128 
Another key legislative achievement for consumer protections 
came in 1962 with the enactment of the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments.129 Prior to this landmark legislation, drug manufacturers 
merely had to establish safety before introducing a drug into interstate 
commerce.130 But the Kefauver-Harris Amendments “established a 
framework that required drug manufacturers to prove scientifically 
that a medication was not only safe, but effective.”131 The law 
significantly enhanced the FDA’s authority over drugs, although it also 
increased the cost of developing new drugs by imposing premarket 
review, effectiveness, and other requirements on the drug industry.132 
In the decades since their enactment, both the FDCA and 
PHSA—alongside other laws related to public health and consumer 
protection—have undergone numerous amendments that have 
amplified the scope of FDA jurisdiction over health care in the United 
States.133 Today, the FDA regulates more than $2.5 trillion worth of 
 
 125. Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§	201–300mm (2012)). 
 126. See id. §	311, 58 Stat. at 693; id. §	361(a), 58 Stat. at 703. 
 127. Id. §	301, 58 Stat. at 691–92. 
 128. Id. §	351, 58 Stat. at 702–03. 
 129. Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 130. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, §	505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §	355 (Supp. 2017)). 
 131. Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm322856.htm [https://perma.cc/
BC2L-AKJY]. 
 132. See Grossman, supra note 69, at 1129–30. 
 133. See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) 
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 21, 34, 38 & 42 of the U.S.C.); Drug Quality and 
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§	353, 353b, 360eee, 379j (Supp. 2017)); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§	7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of Titles 21, 28, 35 & 42 of the U.S.C.); Family Smoking Prevention and 
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food, medical products, and tobacco.134 It exercises jurisdiction over 
food safety, drug safety and efficacy, biological products ranging from 
blood to vaccines, cosmetics, medical devices, consumer products that 
emit radiation, veterinary products, and tobacco products.135 Products 
regulated by the FDA constitute roughly twenty cents of every dollar 
spent by American consumers.136 Simply put, the FDA has become one 
of the most powerful and effective agencies in the federal government. 
Despite its sheer size and power, the FDA has earned a favorable 
reputation among the public,137 with consumers reporting higher levels 
of trust in the FDA than the federal government as a whole.138 
In addition to protecting consumers, the FDA strives to (1) 
advance “the public health by helping to speed innovations that make 
medical products more effective, safer, and more affordable”139 and (2) 
educate the public by providing access to “accurate, science-based 
information” needed for consumers to make choices about the use of 
“medical products and foods to maintain and improve their health.”140 
Moreover, the Agency plays a significant role in the federal 
government’s counterterrorism capabilities by ensuring the security of 
the food supply and developing strategies to respond to public-health 
threats.141 
 
Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §	387 
(2012)). 
 134. Fact Sheet: FDA at a Glance, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/
Basics/ucm553038.htm [https://perma.cc/5Q4J-T9Z2]. 
 135. What Does FDA Regulate?, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/
Basics/ucm194879.htm [https://perma.cc/R94E-UU98]. 
 136. Fact Sheet, supra note 134. The Agency also employs over 18,000 individuals, see 
FDA, 2020 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 343 
(2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/121408/download [https://perma.cc/SHV8-AUF5], and 
for fiscal year 2020 requested a federal budget of $6.1 billion, id. at 8. 
 137. Cf. Seok-Eun Kim, The Role of Trust in the Modern Administrative State: An 
Integrative Model, 37 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 611, 613 (2005) (“American political theories are 
often quite explicit in their inherent distaste for strong bureaucratic powers because of 
concern about ensuring accountability.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Sarah D. Kowitt et al., Awareness and Trust of the FDA and CDC: Results 
from a National Sample of US Adults and Adolescents, 12 PLOS ONE, no. e0177546, May 
16, 2017, at 1, 4–6 (reporting results of a study that found 79% of adolescents and 63% of 
adults have high levels of trust in the FDA compared to 43% of adults with a “[g]reat deal 
or a fair amount of trust in the federal [government]”); see also PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR GOVERNMENT 58 (2015) (reporting a 
51% favorable rating of the FDA among the public compared to Congress’s 27% favorable 
rating). 
 139. What We Do, supra note 31. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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As is evident from its historical antecedents, the FDA has become 
what it is today due largely to its pivotal function of protecting 
consumers from systemic abuses perpetrated by select industry and 
manufacturing groups. The FDCA, PHSA, and other laws related to 
public health and consumer protection have been the statutory means 
through which the Agency has fulfilled that broad policy goal. The 
FDA’s long-standing history of consumer protection is significant for 
purposes of this discussion because it has laid a legal foundation to 
support the view that the FDA is well equipped to address the 
challenges of regulating emerging technologies—particularly from 
safety and efficacy standpoints—that fall within the scope of its 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the FDA has already paved ample groundwork in 
the once-emerging fields of recombinant DNA technology and gene 
therapy, which have set precedents in many respects analogous to the 
issue of GGE. 
B. The Somatic Cell Gene-Therapy Model 
During the 1970s, the discovery of restriction enzymes capable of 
triggering sequence-specific cleavage of DNA molecules triggered a 
scientific revolution of colossal proportions.142 In a matter of a few 
years, research into new recombinant DNA techniques ushered in the 
era of modern biotechnology that has changed the world.143 In the 
midst of this molecular enlightenment, which suddenly brought genetic 
engineering within the realm of possibility, scientists began to posit 
whether genetic manipulation in humans could be used for genetic 
therapies to treat, cure, or ameliorate heritable diseases144 and other 
conditions.145 Less than twenty years later, results from the first 
approved nuclear gene transfer in a group of five patients with 
 
 142. See Enríquez, supra note 2, at 619–21. 
 143. Id. at 621. 
 144. A heritable disease refers to a genetic disorder—namely, a type of genetic 
abnormality giving rise to a medical condition—that is passed down from one generation to 
the next via the germline. See Specific Genetic Disorders, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., 
https://www.genome.gov/10001204/specific-genetic-disorders/ [https://perma.cc/39XZ-GUS7]. 
For a list of some common heritable diseases, see id. (including achondroplasia, some forms 
of hereditary breast cancer, hemophilia, Cystic Fibrosis, familial Parkinson’s disease, 
phenylketonuria, Marfan syndrome, and Tay-Sachs). 
 145. See, e.g., Theodore Friedmann & Richard Roblin, Genetic Therapy for Human 
Genetic Disease?, 175 SCIENCE 949, 949 (1972). 
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metastatic melanoma—an advanced cancer—established proof of 
concept for this novel approach to human gene therapy.146 
This modern-medicine breakthrough raised questions regarding 
how human gene therapy would be regulated. Soon, manufacturers of 
products intended for use in emerging gene therapies sought regulatory 
status clarifications from the federal government.147 The FDA 
answered that call in a statement published in 1993.148 Pursuant to its 
jurisdictional authority under the FDCA149 and the PHSA,150 the FDA 
asserted jurisdiction to regulate human somatic cell151 and gene-
therapy products.152 
In the late 1990s, gene therapy experienced severe setbacks after 
the unfortunate death of Jesse Gelsinger, an eighteen-year-old patient 
suffering from partial ornithine transcarbamylase (“OTC”) 
deficiency,153 who died from a gene-therapy treatment in a clinical trial 
in 1999.154 However, following improvements in nonviral and viral 
gene-transfer vectors over the last two decades, gene therapy is now 
viewed as a viable tool to address a wide range of diseases.155 Two gene-
therapy treatments—GlyberaR and Strimvelis—have already gained 
approval in Europe,156 and Kymriah recently became the first FDA-
approved gene-therapy product in the United States.157 
 
 146. See Steven A. Rosenberg et al., Gene Transfer into Humans—Immunotherapy of 
Patients with Advanced Melanoma, Using Tumor-Infiltrating Lymphocytes Modified by 
Retroviral Gene Transduction, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 570, 571 (1990). 
 147. See Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy 
Products and Gene Therapy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248, 53,248 (Oct. 14, 1993). 
 148. See id. 
 149. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§	301–399 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 150. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§	201–300 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 151. “Somatic cells are all of the body’s cells except the reproductive cells.” Enríquez, 
supra note 2, at 633 n.178. 
 152. See Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy 
Products and Gene Therapy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. at 53,249–51. 
 153. OTC is “a rare metabolic disease that can cause a dangerous build-up of ammonia 
in the body.” Sally Lehrman, Virus Treatment Questioned After Gene Therapy Death, 401 
NATURE 517, 517 (1999). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See, e.g., Michael Gross, New Hopes for Gene Therapy, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY 
R983, R983 (2014); A.M. Keeler, M.K. ElMallah & T.R. Flotte, Gene Therapy 2017: 
Progress and Future Directions, 10 CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 242, 242 (2017). 
 156. See Keeler et al., supra note 155, at 242. 
 157. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Gene Therapy—A Synopsis 
The FDA originally defined human gene therapy as “a technique 
that modifies a person’s genes to treat or cure disease” via manipulation 
of gene expression or the alteration of biological properties of living 
cells.158 The cells may be modified in vivo159 or ex vivo160 for subsequent 
administration to humans.161 Genetic modifications performed under 
the latter approach also constitute a form of somatic cell therapy, which 
refers to the administration of autologous,162 allogeneic,163 or 
xenogeneic164 “living non-germline cells .	.	. for therapeutic, diagnostic, 
or preventive purposes.”165 “Cellular products intended for use as 
somatic cell therapy are biological products subject to regulation 
pursuant to the PHS[A] .	.	. and also fall within the definition of drugs 
in the [FDCA].”166 
Among current gene-therapy products within the purview of the 
FDA authority are plasmid DNA molecules, viral and bacterial 
vectors, human gene-editing technology, and patient-derived cellular 
gene-therapy products.167 These products are deemed to be biological 
products subject to regulation by the FDA’s Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research (“CBER”).168 In 2017, Kymriah became the 
first FDA-approved gene-therapy product in the United States for the 
 
 158. What Is Gene Therapy?, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/
cellulargenetherapyproducts/ucm573960.htm [https://perma.cc/KEH3-TJ790] (emphasis 
added); cf. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN SOMATIC CELL THERAPY AND GENE THERAPY 3 
(1998) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR SOMATIC CELL THERAPY], https://www.fda.gov/
media/72402/download [https://perma.cc/G7ZS-88P7] (“Gene therapy is a medical 
intervention based on modification of the genetic material of living cells.”). 
 159. In vivo refers to a process, experimentation, or occurrence that takes place directly 
inside the body of a living organism. Thus, an in vivo cell modification refers to a change 
that occurs in a cell that is directly inside the body of a living organism.  
 160. Ex vivo refers to a process, experimentation, or occurrence that takes place outside 
of the body of a living organism. Thus, an ex vivo cell modification refers to a change that 
occurs in a cell that is outside of the body of a living organism. 
 161. GUIDANCE FOR SOMATIC CELL THERAPY, supra note 158, at 3. 
 162. Autologous refers to cells or tissues derived from the same individual.  
 163. Allogeneic refers to cells or tissues derived from a different individual of the same 
species and, thus, said cells or tissues may or may not be immunologically compatible.  
 164. Xenogeneic refers to cells or tissues derived from individuals of different species.  
 165. GUIDANCE FOR SOMATIC CELL THERAPY, supra note 158, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 166. Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy 
Products and Gene Therapy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248, 53,249 (Oct. 14, 1993). 
 167. What is Gene Therapy?, supra note 158. 
 168. Id. 
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treatment of “certain pediatric and young adult patients with a form of 
acute lymphoblastic leukemia.”169 
Notwithstanding the FDA’s long-established jurisdiction over 
gene therapies aimed at somatic cell modification, to date the Agency 
has remained silent regarding its authority to regulate products 
intended to modify the human germline. The FDA recently expressed 
views that technologies for human genome editing can be regulated 
under the gene-therapy framework.170 In July 2018, the Agency 
published proposed draft regulations asserting jurisdiction over gene-
therapy products involving genome editing.171 However, such authority 
 
 169. FDA Approval Brings First Gene Therapy to the United States, FDA (Aug. 30, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm574058.htm 
[https://perma.cc/V2M3-QKYH]. Kymriah is a genetically modified, autologous, somatic 
cell–based gene-therapy product sold by Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation. Id. 
 170. On January 18, 2017, then-FDA Commissioner Robert Califf published a statement 
asserting that the FDA intends to regulate genome-editing products using a product-
specific, risk- and science-based approach. See Robert M. Califf & Ritu Nalubola, FDA’s 
Science-Based Approach to Genome Edited Products, FDA VOICE (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/X936-U9JJ, reprinted in Robert M. Califf & Ritu Nalubola, FDA’s Science-
Based Approach to Genome Edited Products, CHECK ORPHAN (Jan. 19, 2017), 
http://www.checkorphan.org/news/fda2019s-science-based-approach-to-genome-edited-products 
[https://perma.cc/C7H3-QDG7]. On the issue of human medical products that feature gene-
editing components of therapeutic nature, the FDA indicated that regulation would proceed 
under the existing gene-therapy framework. See id. At the same time, the FDA clarified that 
the statement regarding gene-editing products applies only to nonheritable somatic cell 
gene therapy and not to germline gene therapy. Id. The statement appeared on FDA Voice, 
the FDA’s official blog. Id. 
Interestingly, the statement on the FDA’s intended approach toward the regulation of 
genome-edited products was taken down from the FDA website on or around October 3, 
2018, and replaced with a collection of perspectives from FDA experts. See FDA Voices: 
Perspectives from FDA Experts, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/
fdavoices/default.htm [https://perma.cc/6XS4-ESJK]. It is not clear whether removal of the 
policy statement signals that the FDA intended to proceed with a different approach under 
the direction of Scott Gottlieb, the new FDA Commissioner appointed by the Trump 
Administration who, unexpectedly, resigned from his post in March 2019, see Sheila Kaplan 
& Jan Hoffman, F.D.A. Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, Who Fought Teenage Vaping, Resigns, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/health/scott-gottlieb-
resigns-fda.html [https://perma.cc/74CR-FLXL], or merely that the FDA’s blog was 
reorganized. 
 171. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, LONG TERM 
FOLLOW-UP AFTER ADMINISTRATION OF HUMAN GENE THERAPY PRODUCTS 4, 26 
(2018) [hereinafter LONG TERM FOLLOW-UP], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Cellular
andGeneTherapy/UCM610797.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG7E-9HFY]; see also Long Term 
Follow-Up After Administration of Human Gene Therapy Products; Draft Guidance for 
Industry; Availability, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,311, 32,311–12 (July 12, 2018) (announcing the 
availability of draft guidance). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019) 
1180 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
explicitly applies to somatic cell-based gene therapies and excludes 
GGE interventions.172 
2.  Regulatory Gaps and Limitations of the Gene-Therapy Model 
The FDA’s clear intent to regulate technologies for human 
genome editing under the gene-therapy framework coupled with its 
silence vis-à-vis gene therapies involving GGE brings uncertainty to a 
new field of law. Although both somatic and germline treatments could 
be used for gene therapy and other therapeutic applications, the 
current gene-therapy model simply does not fit GGE intervention. 
Two important points reveal large gaps in the gene-therapy 
regulatory scheme and deserve special attention. First, the Agency has 
explicitly excluded modification of germline cells from its definition of 
gene therapy over the last three decades.173 This is significant because 
it is unclear whether the FDA intends to regulate GGE differently—
presumably because it is fully cognizant of the limitations inherent in 
the current gene-therapy framework that render it inapplicable toward 
GGE modifications—or whether the Agency believes it lacks the 
authority to regulate such technologies at all, which is unlikely. The 
methods used to achieve GGE therapies are likely to overlap 
extensively with those used in present gene-therapy approaches that 
are in preapproval stages or have already been approved. Thus, 
assuming that a particular type of gene therapy warrants approval 
because it is safe and effective, the dispositive distinction between 
somatic and GGE interventions appears to turn on the intended results 
of the therapy—namely, whether the modification remains confined to 
the individual patient or has the potential to be inherited by the 
individual’s progeny.174 
 
 172. See, e.g., CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: GENE THERAPY CLINICAL TRIALS — OBSERVING SUBJECTS FOR 
DELAYED ADVERSE EVENTS 1 n.1 (2006), https://www.fda.gov/media/72225/download 
[https://perma.cc/LP9D-CWQH]; LONG TERM FOLLOW-UP, supra note 171, at 28; see also 
Guidance for Industry: Gene Therapy Clinical Trials—Observing Subjects for Delayed 
Adverse Events; Availability, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,821, 68,821–22 (Nov. 28, 2006) (announcing 
the availability of draft guidance); GUIDANCE FOR SOMATIC CELL THERAPY, supra note 
158, at 3.  
 173. See sources cited supra notes 152, 158, 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 174. A focus on discriminating between particular types of gene therapy based on the 
intended results derived from them raises many legal issues beyond the scope of 
administrative law. One concerns constitutional issues related to a fundamental right to edit 
one’s own germ cells, which is explored in Parts II and III of this Article. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019) 
2019] EDITING HUMANITY 1181 
Second, the FDA’s explicit narrowing of the scope of gene therapy 
to treat or cure disease could create a deep regulatory void.175 The 
Agency’s circumscription to therapeutic applications means that 
nontherapeutic GGE interventions would, in theory, fall beyond the 
Agency’s regulatory reach.176 Failure to broaden the scope of GGE 
past the therapeutic realm might enable an alternate system of 
deregulation in which the potential modification of traits for cosmetic 
or enhancement purposes is not sufficiently scrutinized. 
C. Establishing Jurisdictional Authority over Germline Genome 
Editing 
As noted above, the establishment of FDA jurisdiction over GGE 
under the current gene-therapy framework is problematic. Therefore, 
this Article proposes that the FDA should instead assert authority over 
the regulation of all types of GGE products—regardless of whether 
they are intended for therapeutic uses—as drugs and biological 
products within the meaning of the FDCA and PHSA. In so doing, the 
Article outlines a new regulatory path for GGE that flows from the 
D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Regenerative Sciences, which held that the FDA 
can regulate specific stem cell mixtures as drugs or biological products 
within the meaning of the FDCA and PHSA. 
1.  United States v. Regenerative Sciences, LLC 
In Regenerative Sciences, a Colorado clinic operated by two 
physicians marketed Regenexx-C, a procedure involving a cultured 
stem cell mixture, as part of a medical therapy for treatment of arthritis 
and other orthopedic conditions.177 The treatment involved extraction 
of mesenchymal stem cells (“MSCs”)178 from a patient’s bone marrow, 
followed by a culturing process of approximately two weeks179 that 
 
 175. See What is Gene Therapy?, supra note 158. 
 176. In practice, however, it is difficult to imagine the FDA declaring it lacks authority 
to regulate some human genetic interventions simply because they involve aesthetic or 
enhancement purposes rather than therapeutic purposes. 
 177. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251, 256 (D.D.C. 
2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 178. Id. at 251. MSCs are a type of multipotent stem cells capable of differentiating into 
various cell lineages, including fat, muscle, bone, cartilage, and other cells. See Umberto 
Galderisi, Antonio Giordano & Marco G. Paggi, The Bad and the Good of Mesenchymal 
Stem Cells in Cancer: Boosters of Tumor Growth and Vehicles for Targeted Delivery of 
Anticancer Agents, WORLD J. STEM CELLS, Feb. 26, 2010, at 5, 6. MSCs are of clinical 
interest because they can be easily isolated from bone marrow and expanded in vitro. Id. 
 179. Regenerative Scis., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 251–52; see also Are the Regenexx Procedures 
Performed in the U.S. Approved by the FDA?, REGENEXX, https://www.regenexx.com/
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allowed the stem cells to differentiate and proliferate, and the addition 
of an antibiotic to prevent bacterial contamination of the cells.180 The 
mixture was subsequently injected back into the patient’s body at a 
target site.181 
The Regenexx-C procedure became the subject of FDA scrutiny 
when stem cell therapies were increasingly identified as being part of 
an unregulated, Wild West-like cottage industry. Despite the promise 
of stem cell medicine and its potential to eradicate many diseases, the 
uncertain risks and efficacy of stem cell therapies,182 which by default 
rendered them premature for clinical use, cautioned against their 
broad and unregulated use. Dangerous side effects had already been 
reported for some of these unregulated stem cell therapies, which were 
not subject to traditional clinical-trial protocols.183 Private clinics began 
to thrive in an environment of little to no regulation by marketing 
therapies directly to consumers, often via the internet (Figures 2–4).184 
Providers of stem cell therapies generally portrayed stem cell 
medicine as safe and frequently made unsubstantiated and false claims 
about the efficacy of costly stem cell procedures for a broad range of 
aesthetic and medical conditions, including aging, skin care, diabetes, 
orthopedic injuries, Parkinson’s Disease, spinal cord injuries, 
osteoarthritis, stroke, autism, hair loss, erectile dysfunction, pain, and 
many others.185 Even today, many private clinics that constitute the 
 
resources/faqs/4/are-the-regenexx-procedures-performed-in-the-us-approved-by-the-fda/ 
[https://perma.cc/QG87-99TS] [hereinafter Regenexx Procedures] (describing the Regenexx 
culturing process). 
 180. Regenerative Scis., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 259. 
 181. Id. at 251–52. 
 182. See generally Chris E.P. Goldring et al., Assessing the Safety of Stem Cell 
Therapeutics, 8 CELL STEM CELL 618 (2011) (describing safety issues and knowledge gaps 
in novel stem cell treatments); Hans Lassmann, Stem Cell and Progenitor Cell 
Transplantation in Multiple Sclerosis: The Discrepancy Between Neurobiological Attraction 
and Clinical Feasibility, 233 J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 83 (2005) (commenting that despite 
progress in stem cell research, the feasibility and safety of stem cell therapies remain 
unresolved). 
 183. See, e.g., Bruce H. Dobkin, Armin Curt & James Guest, Cellular Transplants in 
China: Observational Study from the Largest Human Experiment in Chronic Spinal Cord 
Injury, 20 NEUROREHABILITATION & NEURAL REPAIR 5, 5 (2006). 
 184. Darren Lau et al., Stem Cell Clinics Online: The Direct-to-Consumer Portrayal of 
Stem Cell Medicine, 3 CELL STEM CELL 591, 591 (2008). 
 185. See, e.g., Israel Berger et al., Global Distribution of Businesses Marketing Stem Cell-
Based Interventions, 19 CELL STEM CELL 158, 158, 160 (2016) (analyzing the content of 
hundreds of websites marketing stem cell–based interventions and finding that many made 
vague therapeutic claims unsupported by data generated in randomized, controlled, and 
independent clinical trials); Lau et al., supra note 184, at 593 (“We therefore find that the 
treatments offered on stem cell websites are generally unsupported by clinical evidence.”). 
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backbone of the stem cell therapy industry remain largely 
underregulated, have spread globally (Figure 4), and are no longer 
confined to developing countries where weak laws or lax enforcement 
has enabled the clinics to operate with relative impunity.186 
	  
 
 186. Berger et al., supra note 185, at 158; Lau et al., supra note 184, at 591. 
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Figure 2. Stem Cell Clinics Offering Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of 
Stem Cell–Based Interventions in the United States187 
 
The figure shows the number of clinics per U.S. state. California 
(forty-nine clinics), Florida (thirty-five clinics), and New York 
(fifteen clinics) have the highest number of stem cell clinics in the 
country. No clinics were recorded in Delaware, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont 
(colored in gray). No data is available for Alaska or Hawaii (also 
colored in gray).  
In a span of just a few years, U.S. stem cell businesses engaged in 
direct-to-consumer marketing have expanded to offer procedures at 
nearly six hundred clinics as of 2016,188 a trend that is consistent in other 
 
 187. The choropleth map was generated using the data set reported in Berger et al., 
supra note 185, at tbl.S1. 
 188. Leigh Turner & Paul Knoepfler, Selling Stem Cells in the USA: Assessing the Direct-
to-Consumer Industry, 19 CELL STEM CELL 154, 154 (2016); cf. Berger et al., supra note 185, 
at 158 (“[Berger and colleagues] identified 187 unique websites in the US offering 
interventions at 215 clinics, while Turner and Knoepfler found 351 distinct businesses 
offering interventions at 570 physical locations. Due to differences in search strategy 
stringency, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and search engines used, it is not possible to 
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developed countries.189 In a globalized world, clinics now compete for 
a share of the so-called stem cell tourism pie.190 
Figure 3. Stem Cell Clinics Offering Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of 
Stem Cell–Based Interventions in Canada191 
 
The figure shows the number of clinics per Canadian province or 
territory. Ontario (twenty-four clinics), British Columbia (eight 
 
make direct comparisons between these analyses, but the implication is that growth of the 
industry in the US has been rapid and pronounced.”). 
 189. See Berger et al., supra note 185, at 158–59; Leigh Turner, Direct-to-Consumer 
Marketing of Stem Cell Interventions by Canadian Businesses, 13 REGENERATIVE MED. 
643, 643 (2018). 
 190. Berger et al., supra note 185, at 158; see also Ruairi Connolly, Timothy O’Brien & 
Gerard Flaherty, Stem Cell Tourism — A Web-Based Analysis of Clinical Services Available 
to International Travellers, 12 TRAVEL MED. & INFECTIOUS DISEASE 695, 696 (2014) 
(referring to “stem cell tourism” as an expanding category of medical tourism). 
 191. The choropleth map was generated using the data set reported in Turner, supra 
note 189, at 646–47. 
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clinics), and Alberta (six clinics) have the highest number of stem 
cell clinics providing access to stem cell–based interventions in 
the country. No clinics were identified in other Canadian 
provinces—Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, and Prince Edward Island—or territories—Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon (colored in gray with linear 
hatching). 
Against a backdrop of public-health concerns surrounding 
overoptimistic and unsubstantiated stem cell interventions, which 
thwart adequate patient informed consent and examination of clinical 
outcomes, the federal government took action. The FDA filed a 
request to permanently enjoin the Colorado clinic from administering 
the Regenexx-C cell mixture as part of a medical procedure.192 The 
FDA argued that the mixture was a drug and biological product subject 
to FDA jurisdiction.193 The defendants countered the FDA’s position 
by arguing that the Agency lacked jurisdiction to regulate its mixture 
because it was not a drug or biological product, but rather a medical 
procedure that was part of the practice of medicine,194 which is an area 
governed by states and not the federal government.195 The district court 
 
 192. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 262–63 (D.D.C. 
2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 193. Id. at 254. 
 194. A body of literature has examined in recent years the extent to which the FDA 
regulates the practice of medicine, which has been traditionally recognized as a matter of 
state jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in 
Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 KAN. L. REV. 149, 150–51 (2004); Zettler, supra 
note 69, at 849–50. 
 195. Regenerative Scis., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 254–55. 
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ruled in favor of the FDA,196 and the D.C. Circuit affirmed that 
ruling.197 
In reaching its decision, the D.C. Circuit considered the definitions 
of “drug” and “biological product.”198 Under the FDCA, a drug is an 
“article[] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention of disease” or “intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body.”199 A biological product under section 351 of the 
PHSA as it is currently codified is any “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, 
antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic 
product, protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or 
analogous product .	.	. applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure 
of a disease or condition of human beings.”200 The appellate panel held 
that these two statutory definitions clearly applied to the stem cell 
mixture under review.201 Moreover, the panel rejected the practice-of-
medicine claims because the FDA had focused on the mixture itself—
and its safety in human use—as opposed to the medical procedure in 
 
 196. Id. at 263. Some scholars have criticized the FDA’s actions against the Regenexx-C 
stem cell mixture on various grounds. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MANHATTAN INST., 
THE FDA’S MISGUIDED REGULATION OF STEM-CELL PROCEDURES: HOW 
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERREACH BLOCKS MEDICAL INNOVATION 4–7 (2013) (arguing the 
stem cell procedure in Regenerative Sciences is not interstate commerce or a drug under the 
FDCA); Mary Ann Chirba & Stephanie M. Garfield, FDA Oversight of Autologous Stem 
Cell Therapies: Legitimate Regulation of Drugs and Devices or Groundless Interference with 
the Practice of Medicine?, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 233, 238 (2011) (arguing that the 
FDA’s position “impedes medical advances”). Epstein, for example, has argued that the 
FDA lacks authority to regulate the stem cell procedure because the statutory definition of 
interstate commerce under the FDCA is not as expansive as Congress’s constitutional 
authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Supreme Court’s decision in Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See EPSTEIN, supra, at 5–6. He acknowledged that under 
modern law the FDA has authority to regulate a business engaging in the type of interstate 
commerce at issue in Regenerative Sciences but argued that the FDCA, which was enacted 
before Wickard, does not grant the federal government power to apply constitutional 
authority where only statutory authority exists. See id. at 5. Regardless of whether such an 
argument has merit, the Regenerative Sciences decisions indicate that the stem cell clinic’s 
marketing, clientele, and other interstate activities warrant the exercise of FDA jurisdiction 
under the Commerce Clause power. See infra notes 212–18 and accompanying text (pointing 
out that the above criticisms overlook the focus of the FDA on protecting consumer safety 
by regulating private clinics that market therapies with unsubstantiated claims). 
 197. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 198. Id. at 1319. 
 199. 21 U.S.C. §	321(g)(1)(B)–(C) (Supp. 2017). 
 200. 42 U.S.C. §	262(i)(1) (Supp. 2017). 
 201. Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1319. 
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which the mixture was utilized.202 In essence, the mixture was 
considered a drug or biological product regardless of whether or not it 
was used in conjunction with a medical procedure.203 
The panel also agreed with the FDA’s position that the mixture 
was a cellular product intended for somatic cell therapy.204 Cellular 
products fall within the definition of drugs and biological products 
subject to FDA regulation205 unless they are minimally manipulated.206 
“Minimal manipulation” means “processing that does not alter the 
relevant biological characteristics.”207 The court determined that the 
mixture at issue in Regenerative Sciences had been more than 
minimally manipulated because, for example, (1) the culturing process 
can “determine the growth and biological characteristics” of the cell 
population, and (2) the addition of certain substances to the culture 
affect stem cell differentiation.208 Indeed,  
	  
 
 202. Id. But see Lars Noah, Growing Organs in the Lab: Tissue Engineers Confront 
Institutional “Immune” Responses, 55 JURIMETRICS 297, 315–17 (2015) (questioning the 
court’s reasoning on that point). 
 203. See Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1319. 
 204. Id. at 1321–22; see also 21 C.F.R. §	1271.3(d)(4) (2018). 
 205. Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy 
Products and Gene Therapy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248, 53,249 (Oct. 14, 1993). 
 206. Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1321. It should be noted, however, that minimal 
manipulation is not the only criterion under which cellular products fall within the definition 
of drugs or biological products. 
 207. 21 C.F.R. §	1271.3(f)(2) (2018). 
 208. Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1322. 
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Figure 4. Stem Cell Clinics Offering Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of 
Stem Cell–Based Interventions Globally209 
 
 
The figure shows the number of clinics per country. The United 
States (187 clinics), India (35 clinics), Mexico (28 clinics), China 
(23 clinics), Australia (19 clinics), England (16 clinics), Thailand 
(14 clinics), Malaysia (12 clinics), and Germany (11 clinics) have 
more than 10 stem cell clinics in each country. The Cayman 
 
 209. The choropleth map was generated using the data set reported in Berger et al., 
supra note 185, at tbl.S1. 
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Islands—the only place where the Regenexx-C procedure is now 
available210—and the Bahamas have the highest number of stem 
cell clinics providing access to stem cell–based interventions per 
capita in the world.211 No data was reported for clinics in 
countries colored in gray.  
the culturing process and its effects on the safety of MSCs intended for 
clinical use are often overlooked by critics of the case.212 
 
 210. See Regenexx Procedures, supra note 179; Stem Cell Procedures, REGENEXX 
CAYMAN, https://regenexxcayman.ky/procedures/stem-cell-procedures/ [https://perma.cc/
4PA7-2CYR]; infra note 212. 
 211. Berger et al., supra note 185, at 158. 
 212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. Consider the claims that FDA 
interference in Regenerative Sciences was unjustified because (1) use of autologous donor 
stem cells eliminates the risk of transmitting infectious or genetic diseases and (2) stem cell 
processing under locally controlled circumstances is no riskier than other standard 
laboratory procedures outside FDA jurisdiction. See EPSTEIN, supra note 196, at 17. Such 
claims overlook the vast empirical scientific evidence associated with documented changes 
in stem cell characteristics following prolonged in vitro expansion of MSCs and other types 
of stem cells. See studies cited infra notes 214, 216. 
Similarly, the view that “extracting and re-injecting a patient’s own cells is not that 
different from other reparative or surgical procedures,” such as coronary artery bypass graft 
surgery—in which the saphenous vein from a patient’s leg is removed and transferred to the 
site of an occluded artery—or spinal surgery—in which a piece of bone from a patient’s 
pelvis or rib is used to fuse vertebrae—is not quite accurate. Chirba & Garfield, supra note 
196, at 235. This view confounds the level of invasiveness associated with the transfer of a 
patient’s differentiated autologous tissue to another site of the patient’s body with the 
transfer of autologous multipotent stem cells to another site following in vitro expansion. 
The former involves tissue that cannot differentiate into other subtypes, whereas the latter 
involves stem cells that can proliferate and differentiate on their own into multiple tissue 
types. Such a declaration is akin to analogizing the transfer of an inert piece of wood into a 
small garden enclosure to straighten out a crooked plant with the transfer of a tomato plant 
that can grow and proliferate in the small garden enclosure over time. 
To be clear, issues surrounding the decentralization of medical research, the impact of 
overregulation on innovation, and the role of administrative agencies in the advancement 
of emerging technologies that can benefit humankind are interesting, multifaceted, and 
worthy of discussion. Those topics, however, are beyond the central scope of Regenerative 
Sciences. Simply put, the stem cell procedure at issue in that case, which involved the 
expansion of stem cells in vitro over a period of approximately two weeks, should absolutely 
be regulated by the FDA because of the serious potential safety issues associated with in 
vitro stem cell expansion. See studies cited infra notes 214, 216. 
It should be noted that in the aftermath of Regenerative Sciences, Regenexx clinics 
began to market Regenexx-SD, or “same-day,” stem cell procedures in the United States. 
See Regenexx Procedures, supra note 179. During the SD procedures, a “patient’s cells are 
harvested in the morning, isolated and processed, then re-injected into the patient’s injured 
area—all within a period of a few hours.” Id. Thus, unlike Regenexx-C, the Regenexx-SD 
procedures fall within the Same Surgical Procedure Exception for human cells, tissues, and 
cellular and tissue-based products (“HCT/Ps”) outlined under 21 C.F.R. §	1271.15(b), which 
permits the removal and implantation of autologous HCT/Ps so long as they are performed 
within the same surgical procedure. 21 C.F.R. §	 1271.15(b) (2018); see also CTR. FOR 
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Under a jurisprudence of scientific empiricism,213 the type of 
therapy at issue in Regenerative Sciences should fall within the FDA’s 
regulatory jurisdiction because prolonged in vitro expansion and 
culture of stem cells has been shown to induce genomic instability, 
spontaneous malignant transformation (cancer), chromosomal 
abnormalities, loss of multipotency, and aberrant patterns of gene 
expression.214 The progressive accumulation of DNA damage in stem 
cells increases with time of culture and can ultimately lead to loss of 
stemness215 and differentiation potential.216  
 
BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAME 
SURGICAL PROCEDURE EXCEPTION UNDER 21 CFR 1271.15(b): QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTION 2 (2017) [hereinafter GUIDANCE 
FOR SAME SURGICAL PROCEDURE EXCEPTION], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
biologicsbloodvaccines/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/tissue/ucm41
9926.pdf [https://perma.cc/58YY-9FC4]. Because the risks associated with prolonged stem 
cell in vitro expansion are not present in same-day stem cell procedures, the FDA has not 
asserted jurisdiction over them. See GUIDANCE FOR SAME SURGICAL PROCEDURE 
EXCEPTION, supra, at 2–3. Thus, critics’ claims that the “aggressive expansion” of FDA 
authority and its “aggressive legal maneuverings” against select private stem cell clinics will 
exert a chilling effect on the industry have not materialized. See EPSTEIN, supra note 196, at 
4; Chirba & Garfield, supra note 196, at 268 n.210. In fact, private stem cell clinics and their 
direct-to-consumer marketing methods have increased dramatically over the last decade. 
See, e.g., Berger et al., supra note 185, at 158–59; supra Figures 2–4. 
 213. See Enríquez, supra note 2, at 611–14 (defining a jurisprudence of scientific 
empiricism as “a normative structural legal framework .	 .	 . that is broadly adaptable to 
addressing questions of science in law”). 
 214. Flora Clément et al., Stem Cell Manipulation, Gene Therapy and the Risk of Cancer 
Stem Cell Emergence, 4 STEM CELL INVESTIGATION, no. 67, July 25, 2017, at 1, 9; Sven 
Geißler et al., Functional Comparison of Chronological and In Vitro Aging: Differential Role 
of the Cytoskeleton and Mitochondria in Mesenchymal Stromal Cells, 7 PLOS ONE, no. 
e52700, Dec. 28, 2012, at 1, 10; Carla A. Herberts, Marcel S.G. Kwa & Harm P.H. Hermsen, 
Risk Factors in the Development of Stem Cell Therapy, 9 J. TRANSLATIONAL MED., no. 29, 
Mar. 22, 2011, at 1, 6; Myungshin Kim et al., Passage-Dependent Accumulation of Somatic 
Mutations in Mesenchymal Stromal Cells During In Vitro Culture Revealed by Whole 
Genome Sequencing, 7 SCI. REP., no. 14508, Nov. 6, 2017, at 1, 2; Masako Miura et al., 
Accumulated Chromosomal Instability in Murine Bone Marrow Mesenchymal Stem Cells 
Leads to Malignant Transformation, 24 STEM CELLS 1095, 1095 (2006); Fatemeh Norozi et 
al., Mesenchymal Stem Cells as a Double-Edged Sword in Suppression or Progression of 
Solid Tumor Cells, 37 TUMOR BIOLOGY 11,679, 11,679 (2016). 
 215. In general, the term “stemness” refers to stem cells’ ability to self-renew and 
differentiate into other cell types. See Pedro M. Aponte & Andrés Caicedo, Stemness in 
Cancer: Stem Cells, Cancer Stem Cells, and Their Microenvironment, STEM CELLS INT’L, 
Apr. 4, 2017, at 1, 1; Douglas Melton, ‘Stemness’: Definitions, Criteria, and Standards, in 
ESSENTIALS OF STEM CELL BIOLOGY 7, 14–15 (Robert Lanza & Anthony Atala eds., 3d 
ed. 2014). 
 216. See, e.g., Hugo Alves et al., A Link Between the Accumulation of DNA Damage and 
Loss of Multi-Potency of Human Mesenchymal Stromal Cells, 14 J. CELLULAR & 
MOLECULAR MED. 2729, 2729 (2010). 
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Although scientists continue to research the causes underlying the 
above phenomena related to in vitro intracellular and extracellular 
influences on stem cells, private clinics have continued to profit from 
unapproved therapies that are costly and may have little to no 
therapeutic effect.217 The FDA recently filed requests for permanent 
injunctions against two stem cells clinics—US Stem Cell Clinic LLC of 
Sunrise, Florida, and California Stem Cell Treatment Center, Inc.—to 
enjoin them “from marketing stem cell products without FDA 
approval and for significant deviations from current good 
manufacturing practice requirements.”218 
2.  Potential Classifications of GGE Products 
Although Regenerative Sciences applies to somatic stem cell 
therapies and is silent on the status of germ cells, the stem cell 
procedures examined in that case are relevant to GGE in many ways, 
particularly because the safety and efficacy of GGE interventions have 
yet to be proven. Accordingly, Regenerative Sciences establishes a firm 
regulatory path for the oversight of GGE by the FDA. The following 
classifications may apply to the regulation of GGE technologies. 
a. Drug 
Products intended for genome editing meet the FDCA’s definition 
of drug. Under the FDCA, a drug is an article “intended for use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” or 
“intended to affect the structure of any function of the body.”219 GGE 
techniques will most likely require extraction or collection of germ-cell 
samples from patients, followed by a culturing process and the addition 
of a CRISPR-based or other product that enables genome editing 
directly to gametes, zygotes, or human embryos.220 For purposes of in 
vitro fertilization, the modified germ cells will be used during 
fertilization and subsequent implantation into a patient’s uterus with 
 
 217. See Berger et al., supra note 185, at 158–59; Turner & Knoepfler, supra note 188, at 
154–55. 
 218. See FDA Seeks Permanent Injunctions Against Two Stem Cell Clinics, FDA (May 
9, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm607257.htm 
[https://perma.cc/G75W-LJCT]. 
 219. 21 U.S.C. §	321(g)(1) (Supp. 2017). 
 220. See, e.g., Xiangjin Kang et al., Introducing Precise Genetic Modifications into 
Human 3PN Embryos by CRISPR/Cas-Mediated Genome Editing, 33 J. ASSISTED 
REPROD. & GENETICS 581, 581 (2016); Liang et al., supra note 9, at 364; Hong Ma et al., 
supra note 37, at 413; Tang et al., supra note 13, at 525. 
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the intent of causing a pregnancy.221 The product aimed at genome 
editing may or may not be used for therapeutic purposes,222 but it will 
certainly affect the structure and function of the target cells as it will 
trigger cuts on DNA and introduce changes that are intended to affect 
the wildtype223 characteristics of the target genetic locus.224 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has shown deference to the FDA and held that the 
statutory definition of drug under the FDCA is a term of art that is 
broader than the strict medical definition of the word.225 For purposes 
of the FDCA, the interpretation of the term hinges on the article’s 
intended use, rather than its technical properties.226 Accordingly, the 
product for genome editing would squarely fit the definition of a drug 
under the FDCA.227 
b. Biological Product 
Depending on its intended use and method of delivery, a product 
intended for genome editing may also fit the definition of a biological 
product under section 351 of the PHSA for purposes of GGE.228 The 
statute specifies that biological products may encompass viruses or sera 
with therapeutic applications.229 Technological advances have recently 
enabled GGE via delivery of large fragments of DNA into zygotes 
 
 221. Implantation of genetically modified embryos to induce a pregnancy has been 
achieved in cynomolgus monkeys, see Niu et al., supra note 12, at 836, and, more recently, 
in humans, see David Cyranoski & Heidi Ledford, International Outcry over Genome-Edited 
Baby Claim, 563 NATURE 607, 607–08 (2018). 
 222. Whether a genome-editing product ends up being used in therapeutic or 
nontherapeutic applications is significant—from a legal perspective—because the statute 
specifies that a drug is an “article[] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease,” 21 U.S.C. §	321(g)(1)(B) (Supp. 2017), and thereby 
excludes nontherapeutic GGE purposes as outlined supra Sections I.B.1–2. 
 223. The term “wildtype” refers to the most common phenotype—observable 
characteristics or traits—for an organism in a natural breeding population. See Wildtype, 
BIOLOGY ONLINE DICTIONARY, biology-online.org/dictionary/wildtype [https://perma.cc/
R9SL-SPFK].  
 224. The “target genetic locus” in this context means the particular chromosomal 
position—the DNA site within the genome—to which a genome-editing enzyme is recruited 
to cut DNA.  
 225. United States v. An Article of Drug .	.	. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 792–93 (1969). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See 21 U.S.C. §	321(g)(1)(c) (Supp. 2017) (defining drugs as “articles (other than 
food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals,” 
which, when read broadly, includes genome editing). 
 228. See 42 U.S.C. §	262(i)(1) (Supp. 2017). 
 229. See id. 
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using adeno-associated virus230 (“AAV”) vectors,231 thereby extending 
FDA jurisdiction to this type of GGE intervention. Biological products 
within the meaning of the PHSA also include vaccines intended for 
therapeutic purposes.232 Thus, GGE products for prophylactic uses 
would also fit the statutory definition of a biological product subject to 
FDA jurisdiction. 
Interestingly, proteins for therapeutic use are included in the 
statutory definition of a biological product, which would encompass all 
modern protein-based tools for genome editing—including zinc finger-
, TALE-, and CRISPR-based systems—so long as they are not 
“chemically synthesized.”233 In theory, this exception creates a 
loophole in the statute, whereby a researcher using a purified, 
recombinant protein to trigger genome editing for GGE purposes is 
subject to regulation under the PHSA, but another researcher using a 
chemically synthesized version of the same protein is not.234 Lastly, 
unless Congress amends the definition of biological products under the 
PHSA, it should be noted that the statutory text, in its current 
incarnation, precludes regulation of any GGE products intended for 
nontherapeutic uses as biological products subject to FDA oversight.235 
c. Medical Device 
Under section 201(h) of the FDCA as it is currently codified, a 
medical “device” is 
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, 
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, 
including any component, part, or accessory .	.	. intended for use 
 
 230. AAV is a nonpathogenic virus that infects humans—as well as nonhuman 
primates—and carries a relatively small, linear, single-stranded DNA genome. Shyam Daya 
& Kenneth I. Berns, Gene Therapy Using Adeno-Associated Virus Vectors, 21 CLINICAL 
MICROBIOLOGY REVIEWS 583, 583 (2008). AAV’s small size and nonpathogenic properties 
have enabled the development of AAV-based vector biotechnologies for use in gene-
therapy clinical trials to treat a diverse range of human diseases. See id. at 586, 588–90. 
 231. Naoaki Mizuno et al., Intra-Embryo Gene Cassette Knockin by CRISPR/Cas9-
Mediated Genome Editing with Adeno-Associated Viral Vector, 9 ISCIENCE 286, 286 (2018). 
 232. See §	262(i)(1). 
 233. See id. (“The term ‘biological product’ means a .	.	. protein (except any chemically 
synthesized polypeptide) .	.	. applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or 
condition of human beings.”). 
 234. From a biochemical perspective, the purified and chemically synthesized versions 
of the same protein would be indistinguishable. Both proteins would comprise the same 
amino acid sequence regardless of the origin source. 
 235. See §	262(i)(1) (requiring explicitly that biological products be “applicable to the 
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings”). 
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in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man .	 .	 . or 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body .	.	. 
and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes 
through chemical action .	 .	 . and which is not dependent upon 
being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended 
purpose.236 
GGE products intended for therapeutic use are likely to be 
classified as contrivances or in vitro reagents that affect the structure 
or function of their targets. However, as it applies to GGE, in which 
the primary purpose is to modify a target nucleotide sequence, the 
chemical action clause of the statutory text would render GGE 
products beyond the meaning of a medical device under the FDCA, 
primarily because effectors that catalyze DNA double-stranded breaks 
for genome editing achieve their primary goal through enzymatic—i.e., 
chemical—action.237 Accordingly, GGE products are not likely to 
constitute medical devices under the statute. 
 
 236. See 21 U.S.C §	321(h) (Supp. 2017). 
 237. Interestingly, a distinction could theoretically be made between GGE that relies on 
programmable base-editing enzymes—as opposed to genome-editing enzymes—and 
somatic epigenome editing to control patterns of gene expression. Although both methods 
rely on the use of a deactivated genome-editing enzyme, such as dCas9, the former utilizes 
a base-editing enzyme that mediates a chemical reaction to achieve its primary purpose, see, 
e.g., Nicole M. Gaudelli et al., Programmable Base Editing of A•T to G•C in Genomic DNA 
Without DNA Cleavage, 551 NATURE 464, 464 (2017) (using adenine base editors to 
mediate A•T to G•C conversion); Yanting Zeng et al., Correction of the Marfan Syndrome 
Pathogenic FBN1 Mutation by Base Editing in Human Cells and Heterozygous Embryos, 26 
MOLECULAR THERAPY 2631, 2631–32 (2018) (discussing the use of base editors to solve 
“genetic diseases at the embryo stage”), whereas the latter merely relies on physical 
interactions between the deactivated genome-editing enzyme and its target molecule to 
activate or inhibit gene expression, see, e.g., Luke A. Gilbert et al., Genome-Scale CRISPR-
Mediated Control of Gene Repression and Activation, 159 CELL 647, 647–48 (2014). In other 
words, each method achieves its primary intended purpose either via chemical action—in 
the base-editing GGE case—or physical action—in the epigenome-editing case. Only the 
somatic epigenome-editing product would thus constitute a medical device under the law. 
The aforementioned analysis would depend largely on how the FDA interprets the 
term “chemical action.” The Agency recently published a guidance that describes the FDA’s 
position that chemical action should be interpreted consistently with the term 
“pharmacological action” as that term is generally understood in the medical field. See 
FDA, CLASSIFICATION OF PRODUCTS AS DRUGS AND DEVICES & ADDITIONAL 
PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION ISSUES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF 7 (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM258957.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AA6F-TT7R]. The guidance is not legally binding but offers the Agency’s 
current thinking on the topic. Because the term “pharmacological action” in the medical 
field includes the mere binding of molecules through electrostatic, hydrophobic, and other 
types of interactions without the need for catalytic activity, see id. at 7 n.4, the somatic 
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d. Combination Product 
A combination product is a product comprised of two or more 
different types of regulated components.238 Thus, a GGE product may 
be a combination product if it is both a drug and a biological product 
within the meaning of section 503(g) of the FDCA.239 Combination 
products are assigned to an FDA center with primary jurisdiction for 
its premarket review and regulation based on a determination of the 
product’s “primary mode of action.”240 Therefore, the Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research would have primary jurisdiction over a drug-
biological GGE product, while CBER would have primary jurisdiction 
of a biological-drug GGE product. 
3.  Minimal Manipulation 
Germ cells undergoing modification during GGE interventions 
will likely be deemed more than minimally manipulated under both the 
FDA rules and the Regenerative Sciences standard. As noted above, 
any processing that alters the relevant characteristics of cells or tissues 
cannot constitute minimal manipulation.241 Alteration of specific 
biological characteristics of germ cells is at the core of GGE, and, thus, 
the addition of products that enable genome editing is intended to 
affect not merely how the germ cell differentiates but also the cell’s 
own genetic identity. Because GGE interventions involve 
microinjection, viral-based delivery of packaged molecules to activate 
genome editing, and other types of micromanipulations, the modified 
germ cells would not qualify as section 361 products subject to minimal 
FDA oversight.242 In essence, the germ cells are more than minimally 
manipulated and involve “combination of the cells or tissues with 
another article,”243 namely an effector that catalyzes genome editing. 
The aforementioned analysis of the potential classifications for 
GGE regulation, coupled with the current lack of scientific evidence to 
establish the safety and efficacy of genome editing—in both somatic 
 
epigenome-editing product would no longer constitute a medical device under the guidance 
interpretation of the FDCA. 
 238. See 21 C.F.R. §	3.2(e) (2018). 
 239. See 21 U.S.C. §	353(g) (Supp. 2017). 
 240. See id. §	353(g)(1). 
 241. See 21 C.F.R. §	1271.3(f) (2018). 
 242. See id. §	1271.10(a)(1)–(4). 
 243. Id. 
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and germ cells—provides the FDA strong footing to assert its 
jurisdiction over GGE.244 
D. Congressional Proscription of Clinical Applications of Germline 
Genome Editing 
The FDA stands on a strong legal foundation to assert jurisdiction 
over GGE and should do so promptly to restrict the rise of a premature 
industry aimed at engineering genetically modified humans. The safety 
and efficacy of GGE technologies must be adequately addressed from 
a scientific perspective before clinical GGE interventions can proceed. 
At the same time, robust public debate must focus on the potential 
social and ethical benefits and risks of GGE interventions. 
Once jurisdictional hurdles are cleared, any manufacturer of 
products intended for use in clinical applications of GGE would be 
required to submit an Investigational New Drug Application 
(“IND”)245 and a Biologic Licensing Application (“BLA”),246 which 
must be approved prior to marketing GGE interventions. However, 
the FDA is currently prohibited from reviewing any INDs under a 
provision in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (“CAA”) of 2016,247 
which Congress has since renewed.248 The provision states that 
None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to 
notify a sponsor or otherwise acknowledge receipt of a 
submission for an exemption for investigational use of a drug or 
biological product .	 .	 . in research in which a human embryo is 
intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic 
modification. Any such submission shall be deemed to have not 
been received by the Secretary, and the exemption may not go 
into effect.249 
To be clear, there currently is no law explicitly banning human 
GGE. Although no federal funds may be used to perform research on 
 
 244. In addition to regulation under the gene-therapy framework and the Regenerative 
Sciences standard, the FDA may also regulate GGE under provisions applicable to assisted 
reproductive technologies, which relate to the handling of gametes and embryos. See 42 
U.S.C. §	263a-1(a)–(c) (2012). 
 245. See 21 C.F.R. §	312.20 (2018). 
 246. See 42 U.S.C. §	262(a)(3) (Supp. 2017). 
 247. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, §	749, 129 Stat. 2242, 
2283 (2015).  
 248. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, §	731, 133 Stat. 13; 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, §	734, 132 Stat. 348, 389; 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, §	743, 131 Stat. 135, 175.  
 249. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, §	749, 129 Stat. at 2283.  
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human embryos since passage of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment,250 
such research is legal in the United States, so long as it is privately 
funded. The rider provision of the CAA merely restricts the FDA’s 
ability to acknowledge receipt of—in other words, to review—an 
application for clinical use of GGE technology in an embryo. However, 
that limitation is significant because all drugs and biological products, 
including gene therapies, must be approved by the FDA before they 
can be marketed and used in clinical settings. Such approval cannot 
occur if the Agency cannot review INDs and BLAs for GGE purposes. 
In essence, because Congress would likely find it difficult to enact 
a law that directly bans GGE251—particularly given increasingly 
favorable public attitudes toward the use of technologies for genome 
editing252—it has used its power of the purse to achieve a similar policy 
result.253 
With the rider provision of the CAA, Congress introduced a de 
facto ban on any clinical applications of GGE and prohibited the FDA 
from assessing and evaluating the safety and efficacy of any GGE 
clinical intervention. Such a legislative ban is unnecessary and 
counterintuitive as it prevents the FDA from carrying out its mission 
to protect the public health by ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs, 
biological products, and medical devices.254 
By restricting the FDA’s oversight over GGE INDs, Congress is 
also interfering with the Agency’s “responsib[ility] to advance the 
public health by helping to speed innovations that make medical 
products more effective, safer, and more affordable and by helping the 
public get the accurate, science-based information they need to use 
medical products .	.	. and improve their health.”255 Indeed, the FDA’s 
role within the regulatory system is not limited to its consumer-
protection responsibilities. The Agency also plays an important role in 
incentivizing the creation of robust scientific information about 
products.256 By foreclosing FDA review of GGE technologies, 
 
 250. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 251. See, e.g., Spivak et al., supra note 32, at 38, app. tbls.1–4 (compiling data over the 
last few decades on bills related to then-controversial technologies with reproductive 
applications to demonstrate that, despite widespread concerns and contentious debate 
among members of Congress, the vast majority of proposed prohibitions never became law). 
 252. See studies cited infra notes 390–93. 
 253. See Spivak et al., supra note 32, at 37. 
 254. See What We Do, supra note 31. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See generally, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 
13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007) (reexamining “the role of FDA regulation 
in motivating investment in biopharmaceutical innovation”). 
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Congress is hindering efforts to develop robust scientific data on GGE 
applications. 
Furthermore, Congress has not presented evidence to 
demonstrate that the FDA would be unable to fulfill its regulatory 
duties concerning GGE technologies. Simply put, the current ban is 
unnecessary because, given the FDA’s long record of enforcing 
regulations aimed at consumer protection, no evidence suggests that 
the FDA would approve any GGE intervention without first subjecting 
it to the long and rigorous process required to establish its safety and 
efficacy. To the contrary, the FDA has discretion to apply clinical holds 
to delay or suspend an ongoing clinical investigation due to 
unreasonable risks to research subjects or discovery of information that 
undermines confidence in such study. Indeed, the FDA recently 
availed itself of this authority by instituting a clinical hold257 on a 
CRISPR-based therapy.258 
Lastly, the ban increases the likelihood that GGE technologies 
will be pushed to develop in other jurisdictions,259 where regulations 
may be inadequate from social and ethical standpoints.260 Accordingly, 
 
 257. A “clinical hold” refers to an order to delay or suspend a clinical investigation. The 
conditions for issuing a clinical hold may include unreasonable risk to research subjects or 
discovery of information that undermines confidence in the investigators or the study 
protocol. See 21 C.F.R. §	312.42 (2018). 
 258. See Alexander Burik, FDA Puts Clinical Trial for CRISPR Therapy on Hold, 
LABIOTECH (Jan. 6, 2018), https://labiotech.eu/medical/crispr-therapeutics-fda/ 
[https://perma.cc/52Y8-TNH7]. The FDA removed the hold on the clinical trial in October 
2018. See Allison DeAngelis, FDA Lifts Hold on First-Ever CRISPR/Cas9 Gene-Editing 
Trial, MEM. BUS. J. (Oct. 12, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/
news/2018/10/12/fda-lifts-hold-on-first-ever-crispr-cas9-gene.html [https://perma.cc/K4BT-
PBHB]. 
 259. See, e.g., John Zhang et al., First Live Birth Using Human Oocytes Reconstituted by 
Spindle Nuclear Transfer for Mitochondrial DNA Mutation Causing Leigh Syndrome, 106 
FERTILITY & STERILITY (ISSUE 3 SUPP.) e375, e375–76 (2016) (reporting the birth of a baby 
conceived via mitochondrial replacement therapy in Mexico aided by an American 
physician from New York who could not perform the procedure in the United States); 
Zhang et al., supra note 25, at 365 (same); see also Rob Stein, Clinic Claims Success in 
Making Babies with 3 Parents’ DNA, NPR (June 6, 2018, 5:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2018/06/06/615909572/inside-the-ukrainian-clinic-making-3-parent-babies-
for-women-who-are-infertile [https://perma.cc/L9T9-56YF] (noting that a Ukrainian clinic is 
currently marketing in the United States a $15,000 procedure involving the use of DNA 
from three different people to help infertile women—who are willing to travel to Ukraine—
conceive a biological child). 
 260. See Katrin Weigmann, The Ethics of Global Clinical Trials, 16 EMBO REP. 566, 567 
(2015) (noting that stringent FDA regulations are one major reason why clinical trials move 
to low- and middle-income countries). Notably, emerging reproductive technologies can 
present difficult challenges related to patient informed consent, confidentiality, access to 
information, and long-term follow-up. See generally, e.g., Jonathan M. Breslin et al., Top 10 
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Health Care Ethics Challenges Facing the Public: Views of Toronto Bioethicists, 6 BMC 
MED. ETHICS, no. 5, June 26, 2005, at 1 (discussing various ethical challenges posed by 
innovation in the medical profession). Consider, for instance, the case of the Chinese twin 
girls born in November 2018 whose genomes were edited at the CCR5 locus. To obtain 
informed consent from parents enrolling in the clinical trial, He Jiankui described the 
research as an “AIDS vaccine development project” that would bestow upon “gene editing 
[sic] babies .	.	. the genotype of the Northern European to naturally immunize against the 
HIV-1 virus.” He Jiankui, Informed Consent Version: Female 3.0, at 1 (unpublished consent 
form), http://web.archive.org/web/20181126212007/http:/www.sustc-genome.org.cn/source/
pdf/Informed-consent-women-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR9Y-54DX]. The consent 
form was a twenty-three-page document filled with technical jargon, see generally id., which 
underscores the question of whether patients were able to provide adequate informed 
consent to the research that would be performed on embryos intended for subsequent 
implantation and pregnancy.  
One striking aspect of the consent form is the disclaimer of risks associated with off-
target effects, which were identified as “[t]he primary risk of gene editing” without actually 
disclosing the deleterious consequences of genomic mutations that could arise from 
potential targeting of unintended DNA sites. See id. at 4. Assuming arguendo that patients 
thoroughly understood the implications of off-target genome editing, the waiver of liability 
clause disclaiming responsibility for off-target effects is dubious from ethical and legal 
perspectives. The consent form’s acknowledgment that the risks associated with the clinical 
trial are “beyond the risk consequences of the existing medical science and technology,” see 
id., arguably establishes prima facie evidence that safety and efficacy concerns are 
substantial enough to warrant halting the trial. In the United States, for example, proceeding 
with such a trial at the early stages of technological development before safety and efficacy 
issues have been addressed from a scientific perspective likely constitutes a reckless or 
grossly negligent act, which would automatically void the waiver of liability. See 45 C.F.R. 
§	46.116(a)(6) (2018) (“No informed consent may include any exculpatory language through 
which the subject .	.	. is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, 
or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or its agents 
from liability for negligence.”); Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/
patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research [https://perma.cc/49MM-Y4XX] 
(describing the safety and efficacy information which must be reviewed by the FDA before 
clinical trials can legally begin). It also bears noting that although the consent form loosely 
mentions the risk of off-target effects, it does not inform patients of potential unintended 
on-target effects that could arise from editing the CCR5 locus on embryos, including 
susceptibility to other diseases that might be relevant in the patients’ geographic location or 
unknown cognitive outcomes. See infra notes 440–42. 
Lastly, He Jiankui admitted “he obtained consent from the couples himself, rather than 
having a trained, uninvolved professional do it.” Sharon Begley, Amid Uproar, Chinese 
Scientist Defends Creating Gene-Edited Babies, STAT (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.statnews.com/2018/11/28/chinese-scientist-defends-creating-gene-edited-babies/ 
[https://perma.cc/SFF7-96YP]. And despite He Jiankui’s claim that he explained the meaning 
of the consent form “to each family line by line and paragraph by paragraph,” see id., it is 
hard to imagine that all patients enrolled in the clinical trial provided informed consent. 
Similar to the problems associated with obtaining informed consent in the case of the 
Chinese twin girls outlined above—which stemmed from clear institutional failures and gaps 
in the Chinese regulatory system—other issues that fall within social and ethical ambits may 
be inadequately addressed in jurisdictions that lack robust regulatory systems with clear and 
established rules to ensure patient protections. 
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the legislative ban imposes higher scientific, research, and social costs 
that are not outweighed by their potential benefits. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTION AND A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO 
GERMLINE GENOME EDITING 
The current de facto legislative ban on GGE clinical applications 
may be lawful for now, but it is merely a temporary fix that cannot 
adequately address many legal challenges that are looming on the 
horizon. Although human GGE technologies are not quite “ready for 
primetime,”261 fundamental research to address current technological 
limitations of genome editing, including the identification and 
reduction of off-target effects,262 prevention of mosaicism,263 and 
improvements in target efficiency,264 specificity,265 delivery,266 and other 
areas267 constitute active and prolific fields of scientific inquiry. 
Collectively, the results from today’s research will pave the road to 
overcome current obstacles in genome editing. 
At some point in the near future, the technology will become 
primed for clinical applications,268 which in turn will likely lead to 
 
 261. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 666. 
 262. See, e.g., Pinar Akcakaya et al., In Vivo CRISPR Editing with No Detectable 
Genome-Wide Off-Target Mutations, 561 NATURE 416, 416, 419 (2018). 
 263. See, e.g., Yetki Aslan et al., High-Efficiency Non-Mosaic CRISPR-Mediated Knock-
In and Indel Mutation in F0 Xenopus, 144 DEVELOPMENT 2852, 2852, 2855 (2017). 
 264. See, e.g., Jean-Baptiste Renaud et al., Improved Genome Editing Efficiency and 
Flexibility Using Modified Oligonucleotides with TALEN and CRISPR-Cas9 Nucleases, 14 
CELL REP. 2263, 2263–64 (2016). 
 265. See, e.g., Ian M. Slaymaker et al., Rationally Engineered Cas9 Nucleases with 
Improved Specificity, 351 SCIENCE 84, 84 (2016); Josh Tycko, Vic E. Myer & Patrick D. Hsu, 
Methods for Optimizing CRISPR-Cas9 Genome Editing Specificity, 63 MOLECULAR CELL 
355, 355 (2016). 
 266. See, e.g., Wenhua Zhou et al., Enhanced Cytosolic Delivery and Release of 
CRISPR/Cas9 by Black Phosphorus Nanosheets for Genome Editing, 57 ANGEWANDTE 
CHEMIE 10,268, 10,271 (2018). 
 267. See, e.g., Alejandro Chavez et al., Precise Cas9 Targeting Enables Genomic 
Mutation Prevention, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3669, 3669–73 (2018); Van Trung Chu 
et al., Increasing the Efficiency of Homology-Directed Repair for CRISPR-Cas9-Induced 
Precise Gene Editing in Mammalian Cells, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 543, 543 (2015); 
Paul Enríquez, CRISPR-Mediated Epigenome Editing, 89 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 471, 
483 (2016); Benjamin P. Kleinstiver et al., High-Fidelity CRISPR–Cas9 Nucleases with No 
Detectable Genome-Wide Off-Target Effects, 529 NATURE 490, 490 (2016) (reducing off-
target effects). 
 268. See Marilynn Marchione, Chinese Researcher Claims Birth of First Gene-Edited 
Babies	— Twin Girls, STAT (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/11/25/china-
first-gene-edited-babies-born/ [https://perma.cc/5469-LUZQ] (reporting on what is 
presumably the first birth of humans whose genomes were altered during the embryonic 
stage). See generally, e.g., Matthew H. Porteus, Towards a New Era in Medicine: Therapeutic 
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claims brought by parents wishing to use GGE technologies. The next 
section of this Article contends that permanent legislative or 
administrative bans on select uses of GGE cannot withstand 
constitutional scrutiny and, thus, will likely succumb to litigation 
because they impinge on a cognizable fundamental right269 that 
 
Genome Editing, 16 GENOME BIOLOGY 286 (2015) (discussing how advances in genome 
editing have increased the spectrum of diseases that can be treated with therapeutic uses of 
genome editing). It should be noted that the experiments leading to the birth of the first 
gene-edited babies in China highlight the use of a faulty gene-editing strategy by an 
inexperienced researcher but nevertheless demonstrate the feasibility of using gene editing 
in human embryos. The methods requisite to perform such experiments in the human 
germline are likely to improve over time. 
 269. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the Supreme Court articulated a 
two-prong test to determine whether a fundamental right exists under substantive due 
process. See id. at 720–21. First, the asserted right must be “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Second, the party must articulate a “‘careful 
description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Id. If the right is deemed 
fundamental, strict scrutiny applies, “which forbids the government to infringe certain 
‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292, 302 (1993). If the right in question is not fundamental, “[t]he general rule is that 
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
A narrow interpretation of Glucksberg could, at first glance, appear to foreclose the 
emergence of a right to perform select GGE interventions because modern GGE is a 
nascent biotechnology and no deeply rooted history exists that chronicles GGE uses. Under 
a broader interpretation of Glucksberg, however, the right might be articulated as, inter alia, 
the right to bear healthy offspring, make offspring health determinations, guarantee the 
success of biological procreation, or be free from government interference in procreative 
decisions related to GGE—all of which derive from already-existing fundamental rights. 
Although Glucksberg outlined the modern test to determine fundamental rights, 
subsequent case law has abandoned its rigid interpretation. Notably, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending 
point of the substantive due process inquiry.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) 
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (asserting that the 
definition of rights “in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific 
historical practices, .	 .	 . may have been appropriate for the asserted right” of physician-
assisted suicide at issue in Glucksberg but is not the approach the Court has “used in 
discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy”). “[R]ights come not 
from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how 
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
In essence, Lawrence and Obergefell jointly abrogate Glucksberg’s rigid approach to 
determining fundamental rights. And just as “Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial 
marriage,’” the right to perform select uses of GGE articulated in this Article may 
encompass a right “in its comprehensive sense,” see id., that fits within the rights of 
procreation, parental autonomy, and—to some extent—privacy, see infra Sections II.A–D. 
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protects select uses of GGE. This fundamental right flows from 
jurisprudence in the areas of procreative, family autonomy, and—to 
some extent—privacy rights, but it is not absolute. 
An analytical checkpoint is indispensable at this juncture. 
Although the next section examines an issue that has never before been 
the subject of judicial review, it does so in the context of an enduring, 
and often contentious, debate regarding the methodological 
framework under which the Constitution should be interpreted. At the 
outset, it is imperative to note that the invocation of the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments270 to adjudicate cases 
and controversies under Article III of the Constitution has “at times 
been a treacherous field for [the Supreme] Court.”271 The doctrine has 
spawned a litany of controversial decisions,272 many of which are 
discussed below. 
At its core, the doctrine of substantive due process concerns the 
inquiry “of whether the government’s deprivation of a person’s life, 
liberty or property is justified by a sufficient purpose.”273 The term 
“liberty” in the clause has been interpreted broadly to encompass 
protection of certain fundamental rights unenumerated in the 
Constitution.274 Supporters of the doctrine state that it has been used 
to safeguard some of the “most precious liberties” found in modern 
constitutional law.275 Yet critics of that interpretive method have gone 
as far as labeling it “the most anticonstitutional branch of 
constitutional law.”276 
This Article acknowledges the interpretive dichotomy of this area 
of constitutional law. Whether the extant body of substantive due 
process jurisprudence is proper when viewed through the lenses of 
originalism and nonoriginalism, however, is beyond the scope of this 
Article. And no position on the issue is taken herein. With this context 
as a backdrop, this part undertakes a—mostly—descriptive, rather 
 
 270. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person .	.	. be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .	 .	 .	 .”); id. amend. XIV, §	1 (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .	.	.	.”).  
 271. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion).  
 272. See infra Sections II.A–D.  
 273. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 
(1999).  
 274. Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 
69 (2006). 
 275. Chemerinsky, supra note 273, at 1501. 
 276. Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004). 
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than normative, analysis of the existing jurisprudence in this area of the 
law. The part concludes that the current substantive due process 
precedents, collectively, pave a path for the recognition of a right to 
perform GGE in select contexts.277 
A. Jurisprudence on the Family-Unit Sphere and Parental Autonomy 
1.  Substantive Due Process and the Family Rights Doctrine 
The origins of a constitutional doctrine of autonomy involving 
parental choice and the family-unit sphere trace back to the 1920s.278 In 
Meyer v. Nebraska,279 the Supreme Court recognized the core of what 
is now a parent’s fundamental right to make child-rearing decisions. 
Meyer involved a challenge to a Nebraska statute that prohibited 
teaching in any language except English at public or private schools.280 
Under that law, foreign languages could be taught only beyond the 
eighth grade.281 A parochial-school teacher was tried and convicted for 
unlawfully teaching a ten-year-old child to read in the German 
language,282 and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his 
conviction.283 
 
 277. One caveat is that, given the contention in this area of the law, such a path is 
potentially susceptible to the composition of the Court at a particular point in time, as some 
Justices have expressed a willingness to discard the doctrine in the past. See, e.g., United 
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 794 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The majority never 
utters the dread words ‘substantive due process,’ perhaps sensing the disrepute into which 
that doctrine has fallen .	.	.	.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting) (“I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other 
part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court.”). 
 278. See infra notes 279–306 and accompanying text outlining rights in the family 
context. It bears noting some have argued that the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment during the Reconstruction era is itself evidence of the existence of the sort of 
liberty articulated by the Court in the 1920s. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and 
the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 309–10 (1993). This is 
because the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments had 
vivid impressions of what it meant to be denied rights of family, for the denial of 
those rights was a hallmark of slavery in the United States .	.	. that inverted concepts 
of human dignity, citizenship and natural law. .	 .	 . [T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
[was] the instrument with which to re-enshrine family liberty as an inalienable 
aspect of national citizenship and natural law. 
Id. at 309 (citations omitted). 
 279. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 280. Id. at 397. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 396. 
 283. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 104 (Neb. 1922), rev’d, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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Understanding the wider historical context is essential to 
appreciate why Meyer arrived at the Supreme Court. After the United 
States entered World War I by declaring war against Germany in 
1917,284 a wave of anti-German sentiment swept the nation.285 Animus 
toward German culture among government and private actors led to 
the breakdown of civil liberties.286 Government officials publicly 
averred that the freedom of speech in the federal and state 
constitutions does not guarantee the right to speak in any language 
other than English.287 
By 1923, thirty-four states—including Nebraska—had enacted 
legislation mandating English-only instruction at public and private 
elementary schools.288 Meanwhile, the pseudoscientific eugenics 
movement had gained vast popularity,289 and the assimilation of 
immigrants in America had become a major concern.290 
 
 284. RONALD SCHAFFER, AMERICA IN THE GREAT WAR: THE RISE OF THE WAR 
WELFARE STATE, at xvi–xvii (1991). 
 285. Many school districts stopped teaching German as a foreign language as 
nationalism and blinded patriotism replaced melting-pot philosophies. Carlos J. Ovando, 
Bilingual Education in the United States: Historical Development and Current Issues, 27 
BILINGUAL RES. J. 1, 5 (2003). Burning of German books took place, operas and 
symphonies banned German music, and acts of violence or intimidation toward German-
Americans occurred. SCHAFFER, supra note 284, at 20–23. Even German-derived 
vernacular terms changed temporarily. Hamburgers, sauerkraut, frankfurters, dachshunds, 
hamburger steaks, and German measles suddenly became, respectively, “liberty 
sandwiches,” “liberty cabbage,” “liberty sausages,” “liberty dogs,” “Salisbury steaks,” and 
“liberty measles.” H.L. MENCKEN, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE, SUPPLEMENT I: AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH IN THE UNITED STATES 429 (1988); 
SCHAFFER, supra note 284, at 20. 
 286. For instance, Americans were encouraged to spy on and report individuals who 
displayed disloyalty, spoke critically of the war, taught German language at schools, or 
supported pacifism. SCHAFFER, supra note 284, at 19–20. 
 287. See id. at 20 (recounting the Iowa governor’s proclamation that prohibited 
conversations in non-English languages in public places, along with statements to declare 
English as the only official language of the United States and Iowa). 
 288. Ovando, supra note 285, at 5. 
 289. For an examination of the eugenics movement, its pseudoscientific roots, and its 
rise to legitimacy in the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s, see Enríquez, supra 
note 2, at 679–80, 687–91. 
 290. See PAUL POPENOE & ROSWELL HILL JOHNSON, APPLIED EUGENICS 298–301 
(1918). Popenoe and Johnson, for example, asserted, “It is essential if America is to be 
strong eugenically that it slow down the flood of immigrants who are not easily assimilable.” 
Id. at 306. The rhetoric related to immigration in the early twentieth century bears some 
resemblance to that of today’s anti-immigration debate. Compare id. at 303–04 (attributing 
a rise in crime, pauperism, violence, and alcoholism to the wave of immigration of “inferior” 
people from southern and eastern European countries), with ANN COULTER, ¡ADIOS, 
AMERICA!: THE LEFT’S PLAN TO TURN OUR COUNTRY INTO A THIRD WORLD 
HELLHOLE 18 (2015) (arguing that the “mass immigration of the poorest of the poor to 
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Operating in front of this historical backdrop, the Supreme Court 
examined the constitutionality of the Nebraska statute, which the 
Nebraska Supreme Court had ruled reasonable and duly enacted 
within the state’s police powers.291 The state court had held that 
allowing foreigners to rear and educate their children in a foreign 
language was not only contrary to the country’s best interests but also 
inimical to American safety.292 
In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the state court’s 
judgment and held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “without doubt,” protected the liberty “to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children .	.	. and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”293 In so doing, it interpreted the term 
“liberty” broadly and endorsed the concept that “the individual has 
certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”294 Thus, an 
instructor has a constitutional right to teach a foreign language to a 
child whose parents “engage him so to instruct their [child].”295 The 
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment “may not be 
interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by 
legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to 
some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”296 
 
America is bad for the whole country” and is responsible for an increase in welfare 
consumption and crimes such as credit card fraud, human trafficking, child prostitution, and 
robberies perpetrated by immigrants who are not expected to assimilate into American 
culture), and Amber Phillips, ‘They’re Rapists.’ President Trump’s Campaign Launch 
Speech Two Years Later, Annotated, WASH. POST (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/06/16/theyre-rapists-presidents-trump-
campaign-launch-speech-two-years-later-annotated/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.04fb553351cd 
[https://perma.cc/SQ5T-Q7D5] (memorializing President Donald Trump’s remarks during 
his campaign for the 2016 presidential election in which he stated, “When Mexico sends its 
people, they’re not sending their best. .	.	. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, 
and they’re bringing those problems with [sic] us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing 
crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”). 
 291. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397–98 (1923). 
 292. Id. at 398. 
 293. Id. at 399. 
 294. Id. at 401. 
 295. Id. at 400. 
 296. Id. at 399–400. Justice Holmes, a supporter of the eugenics movement who would 
go on to author the infamous Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), decision that legalized forced 
sterilization of mentally disabled individuals, see id. at 207; see also Enríquez, supra note 2, 
at 685–86, dissented in Meyer and filed a dissenting opinion in another case decided the 
same day, in which he expressed the view that the case presented a question upon which 
reasonable people might disagree, particularly because he did not find it unreasonable to 
require young children to hear and speak only English at school, see Bartels v. Iowa, 262 
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Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,297 the Court 
extended the newly minted Meyer principle of fundamental familial 
rights to another family context.298 Pierce concerned amendments to 
the Oregon Compulsory Education Act of 1922,299 which compelled 
parents to send their children to public schools.300 Enforcement of the 
Act posed a threat to the existence of the primary private-school 
model.301 In a unanimous decision, the Court struck down Oregon’s 
statute as unconstitutional302 because it “unreasonably interfere[d] with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.”303 
Under the Meyer doctrine, the Constitution’s “fundamental 
theory of liberty .	 .	 . excludes any general power of the state to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from 
public teachers only.”304 More significantly, Meyer memorialized the 
constitutionally established principle that “[t]he child is not the mere 
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have 
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.”305 The doctrinal consequences of the 
substantive due process applied in Meyer and Pierce have had long-
lasting effects on American jurisprudence. The liberty involving family 
 
U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Thus, Holmes likely would have deferred to 
the judgment of the legislature when considering the question of whether the means 
adopted to achieve language homogeneity in elementary education violated an individual’s 
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (advocating language 
homogeneity in education). Holmes’s brand of deference to the legislative branch also 
played a key role in Buck’s analytically bereft holding, which endorsed a state’s erroneous 
scientific assertions that legalized involuntary sterilizations under the pretense of promoting 
public welfare. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–08; see also Enríquez, supra note 2, at 687–88. 
 297. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 298. See id. at 534–35. 
 299. Compulsory Education Act, ch. 1, 1923 Or. Laws 9 (1922), invalidated by Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 300. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531. 
 301. Id. at 533–34. 
 302. In 2000, Justice Anthony Kennedy indicated that if Meyer and Pierce had been 
decided in recent times, they likely would have been grounded upon First Amendment 
principles that protect the freedom of speech, belief, and religion. See Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). When Pierce was decided, however, the 
Court had not yet incorporated the First Amendment into the rights and liberties 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it applied to the 
states. Such incorporation occurred in a case decided a week after Pierce. See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 303. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 304. Id. at 535. 
 305. Id. (emphasis added). 
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and parental autonomy remains relevant a century later306 and has laid 
a foundation for the application of substantive due process—albeit 
controversially—in the context of other personal liberties. 
2.  Restrictions—or Lack Thereof—on Liberty Under the Parental 
Autonomy Doctrine 
Despite the broad liberties vis-à-vis the family-unit sphere and 
parental autonomy predicated in Meyer and Pierce, the judiciary has 
recognized that the right to make parental decisions about the rearing 
of one’s children is not absolute and may be limited by governmental 
action in certain contexts. 
The Court endorsed such restrictions on parental autonomy in 
Prince v. Massachusetts,307 in which the Commonwealth demonstrated 
a cognizable interest in protecting the welfare of children.308 Prince 
dealt with a challenge to a Massachusetts child-labor law that forbade 
individuals from furnishing or selling articles to any minor with the 
knowledge that the minor intended to sell the article in contravention 
of the law.309 The government convicted Sarah Prince, a Jehovah’s 
Witness and guardian of her nine-year-old niece, of violating child-
labor laws when she allowed her niece to distribute religious literature 
in exchange for voluntary contributions while Prince was preaching on 
a public street.310 
The Prince Court acknowledged the parental autonomy enshrined 
in the substantive due process rulings of Meyer and Pierce.311 However, 
it also noted “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public 
interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither rights of 
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”312 The Court 
further articulated activities that could overcome the constitutional bar 
of parental autonomy, such as compelling parents to send children to 
school, regulating child labor, and mandating compulsory vaccination 
so as not to expose the community or the child to preventable disease 
or death.313 Thus, Prince signaled an inclination to restrict the scope of 
Meyer and Pierce in certain contexts. 
 
 306. See discussion supra Section II.A; discussion infra Sections II.B–C. 
 307. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 308. Id. at 165. 
 309. Id. at 161. 
 310. Id. at 161–62. 
 311. Id. at 166. 
 312. Id. (citations omitted). 
 313. See id. at 166–67. 
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But Prince appears to be an outlier case that is incongruous to 
subsequent seminal cases examining the bundle of parental and family 
autonomy rights.314 Indeed, Justice Murphy’s persuasive dissent in 
Prince appears to have laid the foundation for broadening the scope of 
parental rights decades later.315 Restrictions on parental autonomy 
rights would apply only to instances where “grave, immediate, [or] 
substantial” harm to the child were under consideration.316 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,317 the Court ruled that Amish parents have 
a constitutional right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
refuse to comply with state laws that mandate children attend school 
beyond the eighth grade.318 Although states may lawfully regulate the 
duration of children’s education, the governmental interest of ensuring 
an educated citizenry “is not totally free from a balancing process when 
it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those 
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the 
religious upbringing of their children.”319 
The argument that enforcement of Wisconsin’s law compelling 
education beyond the eighth grade would “gravely endanger if not 
destroy the free exercise of [Amish] religious beliefs” persuaded the 
Court.320 Curiously, the Yoder Court emphasized that the decision to 
terminate primary instruction at an early age does not perpetrate “any 
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public 
safety, peace, order, or welfare.”321 Yet, this emphasis creates tension 
with Prince, in which distribution of religious literature and preaching 
 
 314. See infra notes 317–28 and accompanying text. 
 315. Cf. Prince, 321 U.S. at 175 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[P]arents or guardians [cannot] 
be subjected to criminal liability because of vague possibilities that their religious teachings 
might cause injury to the child. The evils must be grave, immediate, substantial. Yet there 
is not the slightest indication in this record, or in sources subject to judicial notice, that 
children engaged in distributing literature pursuant to their religious beliefs have been or 
are likely to be subject to any [health or moral harms].” (citation omitted)); see also 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972) (holding that Amish parents have a right 
to exempt their teenage children from mandatory-school-attendance laws on constitutional 
grounds related to the right to control child-rearing decisions and the free exercise of 
religion). 
 316. Prince, 321 U.S. at 175 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 317. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 318. Id. at 234. 
 319. Id. at 214. 
 320. Id. at 219. 
 321. Id. at 230. 
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on a public street led to the conclusion that children would be exposed 
to potential emotional, psychological, or physical harm and injury.322 
Another case that highlights the Supreme Court’s expansion of 
broad deference to parental autonomy rights is Parham v. J.R.323 The 
Parham Court held that the power to make choices related to child 
rearing does not automatically transfer from parents to a governmental 
agency simply because it involves certain risks or is not agreeable to a 
child.324 Thus, when it comes to commitment of a child in a mental 
institution, parents “retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the 
decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse.”325 The rationale 
underlying such wide discretion stems from the historical presumption 
that parents often act in the best interest of their children.326 
The foregoing cases establish great parental latitude over the 
control of a child’s upbringing. The interest of parents in directing a 
child’s upbringing “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized” by the Supreme Court.327 Rights concerning the 
family-unit sphere and parental autonomy can be limited by a state’s 
interest in protecting children against parental decisions that 
“jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for 
significant social burdens.”328 However, the substantive due process 
liberty rights in this area are fairly broad in scope, such that parents 
may institutionalize their offspring or even curtail educational 
opportunities at an early age without government intervention. 
B. The Fundamental Right to Procreate 
The fundamental right of individuals to procreate was first 
articulated in Skinner v. Oklahoma.329 The case involved the Oklahoma 
 
 322. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); see also supra notes 312–13 
and accompanying text. 
 323. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
 324. Id. at 603. The Parham Court noted that the authority to make decisions concerning 
medical procedures also lies within the liberty rights afforded to parents because “[m]ost 
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning 
many decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment.” Id. 
 325. Id. at 604. 
 326. Id. at 602, 604; see also id. at 621 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“For centuries it has been 
a canon of the common law that parents speak for their minor children. So deeply imbedded 
in our traditions is this principle of law that the Constitution itself may compel a State to 
respect it.”). 
 327. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 328. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
 329. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act,330 which allowed the compulsory 
sterilization of individuals convicted of crimes amounting to felonies 
involving moral turpitude.331 Compulsory sterilizations had been 
legitimized in American society for decades prior to Skinner as a 
convenient method to propel eugenical laws and policies.332 Indeed, in 
1927, the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell333 had upheld the 
constitutionality of sexual sterilization practices targeting the mentally 
disabled.334 
From a procedural standpoint, Skinner extended an opportunity 
for the Court to answer whether (1) the State exceeded the lawful 
exercise of its police powers in view of scant scientific evidence to 
buttress a theory of heritability of criminal behavior,335 (2) due process 
was lacking due to inadequate review of a prisoner’s purported genetic 
predisposition to father undesirable offspring, and (3) the sterilization 
provisions of the Act constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.336 The Court overlooked all those issues 
and instead chose to focus on whether the Act violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.337 
The Skinner Court held that Oklahoma’s sterilization law violated 
principles of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it discriminated on the basis of seemingly arbitrary distinctions 
between felonies of the same type.338 Thus, individuals convicted of 
 
 330. Act of May 8, 1935, ch. 26, 1935 Okla. Sess. Laws 94, invalidated by Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 331. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
 332. Between 1907 and 1979, more than 65,000 compulsory sterilizations took place in 
thirty-two states across America. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 689–90. 
 333. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 334. See id. at 207–08. 
 335. Justice Jackson filed a brief concurrence in Skinner in which he stated that the 
eugenic purpose of the Oklahoma statute raised “other constitutional questions of gravity” 
because the state of scientific knowledge at the time was uncertain as to the heritability of 
select behavioral traits. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring). I have, in prior 
work, explored the fascinating question surrounding the judiciary’s reluctance, if not 
flagrant antipathy at times, to overcome the false dichotomy frequently associated with 
mutually exclusive roles for science and law. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 679–91. For instance, 
I have argued against the conventional view that Buck’s holding is illegitimate because it 
rests on pseudoscience. An examination of the state of scientific knowledge at the time Buck 
was decided reveals that no legitimate scientific debate existed regarding the heritability of 
human cognitive abilities or mental deficiencies. Buck relied on no scientific evidence. 
Instead, it relied on deceptive propaganda that had been de facto incorporated into popular 
culture over a period of decades. See id. at 685–91. 
 336. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537–38. 
 337. Id. at 538. 
 338. Id. at 541. 
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grand larceny or embezzlement—both felonies—were subject to 
unequal treatment under the law; the larcenist could be subject to 
sterilization, while the embezzler could not.339 
More importantly, Skinner explicitly articulated the fundamental 
status of human procreation by framing the issue presented as one 
concerning a basic right “to the perpetuation of a race—the right to 
have offspring.”340 According to the Court, individuals have 
fundamental civil rights to marry and procreate, which are crucial to 
the survival of our species.341 “The power to sterilize, if exercised, may 
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. .	 .	 . There is no 
redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment 
which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever 
deprived of a basic liberty.”342 
Because of the delicate nature of the right to procreate, the Court 
emphasized that strict scrutiny is the only judicial standard of review 
that could apply to state action encroaching on the ability of humans 
to reproduce.343 The irreversibility of sterilization procedures, as well 
as the social and biological implications of reproduction, provided an 
analytical foundation to promote the majority’s view that the sort of 
sterilization provisions under Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal 
Sterilization Act should be held to the highest scrutiny possible.344 
Although Skinner applied only to punitive sterilizations and failed 
to overturn Buck,345 it nevertheless stands as a landmark decision that 
conceptualized the guarantee of procreative rights under the 
Constitution. 
C. Jurisprudence on Reproductive and Procreative Autonomy and 
Privacy 
The fundamental rights elucidated in Meyer, Pierce, Skinner, and 
other cases related to parental choice, procreation, and the family-unit 
sphere had a lasting impact on early twentieth-century American 
jurisprudence. Collectively, these cases caused a tectonic shift in the 
 
 339. Id. at 538–39. 
 340. Id. at 536. 
 341. See id. at 541. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. In contrast, Buck had applied a primitive form of modern rational basis as the 
standard of review fifteen years earlier. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 686; see also Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927). 
 344. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 345. Indeed, the Skinner Court distinguished Buck by asserting that the latter could be 
upheld because it applied only to mentally disabled individuals in state custody. Id. at 542. 
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interpretation of equal protection and due process law. As time passed, 
it became clear that such precedents could, and would, ultimately 
support a revolution that marked the dawn of the right of privacy and 
other reproductive rights.346 
Griswold v. Connecticut347 was the landmark case that unveiled a 
right to privacy under the Constitution.348 The case involved a 
challenge to a Connecticut statute that prohibited (1) the use of “any 
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing 
conception” and (2) individuals to assist, abet, counsel, cause, or 
command others to violate the law.349 
Griswold’s arrival at the Court was anything but stochastic. The 
Connecticut anticontraception statute under review had been enacted 
nearly a century earlier in 1879.350 It came at the heels of what became 
known as the Comstock Laws, a set of federal351 and state statutes 
enacted in the 1870s designed to punish obscene behavior, providers of 
abortion, and the use of contraception.352 The Comstock Act was not 
the first piece of legislation that aimed to regulate the distribution of 
obscene material in the United States.353 Indeed, throughout the late 
nineteenth century nearly half the states enacted statutes to criminalize 
obscene acts, birth control, and “perversions of the human mind.”354 
 
 346. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502–03 (1965) (White, J., concurring) 
(citing Meyer, Pierce, Prince, Skinner, and other cases concerning liberty guarantees under 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 347. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 348. Id. at 479. 
 349. Id. at 480. 
 350. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND 
THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 1 (1994). 
 351. The Comstock Act of 1873 criminalized the act of knowingly sending “obscene, 
lewd, or lascivious” materials through the mail. PAUL R. ABRAMSON & STEVEN D. 
PINKERTON, WITH PLEASURE: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 177 
(rev. ed. 2002). The Act’s name was derived from Anthony Comstock, founder of the New 
York Society for the Suppression of Vice and special agent of the U.S. Postal Service, who 
had, for years, engaged in a series of anti-obscenity campaigns aimed at ridding society of 
all masturbation, pornography, contraceptives, and nonreproductive sexual activity. Id. at 
176–77. 
 352. NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY 
REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 36–38 (1997). 
 353. See ABRAMSON & PINKERTON, supra note 351, at 178. Laws banning pornography 
had been enacted at the state level as early as 1821 and at the federal level as early as 1842 
with the passage of the U.S. Customs Act. Id.; JUDITH GIESBERG, SEX AND THE CIVIL 
WAR: SOLDIERS, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN MORALITY 12 
(2017). 
 354. See MARY WARE DENNETT, BIRTH CONTROL LAWS: SHALL WE KEEP THEM 
CHANGE THEM OR ABOLISH THEM app. at 268–70 (1926). See generally J.C. Ruppenthal, 
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By the mid-1930s, with no progress made to repeal the 
Connecticut law, some physicians began to quietly open birth control 
clinics throughout the state.355 At first, the clinics thrived due to low 
enforcement of the anticontraception law.356 Poor women gained 
access to birth control advice previously available only to those who 
could afford private physicians.357 With time, however, enforcement of 
the law led to the prosecution and conviction of physicians who 
distributed contraceptives at the birth control clinics.358 
On November 1961, Estelle Griswold, the Executive Director of 
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Lee Buxton, a 
licensed physician and professor at the Yale Medical School, were 
arrested after they opened a birth control clinic in New Haven.359 
Connecticut prosecuted and convicted them for providing information 
and medical advice to married people with the intent that the 
information would prevent conception.360 Griswold and Buxton 
appealed their convictions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to consider the constitutionality of the anticontraception statute.361 
The Griswold majority found that the “Framers did not intend 
that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and 
fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the 
people.”362 Accordingly, the majority identified a “zone of privacy” 
created by the fundamental constitutional guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights.363 The privacy right articulated by the Court concerned the 
right to be free from governmental intrusion, which arose from the 
“penumbras” and “emanations” of other constitutional guarantees.364 
In the contraceptive context at bar, the majority opined that the idea 
of government intrusion into “the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms” was “repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the 
marriage relationship.”365 
 
Criminal Statutes on Birth Control, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48 (1919) 
(providing a survey of said laws). 
 355. GARROW, supra note 350, at 1. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508–09 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 
44, 46 (1943) (per curiam). 
 359. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 490. 
 363. Id. at 484–85. 
 364. Id. at 483–84. 
 365. Id. at 485–86. 
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The right to marital privacy with respect to intimate conduct born 
out of Griswold subsequently led to the conceptualization of a right to 
reproductive and procreative autonomy enshrined in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird.366 In Eisenstadt, the Court extended Griswold’s holding outside 
the marital context to rule that unmarried couples also have a right to 
use contraception.367 Significantly, the Court famously noted that “[i]f 
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”368 The Court further expanded this 
privacy-based right against government intrusion into matters of 
procreation in Carey v. Population Services International.369 In Carey, 
the Court ruled that the right to privacy extends to decisions affecting 
procreation not only for adults but for minors as well.370 Thus, these 
cases establish a robust fundamental right for individuals to make 
decisions about how and when to procreate. 
D. The (In)Applicability of Roe 
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade371 that the liberty 
protected under substantive due process includes a right to privacy that 
supports a woman’s constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.372 
That constitutional right, however, has been restricted in recent 
decades with the introduction of the “undue burden” standard 
articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.373 Undue burden refers to governmental action that “has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”374 Although Roe and 
Casey held that women have a fundamental right to an abortion, the 
cases have to some extent confounded the privacy-based substantive 
due process jurisprudence.375 
 
 366. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 367. Id. at 453. 
 368. Id. (emphasis added). 
 369. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 370. Id. at 693. 
 371. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 372. Id. at 164–67. 
 373. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (per curiam) (holding certain restrictions on the right to an 
abortion are constitutional unless they impose an “undue burden”). 
 374. Id. at 877. 
 375. For instance, Roe held that strict scrutiny applied, but Casey’s joint opinion failed 
to articulate a level of scrutiny and instead concocted the new undue burden standard. See 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019) 
1216 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
Issues related to abortion and GGE may appear intertwined at 
first glance. Both involve questions of reproductive liberties. However, 
Roe’s brand of substantive due process may be less significant in the 
GGE realm, particularly when it comes to therapeutic GGE 
interventions. As will be discussed in Part III, clinical interventions to 
cure or ameliorate disease in an embryo—with the intent to save a child 
from premature death—are at the opposite end of what abortion 
achieves. In the former case, a parent wishes to conceive a child without 
a harmful genetic mutation, whereas in the latter, the parent does not 
wish to bring the embryo to term. Similarly, therapeutic GGE brings 
into focus the prospect of eliminating the need to create dozens of 
embryos during in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), which ultimately get 
discarded or frozen and stored indefinitely.376 
The one area related to abortion that is presumably more relevant 
to GGE than the type of substantive due process applied in Roe and its 
progeny is related to cases involving government restrictions on public 
funding for abortion.377 Thus, restrictions on the use of government 
funds to perform GGE interventions are likely constitutional. 
E. Framing the Issue 
A final pivotal consideration in the discussion of whether a 
fundamental right to GGE might exist under the Constitution is the 
 
id. at 964 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[Roe] 
adopted a .	 .	 . standard under which state regulations could survive only if they met the 
requirement of ‘strict scrutiny.’ .	.	. The same cannot be said for the ‘undue burden’ standard, 
which is created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint opinion. .	.	. [I]t is a 
standard which is not built to last.”). 
 376. See Julie Steffann et al., Could Failure in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Justify 
Editing the Human Embryo Genome?, 22 CELL STEM CELL 481, 481–82 (2018) (analyzing 
results from the Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (“PGD”) Centre of Béclère-Necker 
hospitals in Paris over a five-year period to reveal that PGD aimed at helping couples bear 
healthy children had a 73% failure rate). The study performed by Steffann and colleagues 
found that out of 3047 embryos obtained from 358 couples, only 2038 embryos were 
successfully diagnosed. Id. at 481–82 & app. Of the embryos diagnosed, 53% (1079) were 
unaffected by genetic disease while 47% (959) tested positive for genetic disease and were 
discarded. Id. The unaffected embryos were transferred or cryopreserved and ultimately 
resulted in only 95 deliveries, in which 118 babies were born. Id.  
 377. See generally, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that states 
participating in Medicaid are not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions when the 
state cannot be reimbursed under federal law); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding 
that a state’s refusal to extend Medicaid coverage to nontherapeutic abortions contravened 
federal law); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a city was not 
constitutionally required to provide publicly financed hospital services for elective abortions 
even if the city provides such services for childbirth). 
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ultimate framing of the issue. Consider, for example, the arrival of 
Bowers v. Hardwick378 at the Court. In that case, the issue presented 
was “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy,” which had been illegal “for a 
very long time.”379 Nearly two decades later, the Court reviewed 
virtually the same question in Lawrence v. Texas,380 except that it was 
framed as whether “two persons of the same sex [can] engage in certain 
intimate sexual conduct.”381 Unsurprisingly, the Bowers Court did not 
find a liberty right to engage in homosexual sodomy under the 
Constitution,382 whereas the Lawrence Court ruled that consenting 
adults of the same sex have a constitutionally protected liberty right to 
engage in intimate sexual conduct.383 
Similarly, in Washington v. Glucksberg,384 the Court reviewed 
whether a “prohibition against “caus[ing]” or “aid[ing]” a suicide 
offends the .	 .	 . Constitution.”385 This framing stands in contrast to 
alternative phrasing in concurring opinions in that case, which 
articulated other possible versions such as the “merciful termination of 
suffering,”386 “the narrower question whether a mentally competent 
person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally 
cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her 
imminent death,”387 and “the avoidance of severe physical pain 
(connected with death).”388 
Carefully framing an issue for judicial review has many parallels 
to the design of questions intended for polling and surveys to reveal 
public attitudes about controversial topics. “Polling, of course, is not 
quite a science and certainly is not an exact one. .	 .	 . [I]t is highly 
vulnerable to the use of specific terminology and ambiguity in framing 
the questions asked.”389 
 
 378. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 379. Id. at 190 (emphasis added). The case was decided during the time of the AIDS 
epidemic, and, thus, framing the issue as a right of homosexuals to engage in sexual conduct 
likely played an outcome-determining role. 
 380. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 381. Id. at 562. 
 382. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.  
 383. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.  
 384. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 385. Id. at 705–06. 
 386. Id. at 754–55 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 387. Id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 388. Id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 389. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 675. 
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Consider, for instance, recent polls on public attitudes on the use 
of technologies for genome editing.390 A greater percentage of 
respondents in multiple surveys supported the use of gene-editing tools 
to “cure life-threatening” or “debilitating” diseases.391 In contrast, one 
poll reported that a majority of respondents believed that “changing 
the genes of unborn babies .	.	. to reduce their risk of developing certain 
serious diseases” should be illegal.392 “Public sentiment has 
considerable influence over allocation of resources, political policy, 
and participation rates in studies, all of which affect the course of 
research.”393 And just as public sentiment can be influenced by the 
manner in which a particular issue is presented, so too can judicial 
sentiment be affected. Undoubtedly, judicial review is anything but 
impervious to the proverbial anatomy of the question presented before 
a court. 
The foregoing case law and discussion highlight a crucial role for 
framing a question centered on the right to perform GGE. Different 
 
 390. E.g., STAT & HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, THE PUBLIC AND 
GENETIC EDITING, TESTING, AND THERAPY 9 (2016), https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/94/2016/01/STAT-Harvard-Poll-Jan-2016-Genetic-Technology.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LY3G-CPK3] (compiling results from interviews “conducted with a 
nationally representative sample of 1,000 randomly selected adults, ages 18 and older, via 
telephone”); Tristan McCaughey et al., A Global Social Media Survey of Attitudes to Human 
Genome Editing, 18 CELL STEM CELL 569, 569 (2016) (reporting results from “a worldwide 
online survey of over 12,000 people recruited via social media to gauge attitudes toward” 
genome-editing technology); Dietram A. Scheufele et al., U.S. Attitudes on Human Genome 
Editing, 357 SCIENCE 553, 553 (2017) (reporting results from “national survey data from 
1600 U.S. adults that YouGov collected in December 2016 and January 2017”); Masato 
Uchiyama, Akiko Nagai & Kaori Muto, Survey on the Perception of Germline Genome 
Editing Among the General Public in Japan, 63 J. HUM. GENETICS 745, 745 (2018) 
(conducting “a survey of 10,881 general adults and 1,044 patients in Japan who indicated 
that their disease conditions are related to their genetic makeup”). 
 391. See, e.g., McCaughey et al., supra note 390, at 569 (noting that 59.0% and 59.4% of 
survey respondents approved the use of gene editing in children and adults to cure life-
threatening or debilitating diseases, respectively); accord Scheufele, supra note 390, at 553 
(finding the use of human genome editing for therapeutic purposes is acceptable to 64% of 
respondents for somatic therapies and 65% of respondents for germline therapies); 
Uchiyama et al., supra note 390, at 745 (“[R]esults clearly indicated that the Japanese people 
generally accepted the use of genome editing for disease-related genes.”). 
 392. See STAT & HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 390, at 2 
(emphasis added) (reporting that 26% of respondents believed “changing the genes of 
unborn babies” should be legal in a therapeutic context, while 65% believed it should be 
illegal to do so). It should be noted that phrasing the question as one involving changing 
unborn babies to reduce the risk of disease, rather than using a technology to cure disease, 
may underlie the contrast in the respondents’ attitudes toward gene editing among the 
various polls. 
 393. McCaughey et al., supra note 390, at 571. 
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outcomes likely would be associated with questions framed as whether 
parents have a constitutional right to, among other things, (1) perform 
GGE to bear a healthy child, (2) genetically modify offspring, (3) 
engineer “designer babies,” (4) prevent life-threatening disease or 
death by correcting deleterious genetic mutations in their child, (5) use 
reproductive technology to cure genetic disease, (6) customize traits in 
their offspring, or (7) bear biological children by treating their germ 
cells with medicinal advances. 
III.  A LEGAL- AND SCIENCE-BASED POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
FUTURE OF GERMLINE GENOME EDITING 
Part II laid out a doctrinal foundation of jurisprudence in areas of 
parental, family, procreative, and reproductive autonomy guaranteed 
by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 
But jurisprudence in this realm must be framed in the context of GGE 
in order to derive applicable legal principles that ultimately can guide 
and promote coherent public policy. This part argues that these 
constitutional underpinnings of jurisprudence in the family-unit sphere 
serve as the basis for a cognizable fundamental right to perform specific 
types of GGE. Of course, like many of the rights identified via 
substantive due process—such as the rights to control a child’s 
upbringing, marry, have an abortion, and others394—the right to 
perform GGE would not be absolute.395 
Congressional or judicial fiat may delineate, at some point in the 
near future, the extent and limitations of a right to perform GGE in 
select contexts. However, no framework currently exists to draw clear 
lines that distinguish between permissible and impermissible uses of 
GGE technologies. The normative framework proposed below 
identifies four distinct categories of GGE: (1) therapeutic uses to 
remedy disease; (2) prophylactic purposes, which may or may not be of 
therapeutic nature; (3) cosmetic or enhancement purposes; and (4) 
 
 394. Indeed, other fundamental rights enumerated by the Supreme Court are not 
absolute and could be subject to governmental restrictions. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (implicitly restricting the fundamental right to marry only to 
“couples” or individuals in a “two-person union” (emphasis added)); Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (per curiam) (holding certain restrictions on the 
right to an abortion are constitutional unless they impose an “undue burden”); Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (articulating limits to parental autonomy when a child’s 
safety or health are at risk). Accordingly, a fundamental right to perform GGE in certain 
contexts most likely would still be subject to some level of governmental interference that 
meets the burden of strict scrutiny. See discussion infra Sections III.A–D. 
 395. See discussion supra Sections II.A–D. 
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uses involving modification of traits that raise concerns of 
discrimination that is already prohibited by the law. 
The four-category spectrum proposed here facilitates the creation 
of initial boundaries for GGE and outlines a putative regulatory and 
legal blueprint. Furthermore, the approach avoids the squabbles that 
frequently rise from the conventional tendency to group GGE 
applications into therapeutic uses on one hand, and enhancements on 
the other. That outdated model is inefficient and susceptible to 
analytical derailments stemming from awkward attempts to fit 
therapeutic, eugenical, and so-called “designer baby” enhancements 
into a single doctrinal model. 
The normative framework proposed here, however, deconstructs 
the nuances inherent in various applications of GGE. Hence, under 
Category 1, GGE purposes are permitted, can withstand strict 
constitutional scrutiny, and constitute a fundamental right. Conversely, 
Category 4 GGE uses at the opposite end of the spectrum are 
prohibited because they create a likelihood of discrimination against 
specific groups and are not constitutionally justifiable. Lastly, many 
GGE applications that fall within the sphere of Categories 2 and 3 
involve polygenic,396 as opposed to monogenic,397 conditions. As a 
result, it is unlikely that the technology to address these GGE 
interventions will be ready for clinical use in the near future. Because 
of this fact, premature laws and regulations concerning the sanction or 
prohibition of GGE prophylactic, cosmetic, and enhancement 
interventions should be avoided at this point in time. 
A. Category 1—Therapeutic Uses 
The first category of GGE applications concerns therapeutic uses 
to remedy disease. For parents carrying genetic mutations that increase 
the likelihood of conceiving a child susceptible to a serious genetic 
disease,398 it is quite likely that the awareness of their genetic 
composition fundamentally affects their decision whether to become 
parents. The Supreme Court has noted that “[i]f the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be 
 
 396. The term “polygenic” refers to traits that are determined by the contribution of 
more than one gene. 
 397. The term “monogenic” refers to traits that are determined by the effects of a single 
gene. 
 398. In particular, this section refers primarily to a myriad of monogenic diseases, which 
likely will be the main focus of early genome-editing therapies. See Enríquez, supra note 2, 
at 636. 
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free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”399 
The prospect of bringing a child into this world to suffer a 
debilitating, life-long illness would certainly play a fundamental role in 
an individual’s decision to pursue parenthood within the meaning of 
our existing substantive due process jurisprudence. After all, what 
good is the existence of a “right to have offspring” or procreate400 if 
that offspring is destined to suffer disease and premature death? 
Governmental authority aimed at denying parents the ability to 
perform GGE for therapeutic purposes when their child faces the 
probability of suffering from an imminent, life-threatening, genetic 
disease401 would have overt, “far-reaching[,] and devastating effects” 
on the health and survival of said child that arguably go beyond the 
prohibition of the power to sterilize articulated in Skinner.402 
Congenital disease may force upon a child, as well as all members of 
her family unit, “a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may 
be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child 
care.”403 Denial of a fundamental right to perform GGE under this 
scenario arguably runs contrary to the guarantees found in the 
Constitution, which protect the right to procreation as crucial to the 
survival of the species.404 
A discussion of the right to procreate calls for deeper analytical 
exploration of the basis underlying the incorporation of a putative right 
to rescue one’s offspring from imminent illness or death as part of the 
human procreational prerogative. The core of this argument is that the 
basic fundamental right to “perpetuat[e] a [human] race” and “have 
offspring”405 articulated in Skinner pertains specifically to a right 
rooted in the success of biological procreation. This inference must be 
 
 399. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 400. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). 
 401. The probability of developing a genetic disease depends on many factors, including 
patterns of inheritance. See, e.g., If a Genetic Disorder Runs in My Family, What Are the 
Chances that My Children Will Have the Condition?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/inheritance/riskassessment [https://perma.cc/V2S2-5CFT]. In 
general, children are most at risk of inheriting a serious genetic condition when both parents 
are homozygous for particular mutations that can lead to certain diseases. 
 402. Cf. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that “[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may 
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects” on individuals affected by the law). 
 403. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 404. Id. 
 405. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
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drawn from Skinner’s holding because merely having offspring does 
not, in and of itself, guarantee the perpetuation of the human race. In 
order to perpetuate one’s genetic composition in the human gene pool, 
one’s offspring must be viable, fertile, and capable of developing to an 
age at which the individual can procreate and have offspring herself. 
The right to procreate under the constitutional structure of Skinner’s 
holding is, thus, essentially meaningless if one’s children are destined 
to an early death at the hands of genetic disease. 
That conceptual exposition is also supported by dicta in Skinner 
noting that the power to sterilize “can cause races or types which are 
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”406 Again, a 
reference to favorable or adequate biological procreation appears 
nowhere explicitly in the opinion. But the majority’s concern that 
specific “races or types”—namely, traits that can be traced to specific 
genotypes—can “wither and disappear”407 speaks clearly to the 
proposition that, without a fundamental right to biological procreation 
that limits governmental intrusion into procreative matters, some 
individuals belonging to nondominant groups might find themselves 
defenseless against invidious government action and will ultimately be 
unable to pass down their genes to subsequent generations. 
Procreation in that sense calls for more than just producing offspring; 
it calls for producing offspring healthy enough408 to fulfill the biological 
role of perpetuating one’s genotype within the constitutional structure 
erected by Skinner. 
Although the Supreme Court has counseled caution and restraint 
in the application of substantive due process, “it does not counsel 
abandonment.”409 Parents who must choose between having a child 
destined to be ill or forgoing the benefits of biological parenthood 
entirely would be, in essence, abandoned by the Constitution. 
 
 406. Id. at 541 (emphasis added). 
 407. Id. 
 408. One important consideration relates to the definition of the term “healthy.” For 
instance, does a child with rheumatoid arthritis who is severely crippled and ill but grows up 
to marry and have children qualify as healthy within the meaning of Skinner? Does an 
individual with Cystic Fibrosis (“CF”) who grows up to become a parent and dies at a young 
age from CF-related complications—but nevertheless was able to bear children who also 
carry CF-associated mutations—qualify as healthy within the meaning of Skinner? These 
questions are more difficult to resolve under a fundamental right to procreate but may be 
more soluble under the principles embedded in the right to parental autonomy. In any event, 
at a minimum, Skinner arguably endorses a substantive reading of biological procreation in 
the context of a right to have offspring healthy enough to develop and grow to an age when 
they will be able to reproduce and pass down their genetic makeup to a new generation. 
 409. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
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Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine a more compelling scenario for 
the application of modern substantive due process. Furthermore, the 
decision to enter into a marriage relationship has been recognized as 
the core of family in our society.410 But what shall we then make of the 
decision to enter the ultimate relationship that perpetuates the human 
race—namely, the parent-child relationship—which, unlike marriage, 
is ever-lasting, not susceptible to divorce,411 and often becomes more 
significant and life altering than the decision to marry? Assuming GGE 
technologies become safe and effective for clinical use,412 if the rights 
of procreation, parental autonomy, and privacy mean “anything at 
all,”413 they must imply some right to enter the parent-child relationship 
unencumbered by the burdens of disease stemming from random or 
inherited genetic mutations many individuals bear no responsibility for 
carrying. 
For individuals who carry alleles associated with genetic diseases, 
the right to be free from state intervention in the decision to bear 
children without deleterious genetic mutations via GGE intervention 
likely triggers strict scrutiny. Thus, the government may find it difficult 
to establish a compelling state interest that would justify wholly 
prohibiting GGE interventions.414 After all, bearing healthy children 
 
 410. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). 
 411. Although the legal status of the parent-child relationship is unaffected by divorce 
between two parents, it should be noted that the law recognizes circumstances under which 
the parent-child bond can be severed. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 
641–42 (2013) (terminating paternal rights of a biological father who never had custody of 
his child); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131–32 (1989) (restricting parental rights 
of unmarried fathers); Diamond v. Diamond, 283 P.3d 260, 261 (N.M. 2012) (addressing the 
issue of child emancipation); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 405–06, 293 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1982) 
(terminating parental rights in response to child abuse or neglect). However, termination of 
parental rights, emancipation of minors, and other related principles are legal constructs. 
From a purely biological perspective, which encompasses the ambit of the fundamental right 
to “perpetuat[e] a [human] race .	.	. [and] have offspring” articulated in Skinner, see Skinner, 
316 U.S. at 537, the parent-child genetic link is permanent. 
 412. Safety and efficacy are relative terms—“no technology is ever completely safe, or 
completely efficacious.” OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND 
SAFETY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 17 (1978), https://ota.fas.org/reports/7805.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M6VU-ZJ4A]. “Efficacy is defined in terms of a benefit; safety, in terms 
of a risk. .	.	. Neither efficacy nor safety is absolute. Both are discussed in terms of probability 
and magnitude of benefit or harm.” Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted). Thus, for example, the 
FDA’s determination that a drug is safe does not indicate a complete absence of risk or 
potential harm. Safety means that the therapeutic “benefits of the drug outweigh the risks.” 
21 U.S.C. §	355-1(a)(1) (Supp. 2017). 
 413. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 (emphasis added). 
 414. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine the opposite scenario in which the government 
might begin to mandate GGE intervention for prospective parents carrying deleterious 
genetic mutations, so as to promote a myriad of governmental interests related to the 
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significantly contributes to the pursuit of happiness in the family 
context.415 Moreover, the wide latitude afforded to parents in making 
decisions related to the upbringing of their offspring—including 
medical decisions that do not endanger the health or safety of the 
child416—support a cognizable right to GGE interventions with 
therapeutic intent. In fact, the availability of GGE that is proven safe 
and effective brings into focus the prospect of allowing parents to make 
medical decisions that will promote and safeguard the health of the 
child by ensuring offspring will not carry genetic mutations for serious 
diseases.417 
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government might find it 
difficult to establish the existence of narrowly tailored measures to 
further the interest of denying GGE for therapeutic purposes. Indeed, 
for homozygous individuals carrying deleterious genetic mutations that 
all but guarantee that offspring will be susceptible to genetic diseases,418 
there are likely few, if any, suitable alternative means419—including 
 
protection of children and the reduction of social costs associated with health care and 
management of diseases. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11–12 (1905) 
(upholding the authority of states to enforce compulsory vaccination statutes). 
 415. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 416. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“Most children, even in adolescence, 
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their 
need for medical care or treatment.”). 
 417. The prospect of using GGE for benign, therapeutic purposes actually overcomes 
one of the possible limitations outlined in Section II.A.2 relating to the protection of 
children from harm and exploitation articulated in Prince. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 418. Several patterns of inheritance exist by which an individual may inherit a genetic 
condition, including, inter alia, autosomal dominant, autosomal recessive, codominant, and 
mitochondrial inheritance. For a brief explanation of each pattern, see, for example, What 
Are the Different Ways in Which a Genetic Condition Can Be Inherited?, GENETICS HOME 
REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/inheritance/inheritancepatterns [https://perma.cc/
Z3YJ-7Q6F]. The probability of inheriting a particular genetic disease varies depending on 
the pattern of inheritance and whether the parents are homozygous or heterozygous for a 
particular allele associated with genetic disease. Cases in which both parents are 
homozygous for a particular genetic disease are very rare, but they can occur. And potential 
arguments that GGE should be banned because only a small minority of couples would be 
affected by such prohibitions are likely to crumble before legal challenges brought by 
individuals asserting the principle that the Constitution protects the rights of individuals 
rather than the collective rights of groups. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
579 (2008) (explaining that “the right of the people” refers to individual and not “collective” 
rights). 
 419. The parents could elect to receive sperm, egg, or embryo donations from other 
individuals or decide to have an abortion as possible alternatives. Neither of these options, 
however, offers a path toward biological parenthood and, thus, cannot truly be considered 
alternatives within the general purview of the right to have biological offspring articulated 
in Skinner. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Furthermore, the argument 
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preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”)420—to conceive an 
otherwise healthy child without GGE intervention. Thus, the right to 
be free from government intrusion in the decision to pursue GGE for 
therapeutic purposes is an extension of the rights to procreate and 
exercise parental autonomy under current substantive due process 
jurisprudence.421 Once GGE’s safety and efficacy are scientifically 
established, it may be difficult for the government to impose bans on 
access to the technology for therapeutic uses. 
Lastly, there is some validity to the point that banning a 
technology that may assist deleterious mutation-carrying parents 
would not violate the right to procreate because they may still choose 
to conceive and assume the risks of bringing a child who may be 
susceptible to genetic disease. That some parents may choose not to 
reproduce because of an awareness of the burdens inherent in their 
genetic composition is a personal choice, which the government does 
not interfere with when it denies access to a particular reproductive 
technology. For instance, Califano v. Jobst422 articulated the principle 
that a “general rule is not rendered invalid simply because some 
persons” might be deterred from engaging in certain conduct.423 
However, Jobst can be clearly distinguished from the GGE context, as 
 
that the risk of transmitting genetic disease can be avoided via PGD coupled with abortion 
overlooks PGD’s financial, medical, and emotional burdens; its low chance of success; and 
the large number of embryos that are discarded in the process, which some potential parents 
may object to from ethical or faith-based perspectives. See Steffann et al., supra note 376, at 
481 (“In weighing the risks and benefits of [GGE], one needs to consider the potential of 
genome editing to cure genetic diseases at an early stage of life, and the concept that we 
have a moral duty to cure affected human embryos instead of discarding them.”). 
 420. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis refers to an ART technique that facilitates 
genetic profiling of human embryos—obtained through IVF—for the purpose of testing for 
genetic abnormalities. Peter Braude et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 3 NATURE 
REVIEWS: GENETICS 941, 941 (2002). The screening takes place prior to implantation in a 
woman’s uterus and, therefore, can be distinguished from in utero prenatal diagnosis or 
screening of an embryo or fetus. See id. PGD is often used as an alternative to abortion for 
parents with substantial risk of transmitting genetic disorders to their progeny by preventing 
a pregnancy from occurring in the first place. Id. at 942. 
 421. An alternative legal path would be to identify a de novo fundamental right to GGE 
for therapeutic purposes under Glucksberg’s two-prong test. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 703 (1997). It appears, however, that extending already-established rights affords 
the best strategy to crystallize a right to perform GGE for therapeutic purposes under 
procreative- and parental-autonomy principles. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2585 (2015) (extending an already existing right to marry for opposite-sex couples to 
same-sex couples); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1977) (extending 
an already-existing right to purchase and use contraception for adults to minors under age 
sixteen); see also supra note 269 and accompanying text.  
 422. 434 U.S. 47 (1977). 
 423. Id. at 54. 
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it concerned a limitation on the right to marry but only in the context 
of the distribution of government benefits under a specific program 
that would have been lost when the plaintiff remarried and would no 
longer be dependent on government assistance.424  
As stated earlier, for some parents who carry deleterious genetic 
mutations, there is no alternative path to have a healthy child. That 
strikes at the core of the fundamental right to procreate. It also stands 
in contrast to Jobst, which was related to the loss of a government 
benefit and, thus, did not strike at the core of the fundamental right to 
marry. In the GGE context, parents contemplate a decision that goes 
beyond giving up a government benefit. Instead, parents must decide 
whether they are willing and able to bring a human being into the world 
who is likely destined to suffer from disease—a decision that carries 
substantial emotional, social, and financial costs. 
As discussed above, the use of GGE intervention—for which 
scientific evidence exists to establish the safety and efficacy of the 
desired genetic modification—in the therapeutic context may 
constitute a fundamental right and could withstand strict constitutional 
scrutiny. However, the analysis in the foregoing section may be 
inapplicable to a right to perform GGE for nontherapeutic uses. 
B. Category 2—Prophylactic Purposes 
The second category of GGE applications refers to the use of 
GGE interventions for prophylactic purposes. This category shares 
many similarities to Category 1, but can be clearly distinguished by 
noting that prophylactic interventions may or may not be therapeutic 
in nature. 
The use of GGE in this category is likely to be important, but may 
not be sufficient to withstand the pressures of strict scrutiny that 
Category 1 uses could. For example, parents may wish to confer 
immunity to the HIV virus425 upon an embryo, or protect it against 
potential risks of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and some cancers. 
The parental autonomy highlighted under these scenarios would be 
weighed against potential state interests derived from access to the 
technology, fairness, and equality. Parents may have a constitutionally 
protected right to perform GGE intervention on an embryo to spare it 
from a life of suffering or premature death, but will they also have a 
 
 424. Id. at 48–50. 
 425. Roughly one percent of the world’s Caucasian population carries a genetic mutation 
in the CCR5 gene that confers immunity against the HIV virus. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 
633–34; see also infra Figure 5. Clinical trials are currently underway to explore possible 
cures for HIV using genome-editing technologies. Enríquez, supra note 2, at 634. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019) 
2019] EDITING HUMANITY 1227 
constitutional right to modify the genes of their offspring based on the 
possibility that a given disease will affect them in the future? HIV 
immunity, for example, would not be relevant to a genetically modified 
individual unless, at some point, the person is exposed to the virus. In 
other words, parents may have a constitutional right to bear healthy 
children, but may or may not have a constitutional right to bear 
children who are immune to HIV. 
The prophylactic category of GGE interventions also shines a 
light on the policy challenges presented by medical advances and 
technologies, which often affect the status of a particular disease in 
society. Case in point, NASEM recommended restricting GGE 
interventions to a “serious disease or condition” and to “prevent 
extension” to other uses.426 But adherence to that recommendation 
largely depends on a definition of what constitutes a “serious disease 
or condition” at a particular point in time, and whether extension to 
other potential uses at some point in the future might be palatable, or 
even desirable, from social, ethical, and policy perspectives. 
Consider the case of HIV infection. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
when the AIDS epidemic caused a public-health crisis, HIV infection 
was considered a death sentence and certainly constituted a serious 
disease or condition that could even be transmitted to an individual’s 
offspring.427 However, scientific advances in antiretroviral drug 
therapies in the last two decades have dramatically altered medical 
outcomes associated with HIV diagnoses in the developed world, and 
many in the medical profession now consider HIV a chronic infection, 
on par with other chronic diseases such as diabetes.428 
 
 426. NASEM REPORT, supra note 21, at 7–8 (emphasis added). 
 427. See Kevin M. De Cock, Harold W. Jaffe & James W. Curran, Reflections on 30 
Years of AIDS, 17 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1044, 1044 (2011) (describing AIDS 
as an “inevitably fatal disease” when it was first documented in the early 1980s, while noting 
that the disease would go on to cause approximately 30 million deaths). 
 428. See, e.g., AM. DIABETES ASS’N, FAST FACTS: DATA AND STATISTICS ABOUT 
DIABETES, https://professional.diabetes.org/sites/professional.diabetes.org/files/media/sci_
2019_diabetes_fast_facts_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DRS-2YU5] (noting that “[d]iabetes 
kills more Americans every year than AIDS and breast cancer combined”); Mandy 
Freeman, ‘I Believe It’s Easier to Live with HIV than Being Diabetic’, HEALTH24 (May 29, 
2017), https://www.health24.com/Medical/HIV-AIDS/Real-life-story/i-believe-its-easier-to-
live-with-hiv-than-being-diabetic-20170526 [https://perma.cc/R5DY-VL2K]; Max Pemberton, 
As a Doctor, I’d Rather Have HIV than Diabetes, SPECTATOR (Apr. 19, 2014), 
https://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/04/why-id-rather-have-hiv-than-diabetes/# [https://perma.cc/
F62Z-UJHS] (“As a doctor I can tell you that, medically speaking, I’d rather have HIV than 
diabetes. .	.	. [T]he prognosis for those with type 2 diabetes is much worse than for those 
with HIV. .	.	. For those with HIV, providing [sic] they take their medication, there are very 
few problems.”). 
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In fact, individuals already have access to antiretroviral therapy 
for prophylactic purposes today.429 On the other hand, HIV continues 
to represent a serious threat to public health in poverty-stricken 
regions of the 
 
 429. Gilead Sciences, Inc. markets “TRUVADA for PrEP® (preexposure prophylaxis) 
[as] a prescription medicine that can help reduce the risk of getting HIV-1 through sex, when 
taken every day and used together with safer sex practices.” TRUVADA, 
https://www.truvada.com/ [https://perma.cc/2ZX9-87RN]. 
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Figure 5. Structural Representation of the HIV-1 gp120 Viral 
Glycoprotein in Complex with a Human Chemokine Receptor CCR5 
Prior to Fusion of Viral and Target-Cell Membranes430  
 
 
  The figure illustrates the formation of the CCR5–gp120 
complex, which has been proposed as the most crucial 
 
 430. The structural model was built using the atomic coordinates deposited in the 
Protein Data Bank, accession code 6MEO. 6MEO, PROTEIN DATA BANK, 
https://www.rcsb.org/structure/6MEO [https://perma.cc/B8EV-3NYX]. The cell membrane 
in the figure was adapted from a figure provided by the WikiJournal of Medicine, Blausen 
Med., Passive Transport by Diffusion Across a Cell Membrane, WIKIJOURNAL MED., 
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/WikiJournal_of_Medicine/Medical_gallery_of_Blausen_Me
dical_2014#/media/File:Blausen_0213_CellularDiffusion.png [https://perma.cc/RC2X-FDJR], 
which is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International 
license, Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode [https://perma.cc/65BG-NRTQ]. 
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interaction that induces viral and target-cell membrane fusion.431 
The figure also illustrates subsequent HIV-1 viral entry into 
CD4+ cells—a type of white blood cell bearing surface CD4 
glycoproteins that are important for the function of the immune 
system. When the HIV-1 virion encounters CD4 glycoproteins 
on the cell surface (not shown), CD4 binds to a region of the 
gp120 viral protein (orange). The interaction induces 
conformational changes in a fragment of gp120 called the 
hypervariable region 3 (V3) loop (bright orange),432 which 
assumes a hook-like shape that docks inside the CCR5 (cyan and 
blue) coreceptor as shown in the figure. This crucial molecular 
“docking” of the gp120 viral protein to the human CCR5 
coreceptor allows the mature HIV-1 envelope spike—comprised 
of the gp120 protein (orange) and gp41 fusion peptides (not 
shown)—to undergo further conformational changes that bring 
the virion closer to the cell membrane, so that the viral and 
human cell membranes can fuse together. Upon membrane 
fusion, the virus gains entry into the cell, where it can then 
replicate.433 
 One important point for purposes of the discussion in this 
Article is that a small population of humans carries a mutant 
version of the CCR5 receptor,434 involving deletion of thirty-two 
base pairs in the CCR5 gene (CCR5D32). The CCR5 receptor 
encoded by this mutant gene generates a truncated and 
nonfunctional version of the protein that disrupts the manner in 
which the entire receptor folds and functions in cell membranes. 
The figure shows the residues (colored in red) that are deleted in 
the mutant protein. The CCR5 receptor consists of seven integral 
membrane  a-helices (four in cyan and three in dark blue) that 
are indispensable to maintain the structural integrity of the 
protein, including the shape of the receptor’s “pocket.” Deletion 
of the red residues disrupts  proper formation of all the dark blue 
a-helices (5–7), which results in a “pocketless” CCR5 that no 
longer works. This CCR5D32 mutation has been shown to 
mediate resistance to the HIV-1 virus in humans in part because 
 
 431. Md Munan Shaik et al., Structural Basis of Coreceptor Recognition by HIV-1 
Envelope Spike, 565 NATURE 318, 318 (2019). 
 432. Wei-Kung Wang et al., Hypervariable Region 3 Residues of HIV Type 1 gp120 
Involved in CCR5 Coreceptor Utilization: Therapeutic and Prophylactic Implications, 96 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4558, 4558 (1999). 
 433. For an overview of the mechanisms of HIV entry into human cells, see, for example, 
Craig B. Wilen, John C. Tilton & Robert W. Doms, HIV: Cell Binding and Entry, 2 COLD 
SPRING HARBOR PERSP. MED., no. a006866, Aug. 2012, at 1, 1–3, 5–6. 
 434. See supra note 425. 
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the gp120 protein cannot bind to the nonfunctional receptor. It 
is that particular CCR5-altering mutation that He Jiankui 
attempted to generate in the embryos that lead to the birth of the 
twin girls in China. But questions loom large as to whether the 
GGE performed in the embryos led to precise targeting of the 
CCR5 locus without off-target effects. 
world,435 which highlights the spatial and temporal challenges of 
defining a “serious disease or condition”436 that should be addressed 
via GGE interventions. 
The semantic problem of limiting GGE to serious diseases also lies 
beneath the analytical impetus for the recent Chinese GGE 
experiments. He Jiankui claimed that he edited the CCR5 gene in 
human embryos, which led to the birth of twins in China, in order to 
“show compassion” and help “people in need.”437 But, as pointed out 
earlier, there is a legitimate question about the compelling nature of 
He Jiankui’s experiments given the availability of alternate means to 
achieve the goal of helping an HIV-positive male conceive children 
without transmitting the HIV virus, such as the use of antiretroviral 
drug therapies or low-cost “semen washing” procedures commonly 
used to reduce HIV transmission in HIV-discordant couples.438 
Importantly, He Jiankui claimed that he is “against genome 
editing for enhancement” and that “he would conduct the experiment 
on his own unborn daughter if she were at risk with [sic] HIV 
infection.”439 But his experiments underscore the murkiness inherent 
in drawing clear distinctions between some prophylactic and 
enhancement GGE interventions. 
 
 435. See, e.g., Siobhan O’Grady, Every Day, 170 Young People Are Infected with HIV in 
West and Central Africa, and Many Can’t Afford Treatment, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-africa-aids-20180402-story.html [https://perma.cc/
V3HD-4CV2]. 
 436. NASEM REPORT, supra note 21, at 7. 
 437. See Gerry Shih & Carolyn Y. Johnson, Chinese Genomics Scientist Defends His 
Gene-Editing Research in First Public Appearance, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-genomics-scientist-defends-his-gene-editing-
research-in-first-public-appearance/2018/11/28/b99b5eba-f2e1-11e8-9240-e8028a62c722_story.
html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b1f843707a20 [https://perma.cc/YTS4-XJ54]. 
 438. See Maryam Zafer et al., Effectiveness of Semen Washing to Prevent Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Transmission and Assist Pregnancy in HIV-Discordant 
Couples: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 105 FERTILITY & STERILITY 645, 646 
(2016). 
 439. See Shih & Johnson, supra note 437. 
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Conferring natural immunity to the HIV virus by deleting a 
fragment of the CCR5 receptor may, at first glance, appear to fit 
squarely within the confines of prophylactic intervention under 
Category 2 experiments because the manipulation is meant to prevent 
HIV infection upon a future exposure event. However, the CCR5 
receptor has recently been implicated in diverse functional roles not 
related to HIV protection, including cognitive function,440 enhanced 
recovery following stroke,441 and increased susceptibility to the West 
Nile virus.442 Accordingly, He Jiankui’s experiments may very well 
have unintended consequences for the twin girls born from his 
experiment. Because the biological and physiological functions of the 
CCR5 receptor are not yet fully elucidated, the CCR5 gene is not a 
prudent target at this point in time, and He Jiankui could theoretically 
bear responsibility for latent harms brought on by his genetic 
manipulation443—at least in jurisdictions willing to recognize such 
causes of action. The same principle applies to other potential targets 
of prophylactic GGE intervention in polygenic diseases for which 
genetic mechanisms and molecular pathways are not completely 
understood, such as obesity, cancer, and diabetes, among others. 
The takeaway point is that prophylactic intervention ought to 
apply only to instances where the desired results match the intended 
purpose. Safety and efficacy must be clearly established, through 
empirical scientific evidence, for any molecular targets of GGE.444 And 
until researchers understand the molecular basis underlying many 
 
 440. Miou Zhou et al., CCR5 Is a Suppressor for Cortical Plasticity and Hippocampal 
Learning and Memory, 5 ELIFE, no. e20985, Dec. 20, 2016, at 1, 2 (reporting a previously 
unknown role for CCR5 in cognitive function). 
 441. Mary T. Joy et al., CCR5 Is a Therapeutic Target for Recovery After Stroke and 
Traumatic Brain Injury, 176 CELL 1143, 1143 (2019) (reporting findings that CCR5 
inhibition or knockdown in mice and CCR5 loss of function in humans induce enhanced 
recovery of neurological impairments, motor control, and cognitive function after stroke 
and traumatic brain injury). 
 442. See, e.g., William G. Glass et al., CCR5 Deficiency Increases Risk of Symptomatic 
West Nile Virus Infection, 203 J. EXPERIMENTAL MED. 35, 35 (2006) (“We conclude that 
CCR5 mediates resistance to symptomatic WNV infection.”). 
 443. See Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 161 (2017) 
(advocating reproductive negligence as a cause of action in cases where reproductive 
professionals engage in negligent acts). 
 444. This is not to say that researchers must know everything there is to know about a 
gene, or DNA target, before certain GGE interventions are allowed to proceed. Such a 
standard would be impracticable and could stunt scientific progress that seeks to address 
the evils of human disease and suffering. As with any medical intervention, the decision to 
perform GGE would involve many factors, including an assessment of the benefits and risks 
to the child and family. 
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human diseases and conditions—which will take a substantial amount 
of time—a robust link cannot exist between intended purpose and 
actual result in any GGE intervention. Therefore, under a 
jurisprudence of scientific empiricism, the constitutionally sanctioned 
assumption that parents can make decisions in the best interests of the 
child is inapplicable to Category 2 GGE interventions.445 
In sum, many GGE applications that fall within the sphere of 
Category 2 are likely to involve polygenic, as opposed to monogenic, 
conditions. As a result, the technology is unlikely to be ready for 
clinical use anytime soon. Thus, premature laws and regulations 
concerning the sanction or prohibition of GGE prophylactic 
interventions should be avoided. 
C. Category 3—Cosmetic or Enhancement Purposes 
The third category of GGE applications relates to interventions 
for cosmetic or enhancement purposes. Interventions under this 
category might involve genetic modifications associated with traits 
such as height, musculature, hair color, intellectual ability, and athletic 
ability, among others. 
The issue here is similar to that in Category 2: Parents may have a 
constitutional right to bear healthy children, but do they have a 
constitutional right to bear children with brown hair and green eyes? 
The scope and authority of state intervention under Category 3 GGE 
uses may be stronger than those in Category 2. But this is not to say 
that all cosmetic or enhancement GGE applications should be 
prohibited. After all, parents can lawfully submit their children to 
cosmetic procedures—e.g., rhinoplasty, polydactyly reconstructive 
surgery, among others—without violating the Constitution.446 
 
 445. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (noting that “the traditional 
presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child should apply” absent 
evidence of neglect or abuse). 
 446. One notable distinction here is that parents who subject their children to some types 
of cosmetic surgeries will—depending on the child’s age at the time of the procedure—
receive input from the child as to whether to go forward with said surgery, even when the 
parents are the ultimate decisionmakers. In contrast, parents who perform GGE on their 
embryos are purportedly the sole and final arbiters. This distinction, in a way, strengthens 
the legal basis for therapeutic GGE under Parham and Yoder when compared to cosmetic 
or enhancement GGE interventions. Parental autonomy in matters of child rearing, which 
includes the decision to subject a child to cosmetic reconstructive surgery, is fairly broad 
even if “not agreeable to the child.” See id. at 603. An individual likely could grow up 
wishing her parents did not choose green eyes or a broad nose for her, but she is unlikely to 
grow up and decide that she would prefer her parents did nothing to correct a deleterious 
mutation that would lead to life-threatening disease. Implied consent is almost embedded 
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Assuming that GGE procedures for cosmetic or enhancement 
purposes could be performed safely and effectively at the molecular 
level, the issue then becomes whether or not such procedures should 
be treated differently merely because they are done at an embryonic 
stage. 
Consider traits associated with obesity, smaller breast size, or 
baldness. Today, individuals may elect to undergo surgical 
procedures—such as gastric bypass surgery, abdominoplasty (tummy 
tuck), breast augmentation, or hair transplantation—to alter their 
physical appearance and improve self-image. If an individual carries 
certain alleles that predispose her to developing any of those traits—
which are at least partly heritable447—and wishes to perform GGE to 
reduce the likelihood of passing those alleles to her offspring, should 
the law be concerned with such types of GGE interventions? Assuming 
that safety and efficacy are not part of the equation, reasonable people 
may disagree about the answer to that question depending on a 
multitude of factors, including financial, egalitarian, ethical, and moral 
considerations. 
In any event, as laid out in Section III.B, time currently favors the 
creation of a rational and robust legal approach to GGE concerning 
Categories 2 and 3. Because not all prophylactic, cosmetic, and 
enhancement concerns for GGE uses are scientifically based and their 
development is not technologically feasible at this time448—and 
perhaps may not be even in the near future—premature laws and 
 
in a decision to perform therapeutic GGE intervention. Thus, the doctrine of parental 
autonomy and the presumption that parents generally “act in their child’s best interest” 
collectively strengthen the rationale for therapeutic GGE in cases where scientific evidence 
exists to establish the safety and efficacy of the desired genetic modification. See id. at 602–
03.  
 447. See, e.g., Nicola Pirastu et al., GWAS for Male-Pattern Baldness Identifies 71 
Susceptibility Loci Explaining 38% of the Risk, 8 NATURE COMM., no. 1584, Nov. 17, 2017, 
at 1, 7 (reporting data that suggests baldness is among the most heritable complex traits); 
Tracey D. Wade, Gu Zhu & Nicholas G. Martin, Body Mass Index and Breast Size in 
Women: Same or Different Genes?, 13 TWIN RES. & HUM. GENETICS 450, 450 (2010) 
(finding breast size is moderately heritable). 
 448. See, e.g., Enríquez, supra note 2, at 679–85 (providing a detailed outline of the 
current state of empirical scientific knowledge vis-à-vis the molecular and genetic basis of 
human intelligence and cognition to highlight the inherent complexity of polygenic traits 
and contrast it to widespread public misperceptions about genetic associations in trait 
formation and development); see also Hana Lango Allen et al., Hundreds of Variants 
Clustered in Genomic Loci and Biological Pathways Affect Human Height, 467 NATURE 
832, 832 (2010) (reporting the existence of at least 180 genetic variants that influence height 
in humans). 
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regulations concerning the authorization or prohibition of Category 3 
GGE interventions should also be avoided. 
D. Category 4—Discrimination Already Prohibited by the Law  
The last category of GGE applications concerns the potential 
modification of traits that raise concerns of discrimination already 
prohibited by the law. Like many of the traits that fall under Categories 
2 and 3 of the proposed framework, Category 4 traits are unlikely to be 
within the realm of clinical possibility in the near future.449 
Nevertheless, a special history of discrimination—against race, gender, 
sexual orientation, specific disabilities,450 etc.451—counsels against 
sanctioning modifications of the genetic composition of germ cells 
related to these traits, regardless of whether or not it ever becomes 
possible to alter them. Because these traits create a likelihood of 
discrimination against specific groups, there is little to no constitutional 
justification to pursue GGE interventions in this realm. 
Clear lines should be drawn to make Category 4 GGE uses 
unpalatable to perform in the clinical setting. And the Supreme Court’s 
equal protection and due process jurisprudence can serve as a robust 
guide that justifies prohibition of GGE interventions intended to 
modify traits that raise concerns of discrimination.452 
 
 449. See supra Sections III.B–C. 
 450. Current legislation and jurisprudence interpreting the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 might be used to inform what qualifies as a disability that ought to be shielded 
from GGE interventions. See 42 U.S.C. §§	12101–12102 (2012). 
 451. Although some of these traits cannot currently be engineered, they are routinely 
selected for or against using modern reproductive technologies without violating any laws. 
For instance, couples have been free to select the gender of embryos through IVF and PGD 
for decades. The same is true for parents who are deaf or have achondroplasia and other 
forms of dwarfism. Sexual orientation, on the other hand, is not a trait that can be screened 
for because a definitive genetic basis for it—if one even exists—has not been established. 
Regarding race, humans have selected and continue to select for this trait in offspring 
indirectly by choosing a mate who fits particular preferences. 
Selection of all these traits using IVF and PGD is drastically different from 
modification of the same traits via GGE technologies. The former merely selects an already 
existing embryo that naturally features all the desired traits, whereas the latter would 
involve genetic engineering to modify nucleotides in an embryo’s genome with the intent 
that such manipulation would give rise to desired phenotypic characteristics. Genetic 
engineering of such complex polygenic traits is unlikely to be possible at this point in time, 
not merely because the technology is not yet capable of producing the intended result but 
simply because we do not know enough about the genetic basis underlying most of these 
traits. 
 452. The Supreme Court has at times invoked due process and equal protection 
principles to strike down precedents and laws that targeted some minorities and 
disadvantaged groups. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding 
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Figure 6. Four-Category Taxonomy for Select GGE Applications 
 
As examined in this Article, therapeutic (Category 1) GGE 
interventions (yellow) are likely protected under the 
 
the constitutionality of a statute that criminalized sexual activity among homosexual 
individuals), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 
U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a state statute that prohibited women from being licensed 
as bartenders unless their father or husband owned the establishment), overruled by Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that required “equal but separate accommodations 
for the white, and colored races”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
Likewise, the Constitution has been amended to remedy institutional discrimination 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in the past. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
393, 452–54 (1857) (holding that persons of African descent could never lawfully become 
U.S. citizens), superseded by constitutional amendments, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; id. 
amend. XIV. Thus, the evolution of laws and jurisprudence aimed at protecting minorities 
from invidious government discrimination throughout U.S. history could serve as a guide to 
inform law and policymakers on the suitability of select uses of GGE that raise concerns of 
discrimination.  
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Constitution and, thus, would be the most accessible to parents 
if GGE safety and efficacy are established. Governmental 
interference aimed at restricting access to these types of GGE 
interventions would need to pass the strict scrutiny test. At the 
top of the spectrum are potential GGE interventions that raise 
concerns of discrimination that is already prohibited by the law 
(Category 4) (red), which are almost certainly not protected as a 
fundamental right. Governmental action aimed at restricting 
Category 4 GGE interventions would merely need to pass a 
rational basis test. Thus, Category 4 GGE interventions could 
easily be restricted by the government. The figure shows select 
examples of each category and highlights the murkiness inherent 
in drawing clear distinctions between some prophylactic 
(Category 2) and cosmetic/enhancement (Category 3) GGE 
interventions, as in the case of obesity. 
Consider the issue of race, which is inextricably linked to 
eugenics.453 Due to the sensitive history of racial discrimination and 
systemic racial inequalities in the United States—as well as abroad—it 
would be unwise to allow parents to edit genetic sequences associated 
with changing an embryo’s race—even if it were ever technologically 
feasible to do so. This principle would apply to cases in which parents 
of a majority group wish to bear offspring of a racial minority group 
and vice-versa.454 Government restrictions on these types of GGE 
interventions would almost certainly pass rational basis review because 
a legitimate government interest likely exists in avoiding the 
institutionalization of race-conscious reproductive policies that could 
lead to discrimination against select discrete and insular groups. Simply 
put, it is hard conceive any constitutional justification to endorse the 
use of GGE interventions to edit an embryo’s race. 
Under the same reasoning, the Constitution would likewise not 
permit parents to use GGE methods to “edit out” a preexisting 
disability in a zygote or embryo, particularly because alternative means 
 
 453. See, e.g., Marius Turda, Race, Science, and Eugenics in the Twentieth Century, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF EUGENICS 62, 62–63 (Alison Bashford & 
Philippa Levine eds., 2010) (discussing the relationship between race and eugenics). 
 454. Suppose that, in order to save their offspring from what some may consider social 
“disabilities” rooted in racial inequality and injustice, see generally Kimani Paul-Emile, 
Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293 (2018) (arguing it may be appropriate to think 
of being black as disabling in the United States), some minority parents choose to bear 
offspring with features that resemble a racial majority group. Government endorsement of 
such GGE purposes could lead to pervasive abuses and discriminatory practices that go far 
beyond the limits of a putative fundamental right to perform GGE articulated earlier in this 
Article. 
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currently exist—e.g., abortion and PGD—to achieve the ultimate 
result of not having disabled offspring. Although some might argue 
that removing a disability from an embryo’s genome has a therapeutic 
purpose, the history of discrimination against particular disabilities 
embedded in our culture cautions against that proposition. The 
analysis would change, however, if both parents bear genes that all but 
guarantee their offspring will be born with a disability. Under that 
scenario the parents lack alternative means to achieve their goal of 
bearing a child without a disability and, thus, could challenge GGE 
prohibitions under a strict scrutiny standard. 
By the same token, parents should not be allowed to “edit in” 
disabilities into their embryos. Although members of specific groups 
with disabilities may sometimes wish to procreate and bear a child who 
shares their disability—e.g., blindness, deafness, etc.—society ought 
not endorse bestowing a disability upon human embryos. And the law 
ought not be used for such purposes either. Under this scenario, the 
disabled parents would also have alternative means to select, screen, or 
discard embryos bearing desirable traits. 
In sum, our equal protection and due process jurisprudence 
supports drawing a line that prohibits individuals to either edit in or 
edit out traits associated with discrimination already prohibited by the 
law.455 Government restrictions on the use of GGE for Category 4 
purposes—assuming they will ever become technologically feasible to 
perform—should be examined under a rational basis standard of 
review, which only require the government to articulate a legitimate 
purpose. The proposed framework under Category 4 aims to take 
eugenics out of the GGE equation. In so doing, it reduces the 
likelihood that eugenics and “designer babies” will pollute 
decisionmaking in the GGE context, which would ultimately promote 
fruitful dialogue and debate about the benefits and risks of availing 
humanity of the use of technologies for genome editing.456 
CONCLUSION 
The advent of genome editing has made it possible for scientists 
to genetically modify the human germline in ways that were previously 
unimaginable. Each passing day, researchers continue to develop and 
 
 455. Cf. Ossareh, supra note 38, at 766 (“[T]here may be strong ethical motivations to 
limit certain types of modifications. However, in most cases, there is no principled legal 
reason to ban or restrict access to genetic modification .	 .	 .	 .”). In contrast, this Article 
demonstrates that existing jurisprudence can guide the conception of limits on a putative 
right to GGE interventions. 
 456. See Enríquez, supra note 2, at 613, 694. 
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refine the tools that are steadily inching humankind closer and closer 
to unlocking the powers of GGE, which will undoubtedly define the 
course human history. Today’s technological improvements aimed at 
establishing the safety and efficacy of genome editing will usher in 
tomorrow’s era of translational genome editing. 
Despite the accrual of steady scientific advances, however, 
significant questions loom on the horizon concerning how 
interventions aimed at GGE should be treated under the law. News 
about the birth of the first gene-edited babies in China in November 
2018 underscored the urgency with which the world needs to address 
the issue of germline interventions. The experiments performed to edit 
human embryos intended for implantation in a woman’s uterus were 
“irresponsible and failed to conform with international norms.”457 
David Baltimore, the committee chair for the Second International 
Summit on Human Genome Editing, decried the “failure of self-
regulation in the scientific community.”458 Admittedly, scientists have 
failed to preempt premature use of the technology despite 
international efforts to build principles of governance for human 
genome editing. Unfortunately, the shortcomings of self-regulation are 
not limited to a particular field of science and technology.459 
Within a cloud of uncertainty surrounding GGE, this Article 
marks a step toward bringing clarity to an emerging area of the law. In 
so doing, it examines the legality of GGE from administrative and 
constitutional law perspectives. The Article argues that the FDA is well 
positioned to regulate germline clinical interventions and proposed a 
new regulatory paradigm stemming from the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in 
United States v. Regenerative Sciences, LLC, which held that specific 
stem cell mixtures can be regulated as drugs or biological products 
within the meaning of the FDCA and the PHSA. Accordingly, 
 
 457. Statement, Org. Comm. of the Second Int’l Summit on Human Genome Editing, 
On Human Genome Editing II (Nov. 29, 2018), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/
onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11282018b [https://perma.cc/VC3G-YE95]. 
 458. See Shih & Johnson, supra note 437. 
 459. See Davide Castelvecchi, Interview, AI Pioneer: ‘The Dangers of Abuse Are Very 
Real’, NATURE (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00505-2?utm_
source=Nature+Briefing&utm_campaign=ffc684d4ec-briefing-dy-20190405&utm_medium=
email&utm_term=0_c9dfd39373-ffc684d4ec-43359693 [https://perma.cc/FE9H-59FH] 
(interviewing “Yoshua Bengio, winner of the prestigious Turing award for his work on deep 
learning,” who expressed the following: “Self-regulation [in artificial intelligence] is not 
going to work. Do you think that voluntary taxation works? It doesn’t.”); Nina Jankowicz, 
It’s Time to Start Regulating Facebook, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/11/15/its-time-to-start-
regulating-facebook/?utm_term=.9bf5b6aaaa50 [https://perma.cc/PE6G-ZU36] (arguing 
that self-regulation in the social media sphere has failed). 
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legislative bans on GGE technologies are unnecessary and create more 
social costs than benefits. 
The current temporary ban on clinical applications of GGE is 
likely unconstitutional because it infringes on a cognizable 
fundamental right to perform select uses of GGE under equal 
protection and substantive due process principles related to 
procreation, parental autonomy, and—to some extent—privacy rights. 
Such a fundamental right, however, is not without limits and the Article 
proposed a normative framework that considers various potential uses 
of GGE that are likely to materialize once safety and efficacy of the 
technology are established. 
The time to create a legal blueprint for the future of GGE has 
come. This Article seeks to ignite a scholarly dialogue among lawyers 
and scientists and, more importantly, contribute to increasing public 
education and engagement of issues raised by scientific advances in 
GGE.460 Robust and substantive discussions among lawyers, scientists, 
policymakers, and the public are more important than ever in this 
watershed era of GGE. 
 
 460. See Enríquez, supra note 2, at 694; Paul Enríquez, Correspondence, GM-Food 
Regulations: Engage the Public, 548 NATURE 31, 31 (2017). 
